我国股份制商业银行高管薪酬激励问题研究

发布时间：2018-01-18 11:41

本文关键词：我国股份制商业银行高管薪酬激励问题研究　出处：《重庆理工大学》2014年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：财政部于2009年初下发了关于限定金融业高管薪酬的指引——《金融类国有及国有控股企业负责人薪酬管理办法》，文中提出金融机构要将280万定为高管薪酬的“涨停板”，由此可见，以银行为主的金融业高管薪酬已经引起了国家的重视。有鉴于此，我们应深入研究商业银行高管人员的薪酬激励机制，制定出符合我国银行业现状的薪酬激励制度，使薪酬制度既能将银行高管薪酬与银行绩效相联系，又能使高管薪酬激励机制切实促进银行业的长足发展。在现阶段对银行高管薪酬制度的研究不仅有利于增强银行的核心竞争力、完善银行的薪酬治理结构，同时也能推进银行业管理效率与水平。本文选择对上市股份制商业银行高管薪酬进行研究，其目的在于：相对于大型国有独资银行而言，股份制商业银行组建时间不长，人员配备，特别是高级管理人才需求较大；而另一方面,由于股份制商业银具有无历史包袱、经营机制较灵活、经营效益相对较好和因规模小便于优化管理的优势，使得股份制商业银行高管薪酬较高，薪酬问题一直备受社会关注，并存在很大争议，因此值得我们去深入研究。本文先阐述了薪酬激励机制的理论基础，，分析当前国内外在高管薪酬激励机制运行中的特点；其次，以研究股份制商业银行的高管薪酬激励制度为出发点，选取8家已上市的股份制商业银行，通过数据的收集和整合，将股份制商业银行高管薪酬水平放在整个行业间进行对比，同时分析银行高管与普通员工的薪酬差距，从而得出股份制商业银行高管薪酬水平过高的问题。另外，通过近三年出具的高管薪酬数据，与银行资产收益率、不良贷款率、利润总额等财务指标进行对比，得出股份制商业银行高管薪酬水平与业绩关联度不明显。再次，收集了股份制商业银行高管在银行中的持股数和占股比例，得出银行高管目前还是以发放现金形式的短期薪酬激励为主，缺乏长期薪酬激励。因此本论文针对上述问题分析，提出了相应的建议与对策，以期对股份制银行薪酬激励制度的建设、完善，提供一定参考。
[Abstract]:In early 2009, the Ministry of Finance issued a guideline on limiting the executive compensation of the financial sector-"measures for the Management of the compensation of the Heads of State-Owned and State-owned holding Enterprises in Finance". This paper proposes that financial institutions should set 2.8 million as the "stop board" of executive compensation, so it can be seen that the bank-oriented financial industry executives' compensation has attracted the attention of the state. We should deeply study the compensation incentive mechanism of senior executives in commercial banks, and formulate a compensation incentive system in line with the present situation of our banking industry, so that the compensation system can not only link the compensation of bank executives with bank performance. At the present stage, the study on the executive compensation system is not only conducive to strengthening the core competitiveness of banks, and improve the governance structure of bank compensation. At the same time can also promote the efficiency and level of banking management. This paper chooses to study the executive compensation of listed joint-stock commercial banks, the purpose of which is: compared with the large state-owned banks, joint-stock commercial banks do not have a long time to set up and staffing. In particular, the demand for senior management personnel is great; On the other hand, because the joint-stock commercial bank has no historical burden, the management mechanism is more flexible, the operating efficiency is relatively good and the small scale is easy to optimize the management, it makes the executive compensation of joint-stock commercial banks higher. The issue of compensation has been concerned by the community, and there is a lot of controversy, so it is worth our in-depth study. This paper first expounds the theoretical basis of the compensation incentive mechanism, and analyzes the characteristics of the executive compensation incentive mechanism at home and abroad. Secondly, in order to study the executive compensation incentive system of joint-stock commercial banks as a starting point, select 8 listed joint-stock commercial banks, through the collection and integration of data. The level of executive compensation of joint-stock commercial banks is compared in the whole industry, and the pay gap between bank executives and ordinary employees is analyzed. In addition, through the data of executive compensation issued in the past three years, it compares with the financial indicators such as the rate of return on assets, the ratio of non-performing loans, the total profits and other financial indicators. It is concluded that the compensation level of senior executives in joint-stock commercial banks is not significantly related to their performance. Thirdly, the paper collects the number of shareholding and the proportion of shares held by senior executives of joint-stock commercial banks in banks. It is concluded that bank executives are mainly short-term salary incentive in the form of cash, and lack of long-term compensation incentive. Therefore, this paper analyzes the above problems and puts forward the corresponding suggestions and countermeasures. In order to share-stock bank compensation incentive system construction, perfect, provide certain reference.
【学位授予单位】：重庆理工大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：F832.33;F276.6;F272.92

【参考文献】