努力不足、过度冒险与金融高管薪酬激励

发布时间：2018-01-01 01:14

本文关键词：努力不足、过度冒险与金融高管薪酬激励　出处：《经济学(季刊)》2012年04期 　论文类型：期刊论文

【摘要】：次贷危机后人们普遍将金融高管薪酬激励不当视为引起危机的重要原因之一,并提出了相应的薪酬改革原则和方案,那么如何理解金融高管薪酬激励的特点及这些改革举措呢?本文依据金融中介的基本职能(通过收集信息和积极监督进行资产组合投资)和(投机性)金融资产的泡沫特性,认为金融高管的薪酬激励需要同时考虑诱导努力和风险控制,当面临经理可以同时控制努力水平和资产选择的双重道德风险时,由于资产选择对努力的替代效应,线性激励会导致无关性结果即激励强度与努力水平无关,造成努力不足,而投机性资产的泡沫性进一步强化了这种效应,并诱发经理的过度冒险行为,即使存在良好治理的董事会时也是如此。各种薪酬改革措施和监管政策讨论需要同时解决努力不足和过度冒险这两个基本问题。
[Abstract]:After the subprime crisis, people generally will be one of the important reasons for the financial incentive not to be regarded as caused by the crisis, and puts forward the principle and scheme of compensation reform accordingly, so how to understand the characteristics of financial incentive and these reforms? Based on the basic functions of financial intermediaries (by collecting information and actively supervise the portfolio investment (speculative)) and bubble characteristics of financial assets, financial executive compensation incentive should be considered at the same time by effort and risk control, when faced with the manager can control the double moral hazard effort level and asset selection, the choice of asset substitution effect to the linear incentive will lead to the independence of the incentive intensity has nothing to do with the level of effort, resulting in insufficient effort, and the bubble of speculative assets to further strengthen this effect, and induce the manager's excessive Even when there are good governance boards, risk taking behavior is also the case. Various pay reform measures and regulatory policy discussions need to solve two basic problems: insufficient efforts and excessive risk.

【作者单位】：西南财经大学中国金融研究中心;
【基金】：国家社会科学基金青年项目“金融高管薪酬设计与金融风险防范”(10CJY072) 西南财经大学“985”创新平台 “211工程”项目资助
【分类号】：F272.92;F832.3;F224
【正文快照】： 一、引言始于2007年的次贷危机引起主要发达国家金融市场的崩溃,大量金融机构面临倒闭的威胁,导致全球经济陷入衰退。究其根源,各国政府和绝大多数研究者(Stiglitz,2009;Bernanke,2009;Blinder,2009)都认为金融高管薪酬激励不当是导致危机发生的主要原因之一1。自20世纪80年

【参考文献】