银行风险承担的政治关联渠道研究

发布时间：2018-04-05 11:33

本文选题：制度变迁　切入点：政治关联　出处：《西南财经大学》2014年博士论文

【摘要】：2013年党的十八届三中全会的提出了：“经济体制改革是全面深化改革的重点,核心问题是处理好政府和市场的关系,使市场在资源配置中起决定性作用和更好发挥政府作用。”这一发展观念不仅契合了新中国建立之后尤其是改革开放后我国政治制度与经济体制自我变迁的客观规律,更是反映出我国制度结构下的当今及未来社会经济发展的需要。从新制度经济学和制度金融学视角看,一国的制度安排对该国的经济增长和金融发展具有奠基性的影响。金融作为经济体中经营和创造信用的特殊行业受到不同金融制度的规制。在此意义上分析,一国基本制度的变迁必会影响到金融制度的变迁,因此基本经济制度乃至金融制度的变迁及其形成的具体制度安排对一国金融行业具体运行存在至关重要的影响。而基于基础制度安排及经济运行机制产生的存在于我国银行业内部的非正式制度安排：政治关联对我国商业银行运行的影响性态是当前理论界面临迫切问题。历次金融风险所呈现出来的巨大破坏性及对实体经济侵染性凸显了银行风险承担诱因及其渠道效应研究的必要性。而作为基础性因素的制度及银行风险承担的政治关联渠道在既有以上问题的研究中并没有得到系统全面的体现。鉴于此,本文基于新制度经济学和制度金融学的研究视角,围绕“我国制度结构及变迁特征”——“政治关联路径形成动机、形式及效能”——“银行风险承担”——“银行风险承担的政治关联渠道影响性态”四个问题梯次推进,从经验论证和理论均衡分析两个维度研究了我国制度结构及其动态变迁背景下银行风险承担的政治关联渠道存在性及其效应,并得出一些有益结论。具体而言,文章紧紧围绕着政治关联产生的基础制度因素、政治关联形式及银行风险承担的政治关联渠道影响性态进行分析。重点解决的基本问题有：第一,我国基础制度因素对银行风险承担的影响性态；第二,以高管政治背景、政府实际控制和银行国有股权性质为主要形式的银行风险承担的显性政治关联渠道的影响性态；第三,基于政府、银行两方博弈所形成的银行风险承担的隐性政治关联渠道的影响性态；第四,基于政府、国有企业、银行三方博弈所形成的银行风险承担的隐性政治关联渠道影响性态。结合研究思路和思想,本文融合了新制度经济学、制度金融学、经济学及金融学等学科知识,采用理论研究和经验论证相结合的研究方法。理论研究的方法主要体现在三个方面：一是基本理论推理与演绎归纳；二是构建理论均衡模型进行比较静态分析；三是在均衡分析过程中,采用逐步放松约束条件进而提高研究结论普适性的论证逻辑。经验论证方法主要体现在三个方面：一是基于我国经济金融运行现状,收集并整理有关数据进行基本统计单变量分析；二是在单变量统计分析基础上构建银行风险承担组合模型和银行风险承担的政治关联渠道检验组合模型,在严格按照经典计量经济学原理和相关模型构建原理基础上,利用收集数据组成非平衡面板数据进行多元拟合回归；三是在具体经验分析中采用递进研究逻辑和对比分析的思想对相关问题进行研究。尽可能的完善研究逻辑并提高研究结论的可信性。文章紧紧围绕着基本问题和研究核心,依据理论演绎归纳、经验论证及均衡分析得出如下基本结论： (1)基本经济制度因素推动了银行三种风险承担水平；产权保护制度因素和社会基本意识性态因素对银行风险承担影响呈现微弱且基本不显著性态；表征基本金融制度因素的信贷资金分配市场化程度因素在计量意义上较为显著的提升银行系统风险和非系统风险的承担水平,而对总风险承担水平影响并不显著,金融市场竞争因素显著加剧了银行风险系统风险承担。 (2)在控制基本制度因素的背景下,外部宏观经济层面的房地产市场景气因素对银行的风险承担影响微弱并且不显著；经济增长因素符合降低银行风险承担水平的预期。同时,样本商业银行层面的净利润增长率因素和规模因素对银行不同类型风险承担存在一定影响并且显著,银行规模反而会积极推动银行三种类型的风险承担水平,而净利润增长因素显著降低系统风险承担却整体提升非系统风险和总风险承担水平。 (3)以高管的政治背景为主要特征的显性政治关联路径并没有显著改变基础制度因素和其余控制变量对银行风险承担的影响性态,但其本身对银行三类风险承担行为存在影响且显著,即使这种影响程度并不高。其中,高管的政治背景对银行系统风险承担的积极影响程度高于其对总风险和非系统风险承担的影响程度。同时,在其他控制条件不变的情况下,基于高管政治背景而形成的政治关联所引致的银行风险承担水平越高,银行就越注重调整其资产组合使其趋于稳健。具体而言,银行总风险承担、系统风险承担与非系统风险承担在计量意义上均有效的降低银行杠杆水平并且显著,尤其是总风险承担水平的上升对银行杠杆水平抑制效应更为显著,也即是说有效引致银行调整其资产组合使其趋于稳健。 (4)政府实际控制因素对银行的三种风险承担的影响微弱并且不显著；银行国有股权性质因素对银行各类风险承担存在一定影响并且显著。整体而言,国有股权因素提升了银行总风险承担程度,但降低了银行系统和非系统风险承担水平。