信息披露政策对真实盈余管理的影响研究

发布时间：2018-01-20 00:20

本文关键词： 信息披露政策信息透明度信息不对称真实盈余管理　出处：《西南财经大学》2014年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：在国内外理论界乃至实务界,信息披露与盈余管理的关系研究都一直备受关注。公司管理层与外部投资者之间存在的信息不对称,为公司进行盈余管理以达到特定盈余目的提供了一定的空间,而充分可靠的信息披露在某种程度上可以降低这种信息不对称,提高投资者识别管理层盈余管理行为的能力,从而有利于减少管理层进行盈余管理的可能性。一般来说,盈余管理没有超越会计准则的范围,适当的盈余管理并不是坏事,但是盈余管理可能隐含着机会主义行为倾向,长期来看可能损害公司价值,会粉饰或模糊公司的真实业绩水平,使投资者难以通过“修饰”后的报告盈余做出有效的投资决策,不利于投资者等利益相关者的利益保护。因此,外部监管者需要制定信息披露政策规范上市公司的信息披露行为,对管理层形成一种有力的外部约束和监督机制,从而在一定程度上抑制管理层的盈余管理行为,保护外部投资者的利益,促进公句健康持续发展,最终有利于资本市场的稳定和发展。经过多年的发展,我国相关监管机构和部门已逐步建立和完善上市公司信息披露体系,深圳证券交易所制定了《深圳证券交易所上市公司信息披露工作考核办法》,我国上市公司信息透明度总体上得到提高,但是仍然存在某些上市公司违规披露信息或降低信息透明度以配合其盈余管理的现象。因此,研究信息披露与盈余管理的关系并根据研究结果采取相应的措施来规范上市公司信息披露行为,将对提高信息透明度、遏制盈余管理行为具有重要的理论意义和现实意义。关于两者关系的研究,国外文献较为丰富,国内文献相对欠缺,且现有文献基本一致认为信息透明度与盈余管理具有负相关关系,即信息透明度越高,盈余管理程度越低,高质量的信息披露对公司盈余管理行为具有一定的抑制作用。这些文献主要从应计盈余管理的视角进行研究,而较少涉及真实盈余管理的研究。近年来,学者们研究发现,管理层在进行盈余管理时,除了操控应计项目外,还可能操控投资、筹资、经营等实际交易活动,而这种通过操控企业真实的交易活动(例如,异常降价促销、削减研发费用、过量生产)来达到盈余目的的盈余操控行为被学界称为真实盈余管理。相比应计盈余管理,真实盈余管理更难以被利益相关者识别,更具有隐蔽性,面临的审查风险和诉讼风险也更低。那么,在外部监管逐渐加强、资本市场和法律制度逐步健全的外部环境下,在信息披露政策逐渐改善、信息披露更加透明的情况下,管理层是否可能从实施应计盈余管理转而实施风险更小、隐蔽程度更高的真实盈余管理呢?抑或管理层又是否可能因外部监管压力而减少真实盈余管理行为呢?这是一个值得思考的问题。但从现有文献来看,较少涉及信息披露对真实盈余管理的影响研究,尤其很少有文章从政策有效性方面进行考虑,从而引发了本文的研究,即以真实盈余管理为视角研究信息披露政策对盈余管理的影响。一般而言,会计上所谓政策属于公司范畴,并非外部宏观制度,而本文以深交所的信息披露考评结果来衡量信息披露政策指标,因此本文的信息披露政策特指外部监管机构对上市公司信息披露行为进行的规范或制定的制度等。本文采取规范研究和实证研究相结合的研究方法,通过从真实盈余管理这一新的研究视角分析信息披露政策对盈余管理的影响,以期丰富相关理论研究,同时提醒投资者关注和重视,并为相关政策制定者和监管者提供证据支持和政策建议。从内容来看,本文包括以下六章：第一章：导论。主要介绍本文的研究背景、研究目的和意义、研究思路和方法、研究框架以及研究创新。第二章：文献综述。通过对信息不对称与信息披露、盈余管理与信息不对称以及信息披露与盈余管理的相关国内外文献进行回顾、梳理和述评,发现信息披露与盈余管理的关系研究主要集中在应计盈余管理的视角上,并较少考虑信息披露政策的有效性,从而引发了本文的研究,即信息披露政策对真实盈余管理的影响研究。第三章：理论基础与理论分析。首先对委托代理理论、信息不对称理论和有效市场理论等进行阐释和分析,然后对信息披露政策和真实盈余管理的相关概念进行概念界定,最后对信息披露政策如何影响真实盈余管理进行理论分析。第四章：研究设计。首先根据上一章的理论分析提出本文的研究假设,即信息披露政策越完善,真实盈余管理程度越低,并进一步探讨真实盈余管理动机以及产权性质对两者关系的影响。然后,将2009-2012年深交所A股上市公司作为研究样本,以Roychowdhury(2006)模型衡量真实盈余管理程度,以深交所的信息披露考评结果作为信息披露政策的替代指标,同时将可能对回归结果产生影响的变量作为控制变量,最后针对研究假设设计实证模型。第五章：实证结果及分析。首先对各变量进行描述性统计,然后采用Pearson系数进行简单的相关性分析,初步判定被解释变量和解释变量之间的相关关系,并通过方差膨胀因子法检验回归模型是否具有多重共线性,接着通过stata11.0软件对回归模型进行多元回归分析,最后进行稳健性检验。第六章：研究结论、政策建议、局限性及研究展望。根据本文的实证研究得出研究结论,并从外部监管和内部治理两大方面提出相应的政策建议。同时,指出本文的局限性,并对有关信息披露与真实盈余管理的研究进行未来展望。通过实证研究,本文得出如下结论：第一,通过全样本回归发现,信息披露政策对真实盈余管理具有一定的抑制作用,但是对不同真实盈余管理方式的影响程度不同,其中对费用操控具有显著的抑制作用,但对销售和生产操控并没有起到明显的抑制作用。结果表明,信息披露政策对抑制真实盈余管理方面具有一定的有效性,但是这种有效性尚未发挥完全的作用。第二,本文根据真实盈余管理动机将样本企业分为微利企业和非微利企业,结果发现非微利企业显著影响了信息披露政策对真实盈余管理的抑制效果。