业绩竞赛、地方国企过度投资和城市商业银行贷款

发布时间：2018-04-05 18:01

本文选题：省级官员　切入点：竞赛　出处：《重庆大学》2014年硕士论文

【摘要】：中国经济自改革开放以来保持了近30年的高速增长，被世人誉为“增长奇迹”。这种奇迹的产生是因为地方行政官员的业绩竞赛，在“政府行为、经济增长和干部选拔”之间构筑了一条较为严密的逻辑链条。城市商业银行在我国银行体系中，是一个较为特殊的群体：一方面承担着推动地方经济发展，推动银行业竞争，支持地方企业融资的重要作用；另一方面因为与地方政府天然的联系，银行行为会受到政府干预。投资作为拉动经济增长的三驾马车之一，对地方经济的发展起着重要的作用，研究表明，中国的GDP与投资之间的相关系数高达0.997，而且在99％的置信区间内显著相关。而这么高的投资与经济增长的相关系数，带来的投资效率却不一定是高的。本文首先从大的政治背景这一宏观原因入手，对业绩竞赛层面、企业过度投资行为层面和政府银行股东几个方面的国内外文献进行回顾。在文献回顾和相关理论梳理的基础上，以中国特色的干部选拔政策，选拔政策影响官员行为，，官员行为影响地方国有企业投资行为，而地方国有企业投资的资金来源是城市商业银行为线索进行研究，并且提出三个假设。在实证部分，利用2002-2012年A股上市企业的相关数据，进行描述性统计、相关分析和线性回归，研究发现：前一年GDP增长排名属于靠前或者靠后组的，当年竞争压力较大，地方国有企业过度投资越大。地方官员任期的最后一年，由于晋升已经成为定局，他们更多追求的是平稳过渡，而对地方资本配置干预较少，对地方过度投资的正向影响会减弱，而城市商业银行为地方企业过度投资提供信贷支持也会减少。最后，在实证研究的基础上，提出了建议和本文研究的局限性。
[Abstract]:China's economy has maintained a rapid growth rate of nearly 30 years since the reform and opening up, and has been hailed as a "growth miracle" by the world.The reason for this miracle is that the performance competition of local administrative officials has constructed a tight logical chain between "government behavior, economic growth and cadre selection".Urban commercial banks are a special group in the banking system of our country. On the one hand, they play an important role in promoting the development of local economy, promoting banking competition and supporting the financing of local enterprises.Banks, on the other hand, are subject to government intervention because of their natural ties to local governments.As one of the troika to stimulate economic growth, investment plays an important role in the development of local economy. The research shows that the correlation coefficient between GDP and investment in China is as high as 0.997, and it is significantly correlated in the confidence interval of 99%.But such high investment and economic growth correlation coefficient, the investment efficiency is not necessarily high.This paper begins with the macro reason of the big political background and reviews the domestic and foreign literature on the performance competition, the behavior of overinvestment of enterprises and the shareholders of government banks at home and abroad.On the basis of reviewing the literature and combing relevant theories, with the selection policy of cadres with Chinese characteristics, the selection policy influences the behavior of officials, and the behavior of officials affects the investment behavior of local state-owned enterprises.The capital source of local state-owned enterprise investment is the city commercial bank as the clue to carry on the research, and put forward three hypotheses.In the empirical part, using the relevant data of A share listed enterprises from 2002 to 2012 to carry out descriptive statistics, correlation analysis and linear regression, it is found that the GDP growth ranking of the previous year belongs to the top or lower group, and the competition pressure is great in that year.The greater the overinvestment of local state-owned enterprises.In the final year of their tenure, as promotions have become a foregone conclusion, local officials are more interested in a smooth transition, with less intervention in local capital allocation and less positive impact on local overinvestment.And city commercial bank provides credit support to local enterprise overinvestment also can reduce.Finally, on the basis of empirical research, some suggestions and limitations of this study are put forward.
【学位授予单位】：重庆大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：F832.4;F275;F276.1

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