政治关联、所有权结构与我国IPO长期回报

发布时间：2018-02-24 08:22

本文关键词： 渐进改革 IPO抑价政治关联社会负担产权保护政府偏袒控制权现金流权利益侵占公司治理新股长期回报　出处：《南开大学》2014年博士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：本文分别研究了新股发行制度变迁对IPO抑价的影响,以及政治关联、终极控股股东所有权结构对IPO长期回报的影响。首先,本文研究了监管市场化与IPO抑价的关系。中国证券市场渐进式改革所取得的经济绩效显著优于其他转轨经济体,有效地促进了证券市场的发展。上市公司的总市值、交易量和交易额逐年提高,融资规模及其效率明显增强,新股发行抑价率显著降低。结合我国一级市场制度变迁,本文运用供求分析框架,发现新股渐进市场化改革带来了发行规模逐步增大,发行定价逐步放松,IPO首日超额抑价逐渐降低。进一步地,我们实证检验了新股渐进式市场化改革所取得的绩效。本文发现,随着新股市场化改革的推进,审核制度与新股首日抑价率显著负相关且系数逐步减小,定价制度与新股首日抑价率显著正相关且系数逐步减小。在理论分析和实证检验相互支持的基础上,本文指出,以去行政化为核心的新股发行制度渐进式改革有效缓解了一级市场供求,极大地减小新股超额抑价,促进了证券市场的发展。新股渐进式改革是可行有效的。其次,本文研究了高管政治关联与新股长期回报的关系。在我国上市公司中,高管的政治关联普遍存在。董事长政治关联、董事长和总经理政治关联以及董事会政治关联分别为40%、46%和82%。以2001年至2008年在沪深证券交易所上市的A股公司为研究样本,本文分析了政治关联对新股长期表现的影响以及政治关联的作用机制。综述政治关联文献,我们提出了社会负担效应、产权保护效应和政府偏袒效应三大假说。我们发现,政治关联长期中显著增加了新股长期收益率,这种政治关联长期正回报主要来源于民营控股公司,而在国有控股公司中政治关联对新股长期回报率影响并不明显。这不同于Fan等(2007)政治关联引致IPO长期回报不佳的结论。进一步考察政治关联的作用机制,本文发现,国有控股公司中,政治关联在为企业带来更多偏袒的同时,也导致了更多的社会负担；民营控股公司中,政治关联不仅可以作为较差制度环境的替代机制保护私有产权,而且为民营企业带来了更多贷款、更长的贷款期限、更低的税负以及更多的政府补贴。我们认为,社会负担对公司业绩具有负面影响；产权保护营造了民营公司与国有公司公平竞争的市场环境,有利于资源配置的优化；而政府偏袒则扭曲了政治关联公司与无政治关联公司公平竞争环境,进而异化了我国企业的市场行为。最后,本文采集了2001至2008年在沪深交易所上市的527家公司,按照终极控制人将样本划分为政府控股公司和家族控股公司,研究了控制权现金流权分离(两权分离)与新股长期价值关系。研究发现,两权分离有利于家族股东实施利益侵占,而政府股东的两权分离与利益侵占关系不明显。这不同于Claessens等(2002)以及Fan等(2013)的研究结论,但却支持了本文提出的利益侵占假说、政府扶持假说以及家族隧道假说。通过分析两权分离作用机制,我们发现,民营公司两权分离导致控股股东利用关联交易、占用上市公司资金、减少资本支出等手段侵占其他股东利益,降低了上市公司价值。进一步地,我们分析了改善控股股东利益侵占的途径,发现高管持股比例、高管薪酬、分析师关注、股权制衡度等公司治理因素能够抑制控股股东对其他股东的利益侵占。我们认为,政府股东出于良善性动机出售股份,拉长了控制链条,释放了放松管制减少干预的信号,从而政府股东减少了利益侵占；而家族股东控制权与现金流权不匹配导致大股东以中小股东利益为代价,转移上市公司资源获取控制权私利,严重侵害了中小股东利益。
[Abstract]:This paper studies the impact of IPO institutional change on IPO underpricing, as well as political connections, and the impact of the ownership structure of the ultimate controlling shareholders on the long-term return of IPO.
Firstly, this paper studies the relationship between the market regulation and IPO underpricing. China securities market gradual reforms achieved significant economic performance is better than that of other transition economies, effectively promote the development of the securities market. The total market value of listed companies, trading volume and transaction volume increased year by year, the scale of financing and its efficiency is significantly enhanced, new the IPO underpricing rate decreased significantly. Combined with the level of market system in China, this paper uses analysis frame of supply and demand, find new gradual market reform brings the issue size gradually increased, the pricing gradually relaxed, IPO over the first day underpricing decreases gradually. Furthermore, we empirically test the new gradual market-oriented reforms achieved performance. This paper found that with the IPO market reform, the audit system and the IPO underpricing rate and a significant negative correlation coefficient gradually decreases, and the IPO pricing system Underpricing rate significantly positive correlation and the coefficient decreased gradually. Based on theoretical analysis and empirical test of mutual support, this paper pointed out that the administration is the core of the IPO system gradual reform to effectively alleviate the level of market supply and demand, greatly reducing the new stock excess underpricing, promote the development of the securities market. The new gradual reform is feasible and effective.
