市场集中、控制权特征与内部控制鉴证报告披露

发布时间：2018-03-13 13:28

本文选题：市场集中　切入点：内部控制鉴证报告　出处：《会计研究》2012年06期 　论文类型：期刊论文

【摘要】：企业披露自愿信息可以获取部分竞争优势。在相对集中的市场中企业间互相依存的程度更强,此时企业需要在充分披露信息以吸引投资者和酌情披露信息以避免泄露商业秘密之间进行权衡。内部控制鉴证报告包含的专有信息比较有限,且作为自愿信息可以向市场传递积极信号,故而成为企业获取竞争优势的手段之一。本文用2007-2009年深沪两市4131个样本检验发现:整体上内部控制鉴证报告披露的概率随着市场集中程度的变化呈倒U型关系;当市场从极度分散向相对集中变化时,非国有企业更倾向于披露内部控制鉴证报告获取一定优势;但如果金字塔层级较多,非国有企业的内部控制鉴证报告披露动机会减弱。
[Abstract]:Companies can gain some competitive advantage by disclosing voluntary information. In relatively centralized markets, enterprises are more interdependent. At this point, businesses need to balance the full disclosure of information to attract investors and, where appropriate, disclosure of information to avoid disclosure of trade secrets. Internal control forensics reports contain relatively limited proprietary information, And as voluntary information can send positive signals to the market, Therefore, it has become one of the means for enterprises to gain competitive advantage. This paper uses 4131 samples from Shenzhen and Shanghai stock markets from 2007 to 2009 to find that the probability of disclosure of internal control authentication reports is inversely U-shaped with the change of market concentration; When the market changes from extreme dispersion to relative concentration, non-state-owned enterprises tend to obtain certain advantages by disclosing internal control authentication reports; however, if there are more pyramid levels, the motivation of disclosure of internal control authentication reports of non-state-owned enterprises will be weakened.
【作者单位】：北京理工大学管理与经济学院;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金项目(项目批准号70902012,71172171) 教育部人文社会科学研究基金项目(项目批准号09YJC790016)的阶段性成果北京理工大学基础研究基金(项目批准号20082142007,20092140003)资助
【分类号】：F233;F832.51;F224

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