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上市银行公司治理对现金股利政策的影响研究

发布时间:2018-01-09 22:21

  本文关键词:上市银行公司治理对现金股利政策的影响研究 出处:《四川师范大学》2014年硕士论文 论文类型:学位论文


  更多相关文章: 上市银行 公司治理 现金股利政策 代理理论 结果模型


【摘要】:作为公司财务决策的核心内容之一,现金股利政策关系到公司的股东等多方主体的直接利益,因此受到极大的关注。公司出于什么动机发放现金股利,,发放金额的多少以及这种发放行为的持续性均是焦点所在。而要找到现金股利分配行为的源头,就需要探究究竟是什么原因引致公司的股利发放行为。从不同角度作为切入点对现金股利发放行为展开研究会得出不同的结论。近年来,现金股利的代理理论得到了学界较大的认可。代理问题是公司治理的根本,由此可以看出,公司治理对于现金股利政策也具有解释力。 商业银行由于承担国内资金融通的重要中介功能,是我国的命脉产业,具有其独有的行业特殊性,不论是受到的监管还是自身的经营管理,相对其他行业而言都有诸多不同之处。在我国证券市场进行股权分置改革的过程中,上市银行为了进一步提高自身的治理水平,在很多方面作出了改革,其治理情况有了较大的改变,现金股利分配也逐渐转变,因此,有必要研究上市银行公司治理对其现金股利政策的影响形成对这方面理论的补充。 为了探求商业银行这个特殊行业其公司治理对现金股利政策产生的影响,本文首先从理论方面梳理公司治理、现金股利政策两个领域的已有研究成果,然后介绍我国16家上市商业银行的公司治理以及现金股利发放的现状并加以归纳,再以实证分析的方法探究这些研究对象公司治理对现金股利政策的作用。 实证结果显示:第一大股东持股比例与银行现金股利分配力度正相关,即股权集中度越高,现金股利分配越多;第二大股东持股比例越大,现金股利分配越多。即具有一定话语权的第二大股东的存在可以对第一大股东的自利行为形成有力制衡,促使分配更多的现金股利;董事会规模越大,独立董事人数越多,会促使银行发放更多的现金股利。实证检验结果支持了LLSV提出的股利代理的结果模型假说。
[Abstract]:As one of the core contents of the company's financial decision, the cash dividend policy is related to the direct interests of the company's shareholders and other parties, so it has received great attention. The amount of payment and the sustainability of this behavior are the focus. And to find the source of cash dividend distribution behavior. Need to explore exactly what causes the company's dividend behavior. From different perspectives as a starting point to conduct a study of the behavior of cash dividend payment will come to different conclusions in recent years. The agency theory of cash dividend has been widely accepted by academic circles. Agency problem is the fundamental of corporate governance, and it can be seen that corporate governance also has an explanatory power for cash dividend policy. Commercial banks are the lifeblood industry of our country because of their important intermediary function of domestic capital financing, which has its own industry particularity, whether by supervision or its own management. Compared with other industries, there are many differences. In the process of equity reform in China's securities market, listed banks in order to further improve their own governance level, in many aspects of the reform. Its governance has changed greatly, and the distribution of cash dividend has gradually changed. Therefore, it is necessary to study the influence of listed bank corporate governance on its cash dividend policy to form a supplement to this theory. In order to explore the impact of corporate governance on cash dividend policy in the special industry of commercial banks, this paper firstly reviews the existing research results in two fields: corporate governance and cash dividend policy. Then it introduces the current situation of corporate governance and cash dividend distribution of 16 listed commercial banks in China, and then explores the effect of corporate governance on cash dividend policy by empirical analysis. The empirical results show that the proportion of the first largest shareholder is positively related to the distribution of cash dividend, that is, the higher the degree of equity concentration, the more the distribution of cash dividend; The larger the shareholding ratio of the second largest shareholder, the more the distribution of cash dividend, that is, the existence of the second largest shareholder with a certain right of speech can form a powerful balance on the self-interest behavior of the first largest shareholder and promote the distribution of more cash dividends; The larger the board size, the larger the number of independent directors, which will encourage banks to pay more cash dividends. The empirical results support the hypothesis of dividend agency model proposed by LLSV.
【学位授予单位】:四川师范大学
【学位级别】:硕士
【学位授予年份】:2014
【分类号】:F832.33;F271;F830.42

【参考文献】

相关期刊论文 前1条

1 曹国华;蒋丹璐;林川;;商业银行治理与现金股利政策——来自中国上市银行的经验证据[J];金融论坛;2012年12期

相关博士学位论文 前1条

1 姜宝军;中国上市商业银行公司治理机制研究[D];西北农林科技大学;2009年



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