竞争、偏好与信贷契约治理效率——基于比较制度实验的研究

发布时间：2018-01-13 10:36

本文关键词：竞争、偏好与信贷契约治理效率——基于比较制度实验的研究　出处：《中南财经政法大学学报》2012年01期 　论文类型：期刊论文

【摘要】：偏好机制作为规制道德风险行为的基础制度安排,受到了信贷契约所处竞争态势的影响,两者共同决定了信贷契约的治理效率。本文采用比较制度实验方法,研究了对称市场、买方竞争和卖方竞争三种信贷市场中偏好机制的治理效率,对比分析了三种竞争状态下的市场绩效和收益分布,研究结果表明:买方竞争强化了偏好机制的治理效能,卖方竞争削弱了偏好机制的治理效能;信贷契约治理效率随时间逐渐降低,对称市场的签约比率下降最快,卖方竞争市场的守约比率下降最快;买方竞争市场的平均绩效最高,卖方竞争市场的最低;买方竞争市场的投资者占有了较大比例的交易剩余;卖方竞争市场的企业家占有了较大比例的交易剩余。
[Abstract]:As the basic institutional arrangement to regulate moral hazard behavior, preference mechanism is influenced by the competitive situation of credit contract, and both of them jointly determine the governance efficiency of credit contract. This paper studies the governance efficiency of preference mechanism in three credit markets: symmetric market, buyer's competition and seller's competition, and analyzes the market performance and income distribution under the three competitive states. The results show that the buyer competition strengthens the governance effectiveness of the preference mechanism, while the seller competition weakens the governance effectiveness of the preference mechanism. The efficiency of credit contract governance decreases gradually with time, the signing ratio of symmetrical market decreases fastest, and the contract keeping ratio of seller competitive market decreases fastest. The average performance of buyer's competitive market is the highest, and the seller's is the lowest. The buyer competes with the market investors to occupy a large proportion of the transaction surplus; The seller competes the market entrepreneur to occupy the large proportion of the transaction surplus.
【作者单位】：南开大学公司治理研究中心;
【基金】：国家社会科学基金重大招标课题“完善国有控股金融机构公司治理研究”(10ZD&035) 国家自然科学基金项目“社会偏好、激励层次与和谐劳动契约的设计及治理”(70972086) 教育部人文社科重点研究基地重大项目“经济治理、二元治理结构与转型期企业行为”(10JJD630002)
【分类号】：F832.4;F272;F224
【正文快照】： 一、引言在我国转轨经济背景下,制度的缺失和法律的不完善导致了投资者利益在企业经营过程中无法得到有效保障。针对信贷签约、项目选择和收益分配中的道德风险问题,理论文献设计并研究了各种正式的缓解制度,这些制度设计大多以行为人偏好稳定、信息完全等严格条件为假定前提

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