投资基金模式下的协同创新激励机制研究

发布时间：2018-04-11 04:17

本文选题：协同创新 + 激励机制　；参考：《重庆大学》2014年博士论文

【摘要】：协同创新因能给企业带来有效利用外部优势创新资源、分担成本和风险、形成协同优势等诸多好处，成为了企业技术创新的重要方式。同时，协同创新也得到政府的大力支持。2013年11月党的十八届三中全会指出，要建立“产学研用”协同创新机制，促进企业成为创新主体。但是由于资金缺乏、逆向选择、利益分配不合理和道德风险等原因，协同创新的成功率一直不高。对于资金缺乏问题，我国政府以往一般采取直接财政资助模式对协同创新活动进行支持。然而，在该模式下，由于信息不对称和专业知识的缺乏，政府很难准确选出资助对象。因此，借助于创业投资公司在项目选择上的专门才能，由政府出资成立引导基金，并以此为杠杆撬动社会资本成立创新投资基金，对协同创新进行间接资助成为我国政府支持科技创新的重要模式。然而，从实际运作的情况看，虽然创新投资基金在创新项目选择及投资上拥有专业技能，取得了一定的成效，但因信息不对称带来的逆向选择等问题仍然没有从根本上得到解决。此外，产、学、研在合作过程中不按契约进行投入，通过减少投资甚至“搭便车”来获取不当利益的道德风险，以及合作收益的分配不合理等也是阻碍我国协同创新规模扩大和效率提升的重要因素之一。如何解决逆向选择、道德风险和利益分配不合理等问题，仍然是投资基金模式下协同创新成功运行的关键问题。针对逆向选择、道德风险和利益分配不合理导致我国协同创新成功率低下，甚至无法达成的问题，论文通过对协同创新中利益分配机制、对赌机制的研究，设计了协同创新中防范逆向选择和道德风险的激励机制，促使协同创新成员如实披露私人信息、提高创新投入，促进协同创新的成功，为投资基金、企业、科研机构、高校以及政府管理部门制定相关策略提供决策借鉴。论文主要研究内容如下： ①解决逆向选择的协同创新对赌机制设计本部分由第3章“投资基金与企业协同创新对赌机制设计”构成。考虑创新企业计划实施一个市场前景好的创新项目，由于资金限制，创新企业希望寻求投资基金进行协同创新，通过构建创新企业与投资基金的对赌博弈模型，研究了创新企业如何通过对赌协议的设计，解决协同创新中因信息不对称导致的逆向选择问题，促进协同创新形成，并通过理论及仿真分析得出创新企业与投资基金协同创新的形成条件及最优对赌协议。 ②协同创新中合理的利益分配机制设计本部分由第4章“多委托-多代理下协同创新利益分配机制设计”、第5章“投资基金模式下协同创新讨价还价分配机制设计”组成。第4章考虑两家企业分别委托不同的外部独立机构开发新产品，且承包方之间由于存在着创新技术人员的沟通、交流或流动，或研发信息、技术的交换等导致的创新投资溢出，构建了存在投资溢出环境下的多委托-多代理协同创新模型，研究了创新发包方与承包方的合作决策，得出了发包方的最优合作策略以及承包方的最优创新投资策略，并在此基础上分析了投资溢出对承包方创新投入的影响。第5章考虑由于资本约束，企业将技术创新活动交给外部科研组织的同时，寻求与创新投资基金进行合作，由其出资参与协同创新，针对协同创新参与各方通过讨价还价进行合作及收益分配的本质特征，通过构建投资基金参与下的协同创新讨价还价合作博弈模型，研究了创新投资基金、企业及高校或科研机构间的分配策略，并分析了参与各方讨价还价能力等相关因素对分配策略的影响，并通过理论及仿真分析，得出了协同创新的最优分配方案。 ③协同创新中防范道德风险的利益分配机制及投资机制设计本部分由第6章“投资基金模式下协同创新利益分配及投资机制设计”构成。考虑企业将新产品开发活动以契约形式外包给创新承包方，且引入创新投资基金投资参与协同创新，构建了创新投资基金主导下的协同创新博弈模型，研究了创新投资基金如何通过协同创新利益分配机制及基金投资策略的设计，激励企业和创新承包方提高协同创新投入，提升协同创新投资规模和绩效，并通过理论和仿真分析得出了引导基金主导下协同创新最优分配机制和基金投资策略。论文具有以下理论和方法上的创新： ①构建创新企业与投资基金的对赌博弈模型，研究了创新企业如何通过对赌协议的设计，解决协同创新中因信息不对称导致的逆向选择问题现有协同创新研究中，多是由信息劣势方采用信息甄别的方式，解决逆向选择问题。本文则考虑由信息优势方(即企业)采用信号传递的方式（即提出对赌协议），使投资基金确信自己传递的是真实私人信息，以此解决协同创新中的逆向选择问题，促进协同创新的形成，并通过理论及仿真分析得出创新企业与投资基金协同创新的形成条件及最优对赌协议。 ②分别构建存在基于投资溢出效应的多委托-多代理协同创新博弈模型，以及构建投资基金模式下的协同创新讨价还价合作博弈模型，设计出合理的协同创新利益分配机制，解决利益分配不合理问题考虑同一产品市场上有两家企业分别委托不同的外部研发组织开发同一新产品，且创新存在投资溢出效应，通过构建存在基于投资溢出效应的多委托-多代理协同创新博弈模型，设计出企业的最优合作及利益分配策略以及研发组织的最优创新投资策略，并在此基础上分析了投资溢出对承包方创新投入的影响；接着针对现有研究多采用Cournot或Stackelberg等非合作博弈分析协同创新合作博弈，，以及现实中协同创新各方一般是通过讨价还价达成合作协议，通过构建投资基金模式下的协同创新讨价还价合作博弈模型，研究了创新投资基金、企业及研发机构间的分配策略，并分析了参与各方讨价还价能力等相关因素对分配策略的影响。 ③构建创新投资基金模式下协同创新博弈模型，设计出协同创新利益分配和分阶段投资机制，防范道德风险问题通过构建创新投资基金、企业、研发机构间的协同创新博弈模型，研究了创新投资基金如何通过协同创新利益分配机制及基金阶段性投资策略的设计，激励企业和创新承包方提高协同创新投入，提升协同创新投资规模和绩效，为基金、企业、研发机构间通过协同创新分阶段投资机制设计，防范企业和研发机构的道德风险提供新思路和新方法。
[Abstract]:In November 2013 , the Party ' s 18th Third Plenary Session of the 18th CPC Central Committee pointed out that it is necessary to establish a cooperative innovation mechanism for the production of research and research and promote the enterprise to become the main body of innovation .

