银企关系、银行负债融资对国有企业过度投资的影响研究
发布时间:2018-04-20 19:33
本文选题:银企关系 + 银行负债融资 ; 参考:《重庆理工大学》2014年硕士论文
【摘要】:“十二五”以来,国家不断推动加快转变经济发展方式,以保持经济长期平稳发展,提高社会资源的有效配置。这对于推进我国经济和谐稳定发展具有重要意义。国有企业是推进国家现代化、保障人民共同利益的重要推动力。十八届三中全会提到要进一步深化国有企业改革,国有企业必须适应市场化、国际化新形势,对优化社会资源配置起到带头推动作用,以促进国民经济长期可持续发展。目前我国证券市场的再融资功能因受到某些宏微观因素的限制,债务融资成为了上市公司主要的融资渠道,其中银行借款是上市公司债务融资的主要组成部分。在我国银行业长期处于被五大国有银行垄断的背景下,信贷资金分配受到了较大的政策影响。随着国内金融市场开放的步伐加快,对银行业的深化改革越来越急迫。银行要能够适应信贷市场的发展,加强自身的风险控制水平,提高信贷资金的使用效率,只有这样才能在开放的金融市场中具备核心竞争力,不被市场所淘汰。因此,研究我国银企关系、银行负债融资对企业过度投资影响对于银行及企业的可持续发展都具有重大意义。 本文从银企关系与银行负债融资入手,选取具有企业关系的国有上市公司为样本,再按比例选取配对样本。以上述样本企业2010-2012年数据作为研究样本回归分析检验了银企关系、银行负债融资与国有企业过度投资的相关性。研究发现,国有企业中普遍存在非投资效率的问题,国有企业过度投资问题大量存在,个别国有企业的过度投资程度非常严重;银行负债融资对国有企业过度投资具有显著的正影响,,即银行借款会加剧国有企业过度投资;银企关系的存在对国有企业过度投资具有显著的正影响,紧密型银企关系会导致更大程度的过度投资;具有银企关系的国有企业其负债融资对企业过度投资程度的正影响大于无银企关系的国有企业,即银企关系会加剧国有企业中银行借款的过度投资程度。因此,需要从银行和企业两个方向来提高投资效率,银行方面需要加强贷前审批、贷中监控与贷后问责等来强化管理,企业方面则需要从提高信息披露、加强公司治理、优化股权结构及扩大融资渠道等来强化管理。
[Abstract]:Since the 12th Five-Year Plan, the state has been pushing to speed up the transformation of the mode of economic development in order to maintain the long-term and stable development of the economy and to improve the effective allocation of social resources. This is of great significance for promoting the harmonious and stable development of our economy. State-owned enterprises are an important driving force for promoting national modernization and safeguarding the common interests of the people. The third Plenary session of the 18th CPC Central Committee mentioned that in order to further deepen the reform of state-owned enterprises, state-owned enterprises must adapt to the new situation of marketization and internationalization, and play a leading role in optimizing the allocation of social resources in order to promote the long-term sustainable development of the national economy. At present, the refinancing function of China's securities market is limited by some macro and micro factors, debt financing has become the main financing channel of listed companies, among which bank borrowing is the main component of debt financing of listed companies. Under the background of being monopolized by the five state-owned banks for a long time, the distribution of credit funds has been greatly influenced by the policy. With the rapid opening of domestic financial markets, the deepening reform of the banking industry is becoming more and more urgent. Banks should be able to adapt to the development of credit market, strengthen their own risk control level, and improve the efficiency of the use of credit funds. Only in this way can they have the core competitiveness in the open financial market and not be eliminated by the market. Therefore, it is of great significance for banks and enterprises to study the relationship between banks and enterprises, and the impact of bank debt financing on the overinvestment of enterprises. Starting with the relationship between banks and enterprises and bank debt financing, this paper selects state-owned listed companies with enterprise relations as samples, and then selects paired samples in proportion. Based on the sample data of 2010-2012, the relationship between banks and enterprises, the relationship between bank debt financing and overinvestment of state-owned enterprises is tested by regression analysis. It is found that the problem of non-investment efficiency exists generally in state-owned enterprises, the excessive investment problem of state-owned enterprises exists in a large number, and the degree of over-investment of individual state-owned enterprises is very serious. Bank debt financing has a significant positive impact on the overinvestment of state-owned enterprises, that is, bank borrowing will aggravate the overinvestment of state-owned enterprises, and the existence of the relationship between banks and enterprises has a significant positive impact on the over-investment of state-owned enterprises. The close-knit relationship between banks and enterprises leads to a greater degree of overinvestment; the debt financing of state-owned enterprises with a relationship between banks and enterprises has a more positive impact on the degree of overinvestment of enterprises than state-owned enterprises with no relationship between banks and enterprises. That is, the relationship between banks and enterprises will aggravate the degree of overinvestment of bank loans in state-owned enterprises. Therefore, it is necessary to improve the investment efficiency in both the direction of banks and enterprises, the banks need to strengthen the examination and approval before loans, the supervision in loans and accountability after loans to strengthen management, while enterprises need to enhance information disclosure and corporate governance. Optimize equity structure and expand financing channels to strengthen management.
【学位授予单位】:重庆理工大学
【学位级别】:硕士
【学位授予年份】:2014
【分类号】:F276.1;F832.4;F275
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