高管股权激励水平对上市公司业绩推动作用的实证分析

发布时间：2017-12-31 21:14

本文关键词：高管股权激励水平对上市公司业绩推动作用的实证分析　出处：《西南财经大学》2014年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：近几年来,股权激励是国内理论界与实务界共同关注的焦点,股权激励渐渐被众多企业认可,纷纷制定了适合企业自身需求的股权激励方案。国外学者对于股权激励效果的结论是比较统一的,基本认可股权激励可以推动企业业绩的提升。但国内学者对这方面的研究存在较大分歧,实际中也并非管理层持股就一定能改善企业绩效。本文基于这样的研究背景,试图通过规范性分析和实证分析相结合的方式,探寻上市公司高管的股权激励到底能否推动公司业绩提升,哪种企业更适合实施股权激励。本文的研究主要基于利益趋同假说、掘壕自守假说、风险回避假说。利益趋同假说认为,股权激励使得股东与管理者的目标函数趋于一致有助于降低代理成本,从而改善企业业绩。而掘壕自守假说与风险回避假说的主要观点是,管理层持股会对企业业绩有非正面的影响,因此是否存在适度股权激励持股比例能够实现股东与管理者的利益最大化也是本文需要回答的问题。基于此,本文通过对2009年1月至2012年12月的我国A股上市公司进行实证分析,综合运用主成分分析法、面板回归对样本数据进行处理。采用主成分分析对公司业绩进行测度,试图得到一个全面合理的上市公司经营绩效。运用高管股权激励比例作为自变量,引入控制变量,使用较为科学的面板数据进行模型估计。采用Hansen (1999)所提出的方法,以股权激励水平为门槛变量构建门槛面板回归模型,验证了高管股权激励水平与企业的经营业绩是否存在区间效应。研究发现,股权激励与公司绩效显著正相关。本文进一步验证了成长性不同的企业中高管持股对于公司业绩的影响存在差异,在成长性机会较高的企业中股权激励的治理效应优于成长性一般的企业。同时,本文进一步分析了股权激励是否存在区间效应。结果显示,股权激励的确存在区间效应,持股比例处在[7.5400%,10.2070%]的区间中最有利于提高公司业绩。没有使用多数学者常用的以净资产收益率等单一利润指标来衡量上市公司业绩的做法,本文将十个财务指标进行主成分分析后得到的综合得分作为公司绩效的替代变量,使用较为科学的面板数据进行模型估计,并且采用门槛回归这一较为先进的计量经济学的方法,对股权激励进行实证分析后得到的结论的可信度和实用性相对较高。研究还存在如下不足之处：首先,本研究没有考虑我国上市公司由于内外部环境的不断变化对股权激励和经营业绩的影响。此外,股权激励在我国还未普及,可以得到的样本量较小,可能会导致研究结果与实际结果存在一定的偏差。
[Abstract]:In recent years, equity incentive is the common focus of domestic theoretical and practical circles, equity incentive is gradually recognized by many enterprises. One after another has formulated the stock right incentive plan suitable for the enterprise own demand. The foreign scholar regarding the stock right incentive effect conclusion is quite unified. The basic recognition of equity incentive can promote the improvement of enterprise performance, but domestic scholars have different research on this aspect, and in practice, it is not the management ownership that can improve the enterprise performance. Based on this research background, this paper attempts to explore whether the equity incentive of listed company executives can promote corporate performance through the combination of normative analysis and empirical analysis. The research in this paper is mainly based on the interest convergence hypothesis, trench self-defense hypothesis, risk avoidance hypothesis and interest convergence hypothesis. Equity incentive makes the objective function of shareholders and managers tend to converge to reduce agency cost and improve the performance of enterprises. However, the main viewpoints of trench self-defense hypothesis and risk avoidance hypothesis are. Management ownership will have a negative impact on corporate performance, so whether there is a moderate proportion of equity incentive shareholding can maximize the interests of shareholders and managers is also a question to be answered in this paper. Based on this, this paper through the January 2009 to December 2012 of China's A-share listed companies empirical analysis, comprehensive use of principal component analysis. Panel regression is used to process the sample data. Principal component analysis (PCA) is used to measure the performance of a listed company to obtain a comprehensive and reasonable operating performance. The executive equity incentive ratio is used as an independent variable. Introducing control variables, using more scientific panel data for model estimation. Using the method proposed by Hansen 1999, the threshold panel regression model is constructed with equity incentive level as threshold variable. It verifies whether there is an interval effect between the level of executive equity incentive and the business performance. It is found that equity incentive has a significant positive correlation with corporate performance. This paper further verifies that there are differences in the influence of high management ownership on corporate performance in enterprises with different growth. The governance effect of equity incentive is better than that of common growth enterprise in the higher growth opportunity. At the same time, this paper further analyzes whether there exists interval effect in equity incentive. The result shows that. There is indeed an interval effect in equity incentive, and the shareholding ratio is at [The 7.5400 / 10.2070% range is best for improving the company's performance. It is not used to measure the performance of listed companies by single profit index such as return on net assets, which is commonly used by most scholars. In this paper, the comprehensive scores obtained from the principal component analysis of ten financial indicators are taken as the substitute variables of corporate performance, and the more scientific panel data are used to estimate the model. And the threshold regression, a more advanced econometrics method, the empirical analysis of equity incentive conclusions are relatively high credibility and practicability. The research also has the following shortcomings: first. This study does not take into account the impact of the changing internal and external environment on equity incentives and operating performance of listed companies in China. In addition, equity incentives in China has not yet been popularized, and the sample size can be obtained. It may lead to some deviation between the research results and the actual results.
【学位授予单位】：西南财经大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：F832.51;F272.92;F275

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