基于控制权私有收益的大股东控制对公司IPO行为的影响研究

发布时间：2018-01-07 17:36

本文关键词：基于控制权私有收益的大股东控制对公司IPO行为的影响研究　出处：《哈尔滨工业大学》2014年博士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：首次公开发行新股上市（IPO）是公司的重大战略决策之一，IPO不仅会影响公司的资本结构和规模，而且对于公司治理也会产生深远影响。随着我国多层次资本市场体系建设的不断完善，越来越多的企业通过IPO进入资本市场进行融资，然而公司选择IPO进行融资的影响因素有哪些，，公司IPO相关决策的机理是什么？大股东控制在我国IPO公司中普遍存在，股权集中条件下大股东具有侵占中小股东利益获取控制权私有收益的强烈动机，而大股东或者实际控制人对公司IPO具有重要影响，因此，本文基于大股东控制权私有收益的理论，研究了大股东控制对公司IPO决策、IPO定价和IPO抑价的影响机理。从公司治理的角度揭示了影响我国资本市场公司IPO行为的内在因素。大股东通常是公司IPO的决策主体。公司IPO一方面使得原有大股东的控制权和所有权结构将会产生变化，大股东的控制权和现金流权进一步偏离，大股东攫取控制权私有收益的动机增加。另一方面，会使得大股东面临外部投资者和市场的监督产生变化，外部大股东（如机构股东）的加入和市场的监督有利于公司价值的提高，但又限制了大股东控制权私有收益的获取。因此，大股东控制下的IPO决策需要在公司价值最大化和控制权私有收益的最大化之间进行权衡。本文基于大股东控制权私有收益和外部监督角度构建了大股东控制下公司IPO决策的模型，系统分析了影响公司IPO决策的影响因素，并通过阿里巴巴集团IPO的相关案例分析验证了模型研究提出的相关结论。研究认为企业选择IPO而不进行私募融资的意愿和融资规模、私募股权融资的边际成本及大股东利益侵占效率正相关，与公司最大价值、上市成本负相关。发行定价决策是公司IPO中最核心的问题，在我国现行的IPO询价制度下，新股发行价格反映了资本市场投资者对公司投资价值的判断，如果IPO公司存在股权集中和大股东控制现象，那么外部投资者在对IPO新股定价时就会关注公司存在大股东控制的治理风险，并在新股价格中做出反应。因此，本文在理论模型分析的基础上，通过实证研究的方法发现IPO公司披露的大股东控制股权结构特征对IPO定价能够起到信号传递效应。投资者在新股估值时能够一定程度关注IPO公司大股东控制的治理风险并作出合理的判断。另外，IPO定价会直接影响IPO抑价水平，现有的研究主要基于信息不对称理论来解释IPO抑价现象，但现实中我国公司IPO一直存在“三高”现象，与传统的信息不对称理论对IPO抑价的解释并不一致。本文构建了大股东控制影响IPO抑价的理论模型，并选取我国中小板IPO的公司样本实证研究发现，控制权和现金流权偏离程度越大，IPO公司大股东通过降低IPO定价维持公司控制权的动机减弱，而是倾向于提高公司的IPO定价，一方面，可以补偿外部投资者对新股的定价折扣的成本，另一方面可以高额募集资金，为上市后控制权私有收益的攫取创造条件。研究还发现IPO公司的私募股权资本不能起到对IPO公司控股股东的监督和公司投资价值的认证作用，会减弱终极控股股东控制权和现金流权偏离程度对于公司IPO抑价水平的负向影响。本文的研究丰富和完善了IPO决策和定价的相关理论，同时结合我国证券市场的实际情况，对IPO抑价现象提出了新的观点，本文的研究结论可以为广大企业在IPO的股权结构设计、定价、治理结构的优化等方面提供决策依据，也可以帮助投资者对IPO公司股票进行合理的估值，为证券监管部门加强IPO市场监管和相关政策的制定及调整提供决策参考。
[Abstract]:IPO shares of listed company (IPO) is one of the major strategic decisions, IPO will not only affect the company's capital structure and scale, but also for corporate governance will have a profound impact. With the construction of China's multi-level capital market system more perfect, more and more enterprises through the IPO to enter the capital market for financing, but the company IPO what are the influence factors of financing, what is the mechanism of IPO related decisions? Generally exists in our IPO company in the control of large shareholders, ownership concentration under the condition of large shareholders expropriate small shareholders have strong motivation to obtain private benefits of control, and the major shareholder or actual controller of the company IPO has an important influence therefore, in this paper, the private benefits of control of large shareholders based on the theory of the control of the IPO decision of the major shareholder of the company, IPO IPO pricing and underpricing of the influence from the mechanism. The angle of corporate governance, reveals the intrinsic factors influencing the IPO behavior of China's capital market of the company.
Large shareholders are usually IPO decision-making body. The one hand makes the IPO company will control and ownership structure of the original large shareholders change of control rights and cash flow rights of large shareholders further deviate from the big shareholders to grab private benefits of control motivation increased. On the other hand, will make the big shareholders face outside investors and supervision the changes of the external market, large shareholders (such as institutional shareholders) accession and market supervision is conducive to enhance the value of the company, but has limited access to major shareholders of private benefits of control. Therefore, the decision of IPO under the control of large shareholders need to be weighed