However , because of lack of funds , adverse selection , unreasonable distribution of interests and moral hazard , the success rate of cooperative innovation has been low . In this mode , the government has generally adopted direct financial support mode to support cooperative innovation activities . However , in this mode , the government funded the establishment of the pilot fund because of the lack of information asymmetry and professional knowledge .

However , from the actual operation , although the innovative investment fund has professional skills in innovation project selection and investment , the problem of reverse selection caused by asymmetric information is still not fundamentally solved . In addition , the problem of improper benefit ' s moral hazard and unreasonable allocation of cooperative income is one of the important factors that hinder the scale of cooperative innovation in our country .

Aiming at the adverse selection , the moral hazard and the unreasonable allocation of interests , the success rate of cooperative innovation in our country is low , and even cannot be reached . In this paper , we design the incentive mechanism of preventing adverse selection and moral hazard in the collaborative innovation through the research of the benefit distribution mechanism and the betting mechanism in the collaborative innovation .

The main contents of this thesis are as follows :

( 1 ) To solve the collaborative innovation of adverse selection and the design of the gambling mechanism

This part is composed of the third chapter " Investment Funds and the Innovation of Enterprise Synergies Innovation " . In view of the financial constraints , the innovative enterprise wants to seek the cooperation innovation of the investment fund . Through the construction of the gambling game model of the innovation enterprise and the investment fund , the paper studies how the innovation enterprise can solve the adverse selection problem caused by the asymmetric information in the collaborative innovation through the construction of the betting agreement , and finally , through the theory and the simulation analysis , the formation conditions and the optimal betting agreement between the innovative enterprise and the investment fund are obtained .

The Rational Profit Distribution Mechanism Design in Cooperative Innovation

This part is composed of Chapter 4 " Multi - Principal - Multi - Agency Coordination Innovation Benefit Distribution Mechanism Design " , Chapter 5 " Design of Cooperative Innovation in Investment Fund Model " .