第三,本文根据产权性质将样本企业分为国有企业和非国有企业,结果发现国有企业显著影响了信息披露政策对真实盈余管理的抑制效果。总之,信息披露政策对真实盈余管理具有显著的抑制作用,但对于不同真实盈余管理行为产生的效果不同,而且真实盈余管理动机和产权性质能够显著影响信息披露政策对真实盈余管理的抑制效果。即信息披露政策具有一定的有效性,但是这种有效性尚未得到完全发挥。本文可能的创新之处有：第一,以往有关信息披露对盈余管理的影响研究主要侧重于对应计盈余管理的影响,而近年来研究发现盈余管理方法还包括真实盈余管理,信息披露对不同盈余管理方法的影响程度可能不同,因此本文从真实盈余管理这一新的视角出发研究信息披露对其的影响,具有研究视角上的创新,同时也拓展了信息披露与盈余管理的相关研究,丰富了这方面的研究成果。第二,本文从产权性质这一新视角考察信息披露政策对真实盈余管理的影响,这为理解我国资本市场中信息披露与真实盈余管理的关系提供了新的经验证据。第三,根据信息披露对真实盈余管理三种操控方式的不同影响程度,分析信息披露政策的有效性,并且对信息披露政策未能完全发挥作用进行原因探讨。本文的研究发现有助于监管机构重新审视已有的信息披露政策是否有助于约束管理层的真实盈余管理行为。本文可能的不足之处有：第一,样本选择的局限性。由于受制于信息透明度指标的选择,本文仅将深交所A股上市公司作为研究样本,没有考虑到上交所上市公司,也没有考虑到B股、H股、交叉股等上市公司,这可能导致本文的研究结论不能完全适用于我国所有上市公司的整体情况。第二,变量和模型设计的局限性。本文采用深交所信息披露考评结果衡量信息披露政策指标,虽然这个结果具有一定的权威性和客观性,但在设置评价标准时难免存在主观性从而影响结果的准确性,这个考评结果是否能完全替代信息披露政策指标还有待进一步研究的证实。
[Abstract]:In the domestic and international theory and practice, research on the relationship between information disclosure and earnings management have been a major concern. The information asymmetry between managers and outside investors, in order to achieve a specific purpose of earnings provides enough space for the company's earnings management, and fully reliable information disclosure to some extent can reduce this information asymmetry, improve the ability of investors to identify the earnings management behavior, which is conducive to reducing the possibility OFEARNINGS management. In general, the scope of earnings management is not beyond accounting standards, appropriate earnings management is not a bad thing, but earnings management may imply opportunism behavior tendency, the long term may damage the value of the company, will whitewash or obscure the true performance of the company level, making it difficult for investors to through the "modified" after the earnings report to make effective The investment decision is not conducive to protecting the interests of investors and other stakeholders. Therefore, regulators need external information disclosure of information disclosure of listed companies to develop policies and regulations, the formation of a strong external restriction and supervision mechanism of management, so as to inhibit the earnings management behavior to a certain extent, protect the interests of outside investors the public, to promote the healthy and sustainable development of the final sentence, conducive to the stability and development of the capital market.
