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合同能源管理中的合作机制研究

发布时间:2018-03-14 05:03

  本文选题:合同能源管理 切入点:节能服务公司 出处:《中国科学技术大学》2014年硕士论文 论文类型:学位论文


【摘要】:能源是社会经济发展的命脉,节约能源更是促进社会经济可持续发展最重要也是最有效的手段之一。现如今,能源问题(能源短缺、能源浪费)在很大程度上制约着我国社会经济的发展,而合同能源管理机制正是解决这一问题的有效办法。 本文研究分析了合同能源管理实施过程中的两个难点问题,即客户与能源服务公司之间的合同设计以及客户对于能源服务公司的选择机制。目的在于分别找到一种合作机制和选择机制来协调客户和节能服务公司之间的决策,从而使双方实现合作共赢。 在客户与能源服务公司一对一的情况下,我们引入了利润共享的代销合同来研究分析双方的合作问题。在该合同下,节能服务公司决定提供的节能量以及单位节能量的投入成本,客户则设定合同的参数,包括投入成本和节能收益的分摊比例。在提出的模型中,我们假设非合作情况下客户和节能服务公司进行斯坦伯格博弈,客户是主导者,节能服务公司是跟随者。通过证明我们可以发现,非合作的情况下,双方的决策不能够使得合同能源管理的整个过程达到最大效益。利用纳什讨价还价模型,我们得出了一种合作机制,以此来协调双.方的决策,从而最优化整体利润,达到合作共赢的效果。最后,通过数例分析,我们考察了一些参数对于最优决策的影响,在此基础上为客户选择节能服务公司提出了一定的建议。 在客户与能源服务公司一对多的情况下,我们基于多属性逆向拍卖模型研究了客户对于节能服务公司的选择问题,节能服务公司的投标集由三个属性决定,即节能量、项目完成期以及节能收益共享比例。本文以政府作为节能服务需求方,通过政府和多个节能服务公司间的非合作博弈,推导出各节能服务公司的最优投标策略;在此基础上,提出一种适用于政府挑选合作节能服务公司的选择机制,这种机制回避了节能收益分配的谈判,限制了节能服务公司间的恶意竞争,从而提高了整个合同能源管理过程的运作效率。最后,以某地方政府对全市范围内办公机构大楼的中央空调系统进行节能改造为例,分析验证了上述拍卖机制的有效性,并指出在利用逆向拍卖的方式选择合作的节能服务公司之前,政府应该设定一些资格标准以限定参与投标的节能服务公司的数目。 本文通过研究合同能源管理过程中的合作共赢问题,促进了客户和节能服务公司双方的合作,从而有利于合同能源管理的进一步发展推广。然而,本文提出的模型建立在很多假设的基础之上,这在一定程度上没能很好的表现实际情况,这就需要未来的研究做进一步的深入探讨。
[Abstract]:Energy is the lifeblood of social and economic development. Energy conservation is one of the most important and effective means to promote the sustainable development of social economy. Energy waste to a large extent restricts the development of social economy in China, and the contract energy management mechanism is an effective way to solve this problem. This paper studies and analyzes two difficult problems in the implementation of contract energy management. That is, the contract design between the customer and the energy service company and the customer's choice mechanism for the energy service company. The aim is to find a cooperation mechanism and a selection mechanism to coordinate the decision between the customer and the energy-saving service company. So that the two sides to achieve win-win cooperation. In the case of a one-to-one relationship between customers and energy services companies, we have introduced a profit-sharing contract to study and analyze the issue of cooperation between the two parties. Energy-efficient service companies decide to provide energy saving and unit energy saving input costs, while customers set contract parameters, including the share of input costs and energy efficiency benefits. We assume that in a non-cooperative situation, the customer and the energy-saving service company play the Steinberg game, the customer is the leader, the energy-saving service company is the follower. The decision-making of both sides can not make the whole process of contract energy management achieve the maximum benefit. Using Nash bargaining model, we have come up with a cooperative mechanism to coordinate the decisions of the two parties, thereby optimizing the overall profits. Finally, through the analysis of several examples, we investigate the influence of some parameters on the optimal decision, and put forward some suggestions for the customer to choose the energy-saving service company. In the case of one-to-many customer and energy service company, we study the customer's choice of energy-saving service company based on multi-attribute reverse auction model. The bidding set of energy-saving service company is determined by three attributes, that is, energy saving. This paper takes the government as the demand side of energy-saving services, through the non-cooperative game between the government and several energy-saving service companies, deduces the optimal bidding strategy of each energy-saving service company. This paper proposes a selection mechanism suitable for the government to select cooperative energy-saving service companies, which avoids negotiations on the distribution of energy efficiency benefits and limits malicious competition among energy-saving service companies. Thus, the efficiency of the whole contract energy management process is improved. Finally, taking a local government for example, the energy-saving transformation of the central air conditioning system of office buildings in the whole city is taken as an example, and the effectiveness of the auction mechanism mentioned above is analyzed and verified. It is also pointed out that before selecting cooperative energy-saving service companies by reverse auction, the government should set some qualification criteria to limit the number of energy-saving service companies participating in bidding. By studying the win-win cooperation in the process of contract energy management, this paper promotes the cooperation between customers and energy-saving service companies, which is beneficial to the further development and promotion of contract energy management. The model proposed in this paper is based on many hypotheses, which to a certain extent can not well represent the actual situation, which needs to be further studied in the future.
【学位授予单位】:中国科学技术大学
【学位级别】:硕士
【学位授予年份】:2014
【分类号】:F274;F426.2

【参考文献】

相关期刊论文 前1条

1 吴继兰;李培亮;;基于供应链绩效的网上逆向拍卖模型[J];管理科学;2007年06期



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