Chapter 4 considers that the two enterprises entrust different external independent agencies to develop new products , and the innovation investment caused by the communication , communication or flow of creative technicians , or the exchange of R & D information , technology , etc . has been established between the contractors , and the cooperative decision of the innovative sender and the contractor is constructed . The optimal cooperation strategy of the Employer and the optimal innovation investment strategy of the Contractor are obtained .

In chapter 5 , considering the capital constraints , the enterprises seek to cooperate with the innovation investment fund , and seek to cooperate with the innovation investment fund , and participate in the cooperative innovation through the cooperative innovation of the investment fund , and analyze the distribution strategy between the innovative investment fund , the enterprise and the university or the scientific research institution , and analyze the influence of the relevant factors such as the bargaining power of the participating parties on the distribution strategy , and the optimal allocation scheme of the cooperative innovation is obtained through the theory and simulation analysis .

The Benefit Distribution Mechanism and Investment Mechanism Design of Preventing Moral Hazard in Cooperative Innovation ;

This part is composed of the coordination innovation benefit distribution and the investment mechanism design under the investment fund model of Chapter 6 . The innovation investment fund is introduced into the innovation contractor in the form of contract , and the innovation investment fund is introduced to participate in the collaborative innovation . The innovative investment fund is introduced to improve the cooperation innovation input , improve the scale and performance of the cooperative innovation , and the optimal distribution mechanism and the fund investment strategy under the guidance of the guide fund are obtained through the theory and simulation analysis .

The thesis has the following theoretical and methodological innovations :

The paper studies how to design and solve the adverse selection problem caused by asymmetric information in the collaborative innovation by constructing the model of the gambling game between the innovation enterprise and the investment fund .

In the research of cooperative innovation , it is mostly the way of information selection by the information disadvantaged party to solve the adverse selection problem . In this paper , the paper considers that the information superiority party ( i.e . , the enterprise ) adopts the way of signal transmission ( i.e . , puts forward the betting agreement ) , so that the investment fund is convinced that it is the real private information , thus solving the adverse selection problem in the collaborative innovation , promoting the formation of the cooperative innovation , and obtaining the forming conditions and the optimal betting agreement between the innovative enterprise and the investment fund through theory and simulation analysis .

( 2 ) The multi - agent - multi - agent cooperative innovation game model based on the investment spillover effect is constructed , and the cooperative innovation bargaining game model under the investment fund model is constructed , and a reasonable coordination innovation benefit distribution mechanism is designed to solve the problem of unreasonable benefit distribution .

Considering that there are two enterprises in the same product market respectively entrust different external R & D organizations to develop the same new product , and the innovation has the investment spillover effect , the optimal cooperation and profit distribution strategy of the enterprise and the optimal innovation investment strategy of R & D organization are designed by constructing the multi - agent - multi - agent cooperative innovation game model based on the investment overflow effect , and the influence of the investment overflow on the innovation input of the contractor is analyzed .
Then , for the existing research , the cooperative innovation cooperation game is analyzed by Cournot or StackPower non - cooperative game , and the cooperative innovation in reality is usually negotiated through bargaining , and the distribution strategy among innovation investment funds , enterprises and R & D institutions is studied through the cooperative innovation bargaining game model under the investment fund model , and the influence of the relevant factors such as bargaining power of the participating parties on the distribution strategy is analyzed .

( 3 ) constructing the cooperative innovation game model under the innovation investment fund mode , designing the cooperative innovation benefit distribution and phased investment mechanism , and preventing the moral hazard problem ;

Through the collaborative innovation game model between innovation investment fund , enterprise and R & D institution , how to design the innovative investment fund through the cooperative innovation benefit distribution mechanism and the fund phased investment strategy are studied , so as to encourage the enterprises and the innovation contractors to improve the cooperation innovation input , improve the scale and performance of the cooperative innovation investment , and provide new ideas and new methods for designing and preventing the moral hazard of enterprises and R & D institutions through the design of cooperative innovation phased investment mechanism among the funds , enterprises and R & D institutions .

【学位授予单位】：重庆大学
【学位级别】：博士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：F273.1;F832.48

【参考文献】