同时,在其他控制条件不变的情况下,基于政府股权和政府实际控制因素而形成的政治关联所引致的银行风险承担水平越高,银行就越注重调整其资产组合使其趋于稳健。具体而言,银行总风险承担、系统风险承担与非系统风险承担在计量意义上均有效的降低银行杠杆水平并且显著,具体而言,三类风险承担效应均有效抑制银行杠杆水平,而总风险承担的政治关联渠道而引致的银行资产组合调整进而抑制银行过高的杠杆水平的程度更为积极显著,也即是说有效引致银行调整其资产组合使其趋于稳健。 (5)高管政治背景与政府实际控制共同作用因素显著降低银行系统风险承担水平和非系统风险承担水平,但对银行总风险承担水平影响并不显著,并且二者的共同作用显著的放大了两种因素所形成的政治关联路径对银行系统和非系统风险承担的影响程度,尤其是显著加剧了银行系统风险承担水平。同时,在其他控制条件不变的情况下,基于二者交叉因素而形成的政治关联所引致的银行风险承担水平越高,银行就越注重调整其资产组合使其趋于稳健,尤其是所引起的银行系统风险承担水平越高,银行也就越倾向于调整其资产组合借以抑制银行杠杆水平。具体而言,银行总风险承担、系统风险承担与非系统风险承担在计量意义上均有效的降低银行杠杆水平并且显著,三类风险承担均有效抑制银行杠杆水平,而系统风险承担的政治关联渠道而引致的银行资产组合调整进而抑制银行过高的杠杆水平的程度更为显著。 (6)存在政府干预和外部制度约束条件既定的情形下,基于政府控制而形成的隐性契约和银行经理人个体利益诉求的共同作用塑造银行经理人两种策略：合作策略与非合作策略。政府代理人和银行经理人合作框架下的均衡收益揭示二者合作是其占优策略选择,这种合作收益提供了银行经理人积极构建隐性政治关联路径内在激励。但这种基于合作而形成的隐性政治关联路径所引致的银行经理人的寻租行为和政府补贴行为会加剧银行风险承担。同时,从银行风险承担的政治关联渠道层面来看,理性的银行代理人倾向于选择合作框架下的行为并获得其均衡收益,这一合作框架潜在关键条件就是银行代理人积极构建并维持政治关联渠道的存在,这种政治关联渠道会诱发银行经理人道德风险进而引致银行风险承担,同时银行风险承担改变就会通过银行信贷资金的配给行为于银行资产组合的变动。 (7)政府、银行与国有企业三方博弈的均衡结论揭示,存在于商业银行、国有企业与政府之间的隐性政治关联路径直接或间接形成以政府和政府项目为中心的银行、国有企业和政府之问的紧密关联。现行制度约束条件下,基于隐性政治关联路径之上的银行经理人、国有企业经理人及政府代理人的均衡策略选择不仅共同激化了银行信贷扩张,更是加剧了风险承担水平。同时,从银行风险承担的政治关联渠道层面来看,政府、银行与国有企业三方博弈框架下各自均衡收益表明,三方合作是其占优合作策略。而这种合作策略就形成了围绕政府及政府项目为中心并以隐性契约为核心的政治关联纽带的运作机制,但预期存在的隐性政府信用担保就会诱发银行道德风险并加剧银行风险承担,进而会通过这种隐性政治关联渠道作用于银行以信贷配给为主要诱因的资产组合波动。结合本文的研究内容和既有的相关研究,本文的创新主要体现在如下方面： (1)文章结合Coase创立的新古典关于制度变迁的比较静态分析和Hayek等关于制度变迁的动态演化分析范式,在制度变迁动态演进理论框架内探索中国银行业内政治关联产生的制度基础及形式,并重点分析银行风险承担的政治关联渠道影响性态,最终通过理论研究和合理的经验论证得出银行风险承担的政治关联渠道的影响性态和适应率评价。 (2)在文章理论均衡分析部分,突破既有相关研究中先验性的制度外生假定,通过合理的假设将基础制度安排和政治关联为代表的非正式制度内生到均衡模型中,最终围绕政治关联形式与银行风险承担的政治关联渠道之间动态均衡分析得出银行风险承担的政治关联渠道影响性态。 (3)系统分析基本制度结构对一国制度变迁的影响、制度变迁与具体制度安排(经济体制和金融制度)之间关联,为本文的政治关联产生、路径及对银行风险承担的影响提供研究的理论基础。并从理论上演绎政治关联作为一种非正式制度与正式制度之间的“反馈循环(Feedbeck Loop)"动态作用机制。 (4)文章突破了传统基于货币政策、利率、银行公司治理、市场约束等层面对银行风险承担影响的研究,从政治关联的层面全面系统地论证银行风险承担的政治关联渠道存在性及其影响性态。
[Abstract]:The reform of economic system is the focus of comprehensive deepening reform . The core issue is to deal with the relationship between the government and the market , to make the market play a decisive role in the allocation of resources and to better play the role of the government .

