其他综合收益与上市公司高管薪酬相关性的实证研究

发布时间：2018-01-02 20:23

本文关键词：其他综合收益与上市公司高管薪酬相关性的实证研究　出处：《山东大学》2014年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：2009年6月,财政部颁布了《企业会计准则解释第3号》,要求上市公司在财务报告的列报内容和披露方式方面应做出适当的调整,提出上市公司应该在利润表中增加对“其他综合收益”和“综合收益”项目的披露,还要求在会计附注中对其他综合收益相关明细进行披露。这是利润表改革历程中具有里程碑意义的事件,也标志着我国的收益观由收入费用观向资产负债观的巨大转变。依据《企业会计准则解释第3号》文件,其将其他综合收益界定为之前计入资本公积的公允价值变动部分。因此,其他综合收益的大小很大程度上取决于管理层对金融资产的分类以及对于买卖时间的决策判断。所以说,其变动与高管的努力程度有着密切的关系,必然影响高管薪酬的制定。而高管薪酬契约作为目前解决委托人和代理人之间代理问题的主要方式,对于投资者而言,完善的薪酬契约机制可以有效地衡量高管的努力程度；另一方面,对于管理者而言,薪酬契约可以提高高管的工作积极性,从而实现高管个人目标和组织目标的共同实现。过去学者的研究表明,企业的绩效水平一直是企业股东对公司代理人建立相关薪酬机制的基础。而随着综合收益和其他综合收益指标的披露,其他综合收益是否会对高管薪酬机制的建立产生影响?基于此,本文将尝试从薪酬机制的角度考察其他综合收益的实施后果,希望能为高管薪酬契约的设计提供一些数据参考。本文以我国2009年—2012年有其他综合收益发生的沪、深A股上市公司为研究样本,考察其他综合收益与高管薪酬的相关性,并按照其他综合收益的正负性分组进行检验,以分析其正向和负向变动对高管薪酬的影响是否存在差异。通过概念辨析,理论分析、研究五个假设：1.其他综合收益与高管薪酬之间存在正相关关系。2.其他综合收益与高管薪酬的相关系数应低于真实盈余与高管薪酬的相关系数。3.其他综合收益的正向变动与高管薪酬的变化显著正相关性。4.其他综合收益的负向变动与高管薪酬的变化没有显著相关性。5.其他综合收益与高管薪酬的相关性具有逐年增长的趋势。建立了实证模型,并得以下主要研究结论：(1)其他综合收益的引入提高了高管薪酬契约设计的有效性,消除了“功能锁定”现象。(2)对计入资本公积的公允价值变动的利得与损失,没有存在“重奖轻罚”的问题,说明从其他综合收益角度出发,我国薪酬制定制度正在逐步完善。(3)我国高管薪酬的设计需进一步完善,对于其他综合收益信息要理性对待。基于此,提出以下对策建议：进一步优化高管薪酬契约机制,加强上市公司信息披露；加强公司治理结构建设,完善公司内部环境；完善政府和中介部门的外部监督职能建设,从而最大程度的保障投资者的知情权。
[Abstract]:In June 2009, the Ministry of Finance issued the "Enterprise Accounting Standards interpretation No. 3", requiring listed companies to make appropriate adjustments in the presentation and disclosure of financial reports. It is suggested that listed companies should increase the disclosure of "other comprehensive income" and "comprehensive income" items in the income statement. It also requires disclosure of other consolidated income related details in the accounting notes, which is a landmark event in the reform process of the income statement. It also marks a great change from income view to asset liability view in China. According to the Enterprise Accounting Standards interpretation No. 3 document. It defines other composite income as the portion of fair value changes previously recorded in the capital reserve. The size of other composite returns depends largely on management's classification of financial assets and decision-making judgment on trading time. So its changes are closely related to the level of effort by executives. It will inevitably affect the formulation of executive compensation. The executive compensation contract is the main way to solve the agency problem between the principal and the agent. For investors, the perfect compensation contract mechanism can effectively measure the efforts of senior executives. On the other hand, for managers, the compensation contract can improve the working enthusiasm of executives, thus achieve the joint realization of personal goals and organizational goals. The performance level of the enterprise is always the basis of the shareholders to establish the relevant compensation mechanism for the company agent. But with the disclosure of the comprehensive income and other comprehensive income indicators. Will other comprehensive returns have an impact on the establishment of executive compensation mechanisms? Based on this, this paper will try to investigate the implementation consequences of other comprehensive income from the perspective of compensation mechanism, hoping to provide some data reference for the design of executive compensation contract. This paper takes the Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies with other comprehensive returns from 2009 to 2012 as the research samples to investigate the correlation between other comprehensive returns and executive compensation. And according to the positive and negative groups of other comprehensive returns to test to analyze whether there are differences between the positive and negative changes of executive compensation. Through the concept of discrimination, theoretical analysis. Study five hypotheses:. 1. There is a positive correlation between other comprehensive returns and executive compensation. 2. The correlation coefficient between other comprehensive returns and executive compensation should be lower than that between real earnings and executive compensation .3.The positive correlation of other comprehensive returns should be lower than that of real earnings and executive compensation. There is no significant correlation between the negative change of other comprehensive income and the change of executive compensation. 5. The correlation between other comprehensive income and executive compensation is increasing year by year. Trend. Established empirical model. And get the following main research conclusion: 1) the introduction of other comprehensive income improves the effectiveness of executive compensation contract design. Eliminating the phenomenon of "function locking". 2) the gains and losses of the fair value of the capital reserves are not subject to the problem of "heavy rewards and light penalties", which shows that the gains and losses of the changes in fair value included in the capital reserves are from the angle of other comprehensive income. China's salary system is gradually improving. 3) the design of executive compensation in China needs to be further improved, for other comprehensive income information should be treated rationally. Based on this. Put forward the following countermeasures and suggestions: further optimize the executive compensation contract mechanism, strengthen the information disclosure of listed companies; Strengthen the construction of corporate governance structure, improve the internal environment of the company; Improve the external supervision function of the government and the intermediary sector, so as to protect the investor's right to know to the greatest extent.
【学位授予单位】：山东大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：F832.51;F272.92

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