机构投资者异质性与企业投资效率的关系研究

发布时间：2018-01-06 00:01

本文关键词：机构投资者异质性与企业投资效率的关系研究　出处：《华南理工大学》2014年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：投资活动是企业财务管理的核心，是企业价值创造的直接动因，高效的投资政策能使企业获得更高的利润，创造更多的价值。然而由于委托代理问题和信息不对称问题，我国上市公司中普遍存在过度投资或投资不足的非效率投资现象。如何有效抑制非效率投资成为学术界和实务界长期关注的重要议题。西方成熟资本市场中，机构投资者是股票市场中最重要的参与者，并开始实现向积极股东的转变，在改善公司治理结构、抑制非效率投资等方面的作用日益凸显。而随着我国经济的发展，机构投资者也逐渐成为我国证券市场中的重要力量，其对股票市场影响也越来越大，其也经历着由消极主义向积极主义转变的过渡期。但不同的机构投资者之间存在诸多重要差异，其特征和性质影响着其参与上市公司治理的能力和意愿，从而可能导致其对公司投资决策有不同的影响。研究在过渡期机构投资者是否积极参与了公司以及机构投资者异质性与投资效率的关系是具有理论和现实意义的。本文从机理分析和实证检验两方面研究机构投资者对企业投资效率的影响。在实证方面以2011年—2012年A股制造业企业为研究对象，从两个维度对机构投资者进行分类，分别进行实证检验，研究结果表明：机构投资者整体持股比例和企业投资效率显著正相关；压力抵制型和压力敏感型机构投资者持股比例与企业投资效率均显著正相关；潜在的积极机构投资者的并没有履行积极股东角色，不是真正意义上的积极机构投资者，而是消极地采取“用脚投票”的投资策略，并没有积极参与到公司治理中，起到抑制非效率投资的作用。综上所述，机构投资者持股比例与企业投资效率的显著正相关关系只是机构投资者选择质地较好的上市公司的结果。针对以上的结论，本文提出了促进机构投资者向积极股东转变的几点建议：一是强化市场基础性建设，为机构投资者队伍持续发展壮大创造有利的环境。二是推动各类机构投资者协调发展，，进一步增强专业投资机构稳定市场的作用。三是加强对机构投资者的监督力度，并完善专业机构的自身治理机制。
[Abstract]:Investment activity is the core of enterprise financial management and the direct cause of enterprise value creation. Efficient investment policy can make enterprises obtain higher profits. Create more value. However, due to the principal-agent problem and information asymmetry problem. The phenomenon of over-investment or under-investment is common in listed companies in China. How to effectively restrain the inefficient investment has become an important issue in the academic and practical circles for a long time. Western mature capital markets. Institutional investors are the most important participants in the stock market and begin to realize the transition to active shareholders in improving the corporate governance structure. With the development of China's economy, institutional investors have gradually become an important force in China's securities market, which has a growing impact on the stock market. However, there are many important differences between different institutional investors, whose characteristics and nature affect their ability and willingness to participate in the governance of listed companies. This may lead to different impacts on the investment decision of the company. It is of theoretical and practical significance to study whether institutional investors actively participate in the company and the relationship between heterogeneity of institutional investors and investment efficiency in the transitional period. . This paper studies the impact of institutional investors on the investment efficiency of enterprises from two aspects: mechanism analysis and empirical test. In the empirical aspect, A share manufacturing enterprises from 2011 to 2012 are taken as the object of study. This paper classifies institutional investors from two dimensions and makes empirical tests respectively. The results show that: the overall shareholding ratio of institutional investors is significantly positively correlated with the investment efficiency of enterprises; The proportion of stock holding of pressure-resistant and pressure-sensitive institutional investors is significantly positively correlated with the investment efficiency of enterprises. The potential active institutional investors do not fulfill the role of active shareholders, not the real positive institutional investors, but passively adopt the "vote with the foot" investment strategy. And did not actively participate in corporate governance, play a role in restraining inefficient investment. To sum up. The significant positive correlation between the shareholding ratio of institutional investors and the investment efficiency of enterprises is only the result of institutional investors choosing better listed companies. In view of the above conclusions, this paper puts forward several suggestions to promote the transformation of institutional investors to active shareholders: first, to strengthen the basic construction of the market. We will create a favorable environment for the sustained development and growth of the contingent of institutional investors. Second, we will promote the coordinated development of all types of institutional investors. Third, we should strengthen the supervision of institutional investors and improve their own governance mechanism.
【学位授予单位】：华南理工大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：F406.72;F425;F832.51

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