Based on the research perspective of the new institutional economics and institutional finance , this paper studies the existence and the effect of the political relation between the institutional structure and the changing characteristics of our country , the motive , form and effectiveness of the political association path , and analyses the existence and the effect of the political relation channel borne by the bank risk under the background of the bank risk , and draws some useful conclusions .
Secondly , based on the high political background , the actual control of the government and the nature of the bank ' s state - owned equity as the main forms of bank risk , the influence of the dominant political association channel is affected ;
Third , based on the government , the bank ' s two - party game , the bank risk assumes the influence of the hidden political association channel ;
Fourthly , based on the hidden political association channel influenced by the bank risk formed by the government , state - owned enterprise and bank tripartite game , the author combines the research methods of new system economics , system finance , economics and finance .
secondly , constructing a theoretical equilibrium model to carry out comparative static analysis ;
Third , in the process of equilibrium analysis , the demonstration logic of gradually releasing the constraint conditions and improving the universality of the research conclusion is adopted . The experience demonstration method is mainly embodied in three aspects : firstly , based on the current situation of the economic and financial operation in China , collecting and arranging the relevant data to carry out basic statistical single variable analysis ;
Secondly , on the basis of single variable statistical analysis , the author constructs a combination model of bank risk and bank risk . Based on the theory of classical econometrics and the construction principle of relevant model , the data of non - balance panel is used to make multi - fitting regression based on the collected data .
The third is to study the related problems by using the thought of progressive research logic and comparative analysis in the concrete experience analysis , perfect the research logic as much as possible and improve the credibility of the research conclusion .

