政府主导下闭环供应链的奖惩机制模型研究

发布时间：2018-05-16 06:54

本文选题：政府主导 + 责任分担　；参考：《中国矿业大学》2014年硕士论文

【摘要】：全国多个地区雾霾天气频发，激起了人们对于自然环境污染日益严重的激烈讨论，工业生产污染和重金属污染是导致这一现象的重要原因之一，而废旧电器电子产品的污染占据了其重要位置；近年来，，关于废弃电器电子产品的回收与再制造问题受到了政府部门、环保主义者等的密切关注，因此优化和调整我国现有不规范的废旧电器电子产品回收再制造的方法与途径的问题亟待解决。由此，研究的重点由传统的正向供应链演变为逆向供应链或闭环供应链，政府成为了闭环供应链的主导者，协调和发展闭环供应链的关键，其主导权决定了闭环供应链中其他成员的决策结果以及参与回收制造商的积极性。本文运用运筹学、博弈论、最优化等理论和方法等对奖惩机制下制造商主导或政府主导的废弃电器电子产品闭环供应链的决策进行了研究。依据市场中制造商的个数，分别以价格决策和产量决策构建模型。本文建立了制造商主导和政府主导闭环供应链时制造商双寡头竞争模型、政府主导闭环供应链时有无责任分担的n个制造商竞争模型，其中政府主导双寡头竞争的模型考虑了环境效益型、企业收益型和全社会利益型三种政府收益函数组成方式。通过对4个模型的求解和比较分析得到如下结论：奖惩机制能够有效的提高闭环供应链的回收率和其成员的收益值；在价格、回收率和收益值方面，政府主导闭环供应链的形式优于制造商主导闭环供应链的形式，全社会利益型政府收益函数的组成形式优于环境效益型和企业收益型；责任分担系数和市场中同质制造商的个数对于政府是否实施制造商和零售商共同承担奖惩值具有决定性的影响；奖惩机制对于市场主导者的制造商、零售商和第三方回收商具有保护性，而对于市场追随者的制造商的保护则是具有条件性的。
[Abstract]:The frequent occurrence of haze weather in many regions of the country has aroused a heated discussion on the increasingly serious pollution of the natural environment. Industrial production pollution and heavy metal pollution are one of the important reasons leading to this phenomenon. The pollution of waste electrical and electronic products occupies an important position. In recent years, the issue of recycling and remanufacturing of waste electrical and electronic products has received close attention from government departments, environmentalists, etc. Therefore, the problem of how to optimize and adjust the methods and approaches of recycling and remanufacturing of non-standard waste electrical and electronic products in our country is urgently needed to be solved. Therefore, the focus of the research has changed from the traditional forward supply chain to the reverse supply chain or closed-loop supply chain, and the government has become the leader of the closed-loop supply chain, and the key to coordinate and develop the closed-loop supply chain is to coordinate and develop the closed-loop supply chain. Its leading power determines the decision result of other members in the closed-loop supply chain and the enthusiasm of participating in the recycling manufacturer. Based on the theories and methods of operational research, game theory and optimization, this paper studies the decision of closed-loop supply chain of waste electrical and electronic products under the mechanism of reward and punishment. According to the number of manufacturers in the market, the model is constructed by price decision and output decision respectively. In this paper, a manufacturer duopoly competition model is established when the manufacturer leads the closed-loop supply chain and the government leads the closed-loop supply chain. When the government leads the closed-loop supply chain, there are n manufacturers' competition models with or without responsibility sharing. The model of government-led duopoly competition includes three kinds of government revenue function: environmental benefit model, enterprise income model and whole society benefit model. The conclusions are as follows: the mechanism of reward and punishment can effectively improve the recovery rate of the closed-loop supply chain and the income value of its members, in terms of price, recovery rate and income value, the mechanism of reward and punishment can effectively improve the recovery rate of the closed-loop supply chain and the income value of its members. The form of government-led closed-loop supply chain is better than that of manufacturer dominated closed-loop supply chain, and the composition of the whole social benefit government income function is superior to that of environmental benefit and enterprise income. The coefficient of responsibility sharing and the number of homogeneous manufacturers in the market have a decisive effect on whether the government implements the joint payment of rewards and penalties between the manufacturer and the retailer, and the mechanism of rewards and penalties for the manufacturers of the market leader. Retailers and third-party recyclers are protected, while manufacturers of market followers are protected conditionally.
【学位授予单位】：中国矿业大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：F426.6;F713.2;F224

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