Secondly, this paper studies the relationship between political connection and IPO long-term returns. Listed companies in China, widespread political association. Political association chairman, chairman and general manager of political association and the board of directors of political association were 40%, 46% and 82%. from 2001 to 2008 listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchange A shares as the research sample, this paper analyzes the influence of political connection on the long-term performance of the new shares and the mechanism of political association. This political association of literature, we put forward the social burden effect, property protection effect and the partial effect of the three hypothesis. We found that long-term political connections significantly increased new long-term yields, this kind of political association the long-term returns are mainly from the private holding company, and in the state-owned holding companies to the new political association of the long-term rate of return is not obvious. This is not the same as F An (2007) political association IPO caused poor long-term returns. Conclusion mechanism, to further investigate the political association this paper found that the state-owned holding companies, the political connections bring more biased at the same time, also led to more social burden; the private holding company, the political connection can not only as an alternative mechanism for private the protection of property rights of poor institutional environment, but also bring more loans to private enterprises, longer loan period, lower taxes and more government subsidies. We believe that the social burden has a negative impact on the performance of the company; the protection of property rights to create a fair competition of private companies and state-owned companies in the market environment, conducive to optimizing the allocation of resources; while the government favoritism distorted politically connected company and politically connected company without a fair competitive environment, and the alienation of our country enterprise market behavior.
At last, this paper collected 527 companies listed in Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchange from 2001 to 2008, according to the ultimate controller divides the sample into the government holding company and the family holding company, the control of cash flow rights separation (two rights separation) relationship with the long-term value of shares. The study found that the separation of two rights is conducive to the implementation of family Shareholders Expropriation however, the separation of two rights and interests of the government shareholder's expropriation relationship is not obvious. This is different from the Claessens (2002) and Fan (2013) the conclusion of the study, but support the entrenchment hypothesis, government support hypothesis and family tunneling hypothesis. Through the analysis of two rights separation mechanism, we found that the separation two private companies right lead to shareholders through related transactions, occupied the capital of listed companies, reduce capital expenditures and other means to occupy the interests of other shareholders, reducing the market value of the company. Further, I Are analyzed to improve the ways of controlling shareholders'entrenchment, found that the proportion of executive ownership, executive compensation, analysts pay attention, equity balance degree of corporate governance and other factors can inhibit the interests of controlling shareholders on the other shareholders' embezzlement. We believe that the government for shareholders to sell shares of good motivation, long control chain, the release of deregulation reduced intervention in order to reduce the signal, the government Shareholder Expropriation; family shareholders control rights and cash flow rights, leading to major shareholders to minority shareholders at the cost of transferring resources listed companies to gain control gain, a serious infringement of the interests of small shareholders.

【学位授予单位】：南开大学
【学位级别】：博士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：F832.51;F832.1

【参考文献】