我国上市商业银行高管薪酬影响因素的实证研究

发布时间：2018-04-22 13:45

本文选题：商业银行 + 高管薪酬　；参考：《北京交通大学》2014年硕士论文

【摘要】：摘要：商业银行高级管理人员的巨额薪酬问题总是受到社会的广泛关注和质疑。商业银行高管薪酬水平是否过高?如何使银行高管的薪酬体系更好的促进银行的运营和发展?银行业应该如何合理的制定高管薪酬约束机制,从而在最大程度上减少管理人和银行股东之间的交易成本问题?这些已经成为摆在各国商业银行以及银行业监管部门面前的一个重要问题。自改革开放以来,我国的金融体系特别是银行体系经历了若干次变革,逐渐形成并完善市场化运作经营方式。现如今,我们商业银行在全球影响力、资产规模以及盈利水平等方面都有显著的提高,逐渐拉近了与世界一流商业银行之间的差距。但是,我国商业银行本身仍然存在较大问题,综合管理能力依然较弱,抗风险能力不足,银行员工特别是银行高级管理人员的薪酬激励约束机制问题没有得到有效的解决。本文通过规范分析和实证分析相结合的研究方法,对我国16家上市商业银行高管薪酬问题进行了深入探讨。本文研究发现,我国商业银行初步建立了基本薪酬加绩效薪酬的薪酬体系。不同上市商业银行之间,高管的薪酬水平差异较大,国有控股银行高管薪酬明显低于地方政府企业控股或民营外资控股的商业银行。薪酬形式较为单一,缺乏长期激励计划。另外,回归分析显示,上市银行高管薪酬与银行风险控制业绩和代表股东收益等指标联系较为紧密。本文认为,随着上市商业银行市场化经营方式的日趋成熟,建立一套完善的绩效考核体制和绩效文化,是实现薪酬市场化的当务之急。一方面,商业银行自身的行业特点决定了高级管理人员经营的结果既要与会计利润和股东收益挂钩,又要注重银行资产安全性和流动性方面的考察。另一方面,调整薪酬结构,实现长期激励与短期激励相结合,最大限度的去“行政化”,提高高管人员薪酬信息的透明性,增强投资者和公众的监督也是实现高管薪酬体系健康发展的关键因素。
[Abstract]:Absrtact: the huge salary of senior managers in commercial banks has always been widely concerned and questioned by the society. Is the executive compensation level of commercial banks too high? How to make the bank executives pay system to better promote the operation and development of banks? How should the banking industry develop a reasonable executive compensation constraint mechanism, so as to minimize the transaction costs between managers and bank shareholders? These have become an important issue in front of commercial banks and banking regulators. Since the reform and opening up, China's financial system, especially the banking system, has undergone several changes and gradually formed and improved market-oriented operation mode. Nowadays, our commercial banks have improved significantly in terms of global influence, asset size and profitability, which has gradually narrowed the gap between our commercial banks and the world's top commercial banks. However, there are still big problems in commercial banks in our country, the comprehensive management ability is still weak, the ability to resist risks is insufficient, and the compensation incentive and restraint mechanism of bank employees, especially the senior managers of banks, has not been effectively solved. Through the combination of normative analysis and empirical analysis, this paper probes into the executive compensation of 16 listed commercial banks in China. This paper finds that the commercial banks of our country have initially established the compensation system of basic salary plus performance compensation. The executive compensation level of the state-owned holding banks is obviously lower than that of the local government enterprises or private foreign-owned commercial banks. Pay form is relatively single, lack long-term incentive plan. In addition, the regression analysis shows that the executive compensation of listed banks is closely related to the risk control performance of the banks and the return on behalf of shareholders. This paper holds that with the maturity of market-oriented management mode of listed commercial banks, it is urgent to establish a set of perfect performance appraisal system and performance culture in order to realize the marketization of salary. On the one hand, the industry characteristics of commercial banks determine that the management results of senior managers should not only be linked to accounting profits and shareholders' income, but also pay attention to the safety and liquidity of bank assets. On the other hand, adjust the salary structure, realize the combination of long-term incentive and short-term incentive, maximize the "administrative", and improve the transparency of executive compensation information. Strengthening the supervision of investors and the public is also the key factor to realize the healthy development of executive compensation system.
【学位授予单位】：北京交通大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：F272.92;F832.33

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