After years of development, China's relevant regulatory agencies and departments have gradually establish and improve the information disclosure system of the listed company, the Shenzhen stock exchange to develop a "Shenzhen Stock Exchange listed company information disclosure assessment methods", the information transparency of Listed Companies in China generally improved, but there are still some listed companies illegal disclosure of information or reduce information with the transparency of the phenomenon of earnings management. Therefore, research on the relationship between information disclosure and earnings management according to the research results and take corresponding measures to regulate the behavior of information disclosure of listed companies, to improve the transparency of information, has important theoretical and practical significance to curb the behavior of earnings management.
Study on the relationship between the two, foreign literature is abundant, the relative lack of domestic literature, and the existing literature that information transparency and earnings management has negative correlation, namely the higher information transparency, the lower the extent of earnings management, the high quality of the information disclosure has a certain inhibitory effect on the earnings management behavior of the company. The main earnings management from the perspective, and less involved in the study of real earnings management.
In recent years, many scholars have found that, in the management of earnings management, in addition to manipulate accruals, may control investment, financing, management of actual transactions, and this by manipulating the real business transactions (for example, abnormal price promotions, reduce development costs, excessive production) to achieve earnings manipulation the purpose of the behavior of earnings is generally called real earnings management. Compared with the accrual earnings management, real earnings management is more difficult for stakeholders to identify, more subtle, facing the review of risk and litigation risk is lower.
Then, gradually strengthen the external supervision, the external environment of the capital market and gradually improve the legal system, the information disclosure policy gradually improved, more transparent information disclosure situation, whether management may favor the implementation of accrual earnings management from the implementation of less risk, hidden higher degree of real earnings management or management? It may be due to external pressure and reduce the real earnings management behavior? This is a question. But judging from the existing literature, lack of study on the effect of disclosure on real earnings management, especially a few articles to be considered from the effectiveness of the policy, which led to the research of this paper, that is the real earnings management of the information disclosure from the perspective of policy influence on earnings management. In general, the so-called accounting policy belongs to the company, not the external macro system, and based on the The results of information disclosure evaluation of Shenzhen stock exchange measure information disclosure policy indicators, so the information disclosure policy in this paper is especially the external regulatory institution's standard or formulation system for information disclosure behavior of listed companies.
This paper adopts the research method combining normative research and empirical research, through the real earnings management from the new perspective analysis of the impact of information disclosure policy on earnings management, in order to enrich the related theory research, at the same time to remind investors of concern and attention, and provide evidence to support and policy recommendations for the relevant policy makers and regulators. From the content point of view, this paper includes the following six chapters:
Chapter 1: introduction. It mainly introduces the background, purpose and significance of the study, research ideas and methods, research framework and research innovation.
The second chapter: literature review. Through the information disclosure and information asymmetry, reviewed the related literatures of earnings management and asymmetric information and information disclosure and earnings management, analysis and review, found the relationship between information disclosure and earnings management mainly focus on the accrual earnings management perspective, and seldom consider the effectiveness of information disclosure the policy, which led to the study of this paper, the study on information disclosure policy impact on real earnings management.