Based on theoretical deduction , empirical demonstration and equilibrium analysis , the following basic conclusions are drawn :

( 1 ) The basic economic system factor promotes the three risk assumption level of the bank ;
The factors of property right protection system and the social basic consciousness factor affect the bank ' s risk , and have little or no significant behavior .
The factors that characterize the basic financial institutional factors are significantly higher than that of the banking system risk and the non - systemic risk in the measurement sense , but the influence of the level of the total risk is not significant , and the financial market competition factor significantly increases the risk of the bank ' s risk system .

( 2 ) In the context of controlling the basic institutional factors , the real estate market economic factors at the external macroeconomic level have little influence on the bank ' s risk and are not significant ;
At the same time , the net profit growth rate factor and the scale factor at the sample commercial bank level have a certain influence on different types of risk of the bank and obviously , the scale of the bank can actively promote the three types of risk assumption of the bank , while the net profit growth factor significantly reduces the risk of the system , but the overall promotion of the non - systematic risk and the total risk take place .

At the same time , the higher the level of the bank risk caused by the political background of the high pipe , the higher the level of the bank ' s risk caused by the political background of the high pipe , the higher the level of the bank ' s leverage , especially the increase of the overall risk assumption , is more significant to the level of the bank ' s leverage level , that is , it is said that the effective introduction of the bank ' s asset portfolio makes it more robust .

( 4 ) The effect of the actual control factors on the bank ' s three risks is weak and insignificant ;
On the whole , the higher the risk of the bank , the higher the level of the bank ' s risk , the higher the bank ' s risk is , the more positive the bank asset portfolio adjusted based on the government ' s equity and the actual control factor of the government .

The higher the risk of the banking system , the higher the risk of the banking system , the higher the risk of the banking system , the more the banks tend to adjust their portfolios to restrain the level of the bank ' s leverage . In the meantime , the higher the risk of the banks , the more the banks tend to adjust their assets portfolio to restrain the level of the bank ' s leverage .

( 6 ) Under the established conditions of government intervention and external system constraints , two strategies : cooperative strategy and non - cooperative strategy are created based on the mutual action of implicit contract formed by government control and individual interest of bank manager : the cooperation strategy and non - cooperative strategy .

( 7 ) The equilibrium conclusion of the three - way game between the government , the bank and the state - owned enterprise reveals that the implicit political association path between the state - owned enterprise and the government directly or indirectly forms the close relationship between the bank , the state - owned enterprise and the government .

Combined with the research content and related research , the innovation of this paper mainly lies in the following aspects :

( 1 ) According to the comparative static analysis of the system change created by Coase and Hayek et al . on the dynamic evolution of institutional change , the paper explores the institutional foundation and form of the political association in China ' s banking industry in the framework of the dynamic evolution of institutional change , and analyzes the influence of the political relation channel of the bank risk , and finally demonstrates the influence and the adaptation rate of the political association channel undertaken by the bank through theoretical research and reasonable empirical demonstration .

( 2 ) In the analysis of the theoretical equilibrium of the article , the paper breaks through the system exogenic assumption which has a priori knowledge in the related research , and the informal system , which is represented by the basic system arrangement and the political association , is endogenous into the equilibrium model through reasonable assumptions , and finally , the dynamic equilibrium analysis between the political association form and the political association channel undertaken by the bank is concluded , and the political relation channel of the bank risk is influenced by the dynamic equilibrium analysis .

( 3 ) Systematic analysis of the influence of the basic institutional structure on a country ' s institutional change , the relationship between the institutional change and the specific institutional arrangements ( economic system and financial system ) , provides a theoretical basis for the study of the political association , the path and the influence on the bank ' s risk . ( 4 ) The paper breaks through the research on the influence of traditional monetary policy , interest rate , bank corporate governance and market restriction on bank risk .

【学位授予单位】：西南财经大学
【学位级别】：博士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：F832.33

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