乳制品双渠道供应链协调机制研究

发布时间：2018-05-04 05:51

本文选题：乳制品 + 双渠道供应链　；参考：《北京交通大学》2014年硕士论文

【摘要】：随着电子商务的迅猛发展,以及国外乳制品产品在国内的迅速崛起,乳制品企业的竞争越发激烈,竞争的形式也从企业间的竞争升级为供应链间的竞争。乳制品企业为了扩大市场,提高竞争能力,纷纷构建网络直销渠道。但是,网络直销渠道的建立,不可避免地会与传统零售渠道争夺客户,产生渠道冲突。乳制品生产企业既作为零售商的供应商,同时又是双渠道利益分享的参与者。这种合作竞争的关系,使生产企业尤其关注双渠道供应链中的渠道冲突问题,因为双渠道供应链的协调程度,是决定企业产品能否取得成功的至关重要的因素。鉴于此,本文以乳制品双渠道供应链为研究对象,综合运用优化理论、契约理论,以及非合作博弈理论和方法,在传统零售渠道与网络直销并存的双渠道供应链中,研究了如何设计契约以实现供应链协调,并保证渠道成员共赢,从而提升双渠道供应链的整体竞争实力。首先,在梳理了乳制品供应链基本流程的基础上,分别对传统零售渠道中“生产企业—批发商—零售商—消费者”、“生产企业—分公司—零售商—消费者”和“生产企业—直营店—消费者”的三种结构模式,以及网络直销渠道中网络旗舰店和虚拟零售商的两种结构模式进行分析；同时,分别从生产企业、消费者角度对传统零售渠道和网络直销渠道的特征、优势进行对比分析。其次,归纳了分离渠道模式、混合渠道模式、虚实结合模式和一体化模式四种类型双渠道供应链的特征及适用范围,并结合实例论述了目前乳制品生产企业所采用的双渠道供应链模式。分析了双渠道供应链存在的渠道冲突类型,以及产生渠道冲突的主要因素。最后,讨论了协调双渠道供应链冲突的价格策略、产品策略和渠道策略。针对乳制品混合渠道模式的特点,建立了以生产商为主导的Stackelberg博弈模型。证明了混合渠道模式中,独立决策达到的均衡价格并不能使供应链系统的整体利润最优,存在帕累托改进机会；提出了通过利益共享契约,可以使生产商与零售商的利润得到提高,供应链的整体利润达到最优,并通过实证分析表明利益共享契约能使混合渠道模式的双渠道供应链达到协调。同时针对乳制品分离渠道模式的特点,建立生产商、零售商与电子商务运营商三方参与的两阶段Bertrand博弈模型,证明了独立决策的均衡价格是子博弈精炼纳什均衡；通过设计定价契约,生产商参与供应链整体收益的决策,不仅能提高供应链各方的利润,同时供应链的系统整体利润也达到最优,并运用算例验证了所设计的契约。
[Abstract]:With the rapid development of electronic commerce and the rapid rise of foreign dairy products in China, the competition of dairy enterprises becomes more and more fierce, and the form of competition is upgraded from competition among enterprises to competition between supply chains. In order to expand the market and improve the competitive ability, dairy enterprises have constructed the network direct selling channel. However, the establishment of network direct marketing channels will inevitably compete with traditional retail channels for customers, resulting in channel conflicts. Dairy producers are not only suppliers of retailers, but also participants in double-channel profit sharing. The relationship of cooperation and competition makes manufacturing enterprises pay special attention to the channel conflict in double channel supply chain, because the coordination degree of double channel supply chain is the crucial factor to determine the success of enterprise's products. In view of this, this article takes the dairy double-channel supply chain as the research object, synthetically uses the optimization theory, the contract theory, as well as the non-cooperative game theory and the method, in the traditional retail channel and the network direct sale coexists in the double-channel supply chain. This paper studies how to design the contract to realize the coordination of supply chain and ensure the win-win situation of the channel members so as to enhance the overall competitive strength of the two-channel supply chain. First of all, on the basis of combing the basic process of dairy supply chain, respectively, the traditional retail channels of "production enterprises-wholesalers-retailers-consumers", The three structural models of "production-branch, retailer, consumer" and "production-direct-store-consumer", as well as the two structural models of network flagship store and virtual retailer in the network direct marketing channel, are analyzed. The characteristics and advantages of traditional retail channels and network direct marketing channels are compared and analyzed from the point of view of production enterprises and consumers. Secondly, it summarizes the characteristics and application scope of four types of double-channel supply chain: separated channel model, mixed channel model, virtual reality combination model and integration mode. Combined with an example, this paper discusses the two-channel supply chain mode adopted by dairy production enterprises at present. This paper analyzes the types of channel conflicts in dual channel supply chain and the main factors that cause channel conflicts. Finally, the price strategy, product strategy and channel strategy are discussed. According to the characteristics of the mixed channel model of dairy products, the Stackelberg game model is established, which is dominated by producers. It is proved that the equilibrium price achieved by independent decision in the mixed channel mode can not make the overall profit of the supply chain system optimal and there is Pareto improvement opportunity. It can improve the profit of manufacturer and retailer and optimize the overall profit of supply chain. The empirical analysis shows that the contract of benefit sharing can make the two-channel supply chain of mixed channel achieve coordination. At the same time, according to the characteristics of dairy product separation channel mode, a two-stage Bertrand game model is established, in which producers, retailers and e-commerce operators participate in the two-stage Bertrand game model, which proves that the independent decision equilibrium price is subgame refined Nash equilibrium. By designing the pricing contract, the manufacturer can participate in the decision-making of the whole profit of the supply chain, which can not only improve the profit of all the parties in the supply chain, but also achieve the optimal overall profit of the supply chain. The designed contract is verified by an example.
【学位授予单位】：北京交通大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：F274;F426.82;F224.32

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