The third chapter: analysis of the theoretical basis and theory. Firstly, the principal-agent theory, information asymmetry theory and efficient market theory to explain and analysis, then the relevant concepts of policy and real earnings management information disclosure was defined, at the end of the information disclosure policies such as the impact of real earnings management were analyzed.
The fourth chapter: research design. According to the previous chapter of theoretical analysis this paper puts forward the research hypotheses, namely information disclosure policy more perfect, the lower the degree of real earnings management, and further explore the real motives of earnings management and the nature of property right relationship between the two. Then, 2009-2012 Shenzhen A shares of listed companies as the research sample Roychowdhury (2006) model, to measure the degree of real earnings management, the Shenzhen stock exchange information disclosure evaluation results as alternative indicators of information disclosure policy, and may affect the outcome of the regression variables as control variables, according to the research hypotheses and design of empirical model.
The fifth chapter: empirical results and analysis. First, descriptive statistics of the variables, then the Pearson coefficients of simple correlation analysis, the preliminary judgment is explained the relationship between variables and explanatory variables, and the variance inflation factor test method is multiple linear regression model, and then based on the stata11.0 software, the regression model for multivariate regression the final analysis, health inspection.
The sixth chapter: the conclusion of the study, suggestions, limitations and Prospect of the research. According to the empirical research conclusions, and put forward the corresponding policy suggestions from the external and internal supervision in two aspects. At the same time, points out the limitations of this paper, and Research on information disclosure and management of more than really Suyin future prospects.
Through the empirical study, this paper draws the following conclusions:
First, through the whole sample regression found that information disclosure policy has a certain inhibitory effect on the real earnings management, but the degree of influence of different real earnings management in different ways, which has obvious inhibitory effect on cost control, but the sales and production control and did not have obvious inhibitory effect. The results show that the disclosure of information the policy has certain effectiveness in suppressing real earnings management, but the effectiveness has yet to play a full role.
Second, according to the real earnings management motivation, the sample companies are divided into small profit enterprises and non profit enterprises. It is found that the non profit enterprises have a significant impact on the effectiveness of information disclosure policies on real earnings management.
Third, according to the nature of property right, the sample enterprises are divided into state-owned enterprises and non-state-owned enterprises. It is found that state-owned enterprises significantly affect the inhibition effect of information disclosure policy on real earnings management.
In short, the information disclosure policy has a significant inhibitory effect on the real earnings management behavior, but for the different effect of real earnings management and real earnings management, motivation and property rights can significantly affect the information disclosure policy on the inhibition effect of real earnings management. Information disclosure policy has some validity, but the effectiveness of the has not yet been fully realized.
The possible innovations in this article are as follows:
First, the information disclosure focuses on the influence on the accrual earnings management research on the impact of earnings management, but recent studies have found that earnings management methods include real earnings management, the influence degree of information disclosure of different earnings management methods may be different, so this article based on the information from a new perspective of real earnings management the disclosure of its influence, innovative research perspective, research and develop information disclosure and earnings management, enrich the research achievements in this field.
Second, this paper investigates the impact of information disclosure policy on real earnings management from a new perspective of property right, which provides new empirical evidence for understanding the relationship between information disclosure and real earnings management in China's capital market.
Third, according to the information disclosure effect on real earnings management three control methods, effectiveness analysis of information disclosure policy, and the information disclosure policy has failed to fully play the role of the reason discussion. This study found that information disclosure policies help regulators to reconsider these will help to restrict the management behavior real earnings management.
The inadequacies of this article are as follows:
First, the samples are limited. Due to the information transparency index, this article only Shenzhen A shares of listed companies as the research sample, the listed companies did not pay into account, but also did not consider the B shares, H shares, shares and other cross listed companies, which may lead to the overall situation of the research conclusion of this paper can not be completely applicable to all listed companies in China.
Second, the limitations of design variables and models. In this paper, the disclosure of evaluation results to measure the information disclosure policy indicators by the Shenzhen stock exchange information, although this result has certain authority and objectivity, but in setting up the evaluation criteria of subjectivity and accurate inevitably influence the results, the evaluation results can completely replace the need further study of information disclosure policy index confirmed.

【学位授予单位】：西南财经大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：F832.51;F275

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