in firm value between the maximum and the private benefits of control. This paper constructs the controlling shareholder IPO company's decision model of major shareholders of private benefits and external supervision system based on angle control, we analyze the effects of IPO decision influence for In conclusion, and proposed model is verified by case analysis of Alibaba IPO group. The results showed that the selection of IPO without the intention of private financing and financing scale, the marginal cost of private equity financing and the expropriation of large shareholder is positively related to the efficiency of the company, and the maximum value of listed cost is negative.
Pricing decision is the core of the company in IPO, in the current IPO inquiry system, the IPO price reflects the capital market investors determine the investment value of the company, if IPO company ownership concentration and control of major shareholders, then the external investors in the presence of a large shareholder governance risk of new shares will be IPO the pricing of the company, and to respond in the IPO price. Therefore, the analysis based on the theoretical model, through empirical research methods that IPO the major shareholder of the company disclosure control characteristics of ownership structure on IPO pricing can play a signaling effect. Investors can in the valuation of shares when the controlling shareholder of the company concerned IPO the governance risk and make a reasonable judgment.
In addition, IPO pricing will directly affect the level of IPO underpricing, the existing research is mainly based on the asymmetric information theory to explain the phenomenon of IPO underpricing, but China's real IPO has "three high" phenomenon, which is not consistent with the underpricing the traditional asymmetric information theory explanation of IPO. This paper constructs the impact of large shareholder control theory model IPO underpricing, empirical research sample and select companies in China's SME board IPO, control right and cash flow right deviation degree, IPO the major shareholder of the company by reducing IPO pricing to maintain control of the company's motivation, but tend to improve the IPO pricing, the company on the one hand, can compensate for outside investors the IPO pricing discount cost, on the other hand can be high to raise funds, to create conditions for seizing private gains after the listing. The study also found that private equity capital of IPO company can not play on The role of the investment value of the controlling shareholder of IPO certification company and supervision company, will weaken the ultimate controlling shareholders' control rights and cash flow rights deviation for the company's IPO underpricing level negative impact.
This research enriches and perfects the theory of IPO decision and pricing, and combining with the actual situation of China's securities market, puts forward new ideas on the phenomenon of IPO underpricing, the conclusion of this paper can provide the enterprise pricing in equity structure design, IPO, provide the basis for decision making management structure optimization, also can help investors make reasonable valuation of IPO shares, to provide a reference for the securities regulatory departments to strengthen the formulation and adjustment of IPO market supervision and related policies.

【学位授予单位】：哈尔滨工业大学
【学位级别】：博士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：F275;F832.51

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