基于基金经理更换的激励约束效应研究

发布时间：2018-02-13 11:12

本文关键词： 基金经理更换基金治理激励机制　出处：《上海金融》2012年08期 　论文类型：期刊论文

【摘要】：本文以2005年至2009年为样本期,考察了基金业绩和内部治理机制在基金经理更换中的作用,以及更换后业绩和投资行为的变化。研究发现:业绩能够较好解释基金经理降职,但对升职解释不足。基金经理升职后,继任经理会改变投资风格,从而使得业绩能够保持;而降职之后,继任经理的投资风格和资产配置都发生了显著的变化,从而使得基金业绩在不增加投资组合风险的前提下得以改善。股权较为分散、股东间有效制衡的基金公司旗下的基金经理更容易被更换,但董事会制度与基金经理更换不尽相关。同时中资基金经理更换机制不如合资基金有效。所以,基金经理更换是一种较为有效但尚不完善的激励机制。
[Abstract]:Based on the sample period from 2005 to 2009, this paper examines the role of fund performance and internal governance mechanism in the exchange of fund managers, as well as the changes of performance and investment behavior after the change. The results show that performance can explain the demotion of fund managers. However, there is a lack of explanation for promotion. When a fund manager is promoted, the successor manager changes his investment style, thus allowing his performance to be maintained; and after demotion, the successor manager's investment style and asset allocation change dramatically. Thus, the performance of the fund can be improved without increasing the risk of the investment portfolio. Fund managers under the effective checks and balances between shareholders are more likely to be replaced. However, the board of directors system is not related to the exchange of fund managers, and the replacement mechanism of Chinese fund managers is not as effective as that of joint-venture funds. Therefore, the exchange of fund managers is an effective but imperfect incentive mechanism.
【作者单位】：华南师范大学经管学院;暨南大学管理学院;
【基金】：作者主持的国家自科基金项目“基金行业锦标赛与基金经理激励约束效应研究”(71002087) 教育部人文社科项目“开放式基金经理能力成长与激励机制研究”(08JC63030) 广东省人文社科基地重点项目“基金家庭利益输送与投资者公平待遇研究”(09JDXM79010)阶段性成果
【分类号】：F832.51;F224

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