股权分置改革、盈余管理与高管薪酬业绩敏感性

发布时间：2018-01-30 11:53

本文关键词： 股权分置改革盈余管理薪酬业绩敏感性　出处：《金融研究》2012年10期 　论文类型：期刊论文

【摘要】：本文以2002～2009年中国上市公司为样本,考察股权分置改革促进公司提高高管薪酬业绩敏感性和诱发公司高管操控盈余提高业绩的净效应。研究发现:(1)基于公司财务业绩变量的检验结果表明股权分置改革显著提高了上市公司高管薪酬业绩敏感性,相对于国有控制公司而言,非国有控制公司的这种提高效应更加明显;(2)股权分置改革后非国有控制公司盈余管理对高管薪酬的影响大幅提高,并显著高于国有控制公司;(3)剔除盈余管理对公司财务业绩的影响后,高管薪酬业绩敏感性显著提高的现象消失了。由此说明公司采用最优契约激励高管时应该设置相应的监督机制,才能激励高管提高公司真实经济业绩。
[Abstract]:This paper takes Chinese listed companies from 2002 to 2009 as samples. To investigate the net effect of the reform of split share structure on promoting executives' pay sensitivity and inducing them to manipulate earnings to improve their performance. The test results based on the financial performance variables show that the split share structure reform has significantly improved the performance sensitivity of executives in listed companies. Compared with the state-owned control company, the improvement effect of the non-state-owned control company is more obvious. (2) the effect of earnings management on executive compensation in non-state-owned controlled companies is significantly higher than that of state-owned control companies; 3) excluding the effect of earnings management on the financial performance of the company, the phenomenon of significantly improving the sensitivity of executive compensation performance disappeared. This shows that the company should set up the corresponding supervision mechanism when it adopts the optimal contract to motivate the executives. To encourage executives to improve the real economic performance of the company.
【作者单位】：内蒙古大学经济管理学院;中山大学岭南学院;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金项目(71263034;71272197;70802062;71032006) 教育部人文社会科学研究项目(10XJC630003;11YJA630023) 广东省高校优秀青年创新培育项目(WYM08023) 内蒙古高等学校科学研究项目(NJ10028) 内蒙古大学高层次人才引进科研启动项目(Z20100103)的资助
【分类号】：F275;F832.51;F224
【正文快照】： 一、引言2005年4月29日，中国证监会发布《关于上市公司股权分置改革试点有关问题的通知》，，正式推行股权分置改革，截至2006年底中国资本市场的股权分置改革基本完成。股权分置改革的实质是大股东向中小股东赎买流通权，旨在使大股东与中小股东形成共同的利益基础。股权分置

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