基于历史业绩的风险投资报酬激励机制

发布时间：2018-04-15 02:39

本文选题：风险投资 + 道德风险　；参考：《软科学》2012年01期

【摘要】：针对有限合伙制风险投资基金运作过程中的道德风险问题,从风险投资者角度出发,对风险投资家的报酬激励机制设计问题进行了讨论。为此在两阶段情况下,引入风险投资家的第一阶段业绩作为先验信息来修正对其工作能力的判断,从而建立了风险投资家的报酬激励机制模型。理论研究结果表明,在基于风险投资家历史业绩的报酬激励机制下,风险投资家的努力程度要大于不考虑历史业绩下的努力程度;风险投资家在第二期基金中分享收益的份额大于他在第一期基金中分享收益的份额。因此,这种激励机制有效地刺激风险投资家在每期的基金运作管理中努力工作,降低了道德风险发生的可能性,为风险投资者制定合理有效的激励契约提供了理论依据。
[Abstract]:Aiming at the moral hazard in the operation of limited partnership venture capital fund, this paper discusses the design of reward incentive mechanism for venture capitalists from the angle of venture capital.Therefore, under the two-stage situation, the first stage performance of venture capitalists is introduced as prior information to correct the judgment of their working ability, and the reward incentive mechanism model of venture capitalists is established.The theoretical results show that under the reward incentive mechanism based on the historical performance of venture capitalists, the degree of effort of venture capitalists is greater than that of those without considering historical achievements.Venture capitalists have a larger share of the proceeds in the second tranche than they do in the first tranche.Therefore, this incentive mechanism effectively stimulates venture capitalists to work hard in each issue of fund operation and management, reduces the possibility of moral hazard, and provides a theoretical basis for venture capitalists to formulate reasonable and effective incentive contracts.
【作者单位】：电子科技大学经济与管理学院;西华师范大学数学与信息学院;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金资助项目(70971015) 西华师范大学校基金资助项目(10A014)
【分类号】：F830.59

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