我国上市公司高管更换与企业绩效关系实证研究

发布时间：2018-01-15 19:00

本文关键词：我国上市公司高管更换与企业绩效关系实证研究　出处：《长沙理工大学》2014年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：伴随着竞争的日趋激烈、全球化进程步伐的加快以及公司治理理论与实践的日益完善,上市公司高管人员变更的比例也在不断提高。在我国,随着股份制改革的深入开展,国有控股型企业开始登上我国证券市场舞台,并占据了我国证券市场的多数席位,由于我国证券市场发展的不成熟,国有控股企业存在着诸如委托代理链条过长、最终所有者缺位、公司治理机制尚不科学等问题。而对于公开上市的非国有企业,多数则以家族企业形式存在。面对着不同于西方证券市场的发展路径,我国上市公司的经营发展必然也就带有了浓厚的中国特色。那么,在我国上市公司中,高管人员的更换对上市公司企业绩效的影响如何?上市公司企业绩效的下降是否造成了公司高管的变更?国有上市公司高管变更对企业绩效的影响相比民营企业高管变更对企业绩效的影响的敏感度如何?这些都将是需要关注的焦点。本文通过对国泰安数据库、巨潮资讯网、中国上市公司资讯网等权威信息发布机构披露数据进行整理,最后选定375家发生非正常变更上市公司作为最终样本,从影响高管变更的原因和高管变更后对企业绩效影响两个角度进行逻辑回归,最终得到了如下结论：低劣的企业绩效是导致高管变更的重要原因之一,而从其他导致高管变更的原因来看,年龄因素对于总经理变更反向作用明显,即随着总经理年龄越大,其发生变更的可能性变小。而年龄对于董事长而言,作用并不明显。董事长任期与非正常更换负相关,而总经理任期与更换呈正相关。从国有企业与非国有企业比较结果来看,非国有企业高管非正常变更较国有企业作用更为显著,且企业绩效对董事长和总经理变更的影响截然相反。在考虑到高管变更对企业绩效的作用时,可以发现高管变更对于企业绩效的影响作用十分有限。基于理论上的分析和实证检验的结果,可以发现我国上市公司在公司治理方面还存在着诸多缺陷,本文从改革和完善高管人员任免机制、加强内外部监督机制和加快经理人市场建设等方面提出了相关的政策建议。
[Abstract]:With the increasingly fierce competition, the acceleration of the pace of globalization and the improvement of corporate governance theory and practice, the proportion of executives in listed companies is also increasing. With the further development of shareholding system reform, state-owned holding enterprises began to step onto the stage of our country's securities market, and occupied most of the seats of our country's securities market, because of the immature development of our country's securities market. State-owned holding enterprises have problems such as long chain of principal-agent, absence of ultimate owners, unscientific corporate governance mechanism, and so on. Most of them exist in the form of family enterprises. Facing the development path different from the western stock market, the management and development of the listed companies in our country must have strong Chinese characteristics. Then, in the listed companies of our country. How does the turnover of executives affect the performance of listed companies? Does the decline in the performance of listed companies cause the change of executives? What is the sensitivity of the change of the senior executives of the state-owned listed companies to the performance of the enterprises compared with the change of the senior executives of the private enterprises? These will be the focus of attention. This paper through the Cathay Pacific database, Giant Tide Information Network, China listed companies Information Network and other authoritative information publishing organizations to organize the disclosure of data. Finally, 375 listed companies with abnormal changes are selected as the final sample, from the perspective of the reasons that affect the change of executives and the impact on corporate performance after the change of executives, the logical regression is carried out. Finally we get the following conclusion: poor corporate performance is one of the important reasons leading to the change of executives, and from the other reasons leading to the change of executives, the age factor has an obvious reverse effect on the change of general manager. That is, with the age of the general manager, the possibility of change becomes smaller. Age is not obvious to the chairman. The term of office of the chairman is negatively correlated with abnormal replacement. The term of the general manager is positively correlated with the change. From the comparison between state-owned enterprises and non-state-owned enterprises, the abnormal change of senior executives of non-state-owned enterprises is more significant than that of state-owned enterprises. And the effect of corporate performance on the change of chairman and general manager is opposite. When considering the role of executive change on corporate performance. It can be found that the effect of executive change on corporate performance is very limited. Based on the results of theoretical analysis and empirical test, we can find that there are still many defects in corporate governance of listed companies in China. This paper puts forward some relevant policy suggestions from the aspects of reforming and perfecting the mechanism of appointment and removal of senior managers, strengthening the internal and external supervision mechanism and speeding up the construction of the manager's market.
【学位授予单位】：长沙理工大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：F272.5;F272.91;F832.51

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