机构投资者持股对高管变更的影响研究

发布时间：2018-04-28 13:50

本文选题：机构投资者 + 高管变更　；参考：《西南财经大学》2014年硕士论文

【摘要】：近年来,机构投资者队伍在我国得到迅猛发展,并且逐渐成为资本市场上举足轻重的中坚力量。2000年上半年,中国证券监督管理委员会提出了“超常规、创造性地培育和发展机构投资者”的口号,虽然当年即爆发了一些负面事件,但监管层超常规发展机构投资者的决心并没有因此改变。2004年初,国务院出台的《国务院关于推进资本市场改革开放和稳定发展的若干建议》中也指出,要培养一批诚信、守法、专业的机构投资者,使以基金管理公司和保险公司为主的机构投资者成为资本市场的主导力量。近几年,证监会把超常规、创造性地培养和发展机构投资者作为推进中国证券市场发展的重要政策手段,QFII制度的实施、保险和社保基金的入市,使得机构投资者比例日益增加。在我国机构投资者的不断发展过程中,越来越多的学者开始对机构投资者参与公司治理的情况进行相关的研究。最开始的研究更多的是对国外理论和实践的引进与学习,现在已经有了较为深入的理论分析和实证研究,这也表明我国学者针对此类研究已经日渐成熟。而在理论界诸多的研究中,对于我国的机构投资者参与上市公司治理的影响力却一直存在着争议：我国的机构投资者是否真正参与了上市公司的公司治理?如果参与到了公司治理中,那么是存在积极的治理作用还是产生了消极的后果?而不同类型的机构投资者在发挥其治理作用时是否有不同之处呢?正是基于理论界对于上述问题的争议,笔者认为有必要对机构投资者参与公司治理产生的影响力进行进一步地探讨,并从高管变更的角度进行研究。同时,不同的地区经济发展速度不同,市场化进程也不相同,那么市场化进程的不同是否也会影响到机构投资者的公司治理效果?这些都是本文认为值得探讨的问题。正是出于以上原因,本文拟对以下问题进行理论分析和实证的检验：(1)机构投资者在替换业绩较差高管的过程中到底是演绎着什么样的角色呢,“有效监督者”、“旁观者”抑或是“合谋者”?(2)不同的机构投资者对公司高管变更的影响力是否存在差异?(3)市场化进程的不同是否会对机构投资者参与公司高管变更的影响力产生不同? 本文共分为六章,研究内容如下：第一章为绪论,简要介绍了本文的研究目的与研究意义,研究内容与方法,以及本文主要的贡献。第二章为相关的概念界定以及国内外相关研究的文献述评,主要对机构投资者、异质机构投资者、公司治理以及高管变更的定义进行了阐述,对本文涉及到的基础理论进行了简要地分析,如委托代理理论和股权结构理论,同时对国内外相关的文献按照以下几个方面进行了梳理：(1)机构投资者参与公司治理的意愿以及监督效率；(2)机构投资者参与公司治理的主要领域；(3)高管变更的影响因素。第三章是对机构投资者在公司高管变更过程中所产生作用力的理论进行分析并提出相应的假设。理论分析主要包括以下几个方面：机构投资者影响高管变更的动因分析,机构投资者影响公司高管变更的方式分析,机构投资者影响高管变更的理论分析,异质机构投资者影响高管变更的效应分析,以及市场化进程的快慢对机构投资者参与公司高管变更决策的理论分析。进而根据下面的疑问提出了相应的假设：(1)机构投资者在替换业绩不佳的上市公司高管过程中发挥的作用。(2)不同类型的机构投资者发挥的作用是否有所差异。(3)上市公司所在地的市场化进程的快慢程度是否会对机构投资者参与高管变更产生影响。第四章为研究设计,主要介绍了样本选择的方法以及数据来源,说明了变量选取的原因,同时对本文模型的构建进行了解释,并对采用的变量进行了定义。第五章为实证检验与结果分析。首先是对本文所运用的基础数据进行描述性统计分析,并进行变量之间的相关性检验。接着运用stata软件对模型进行相关的实证检验,在获得检验结果后进行了相应的解释。第六章为本文相关的研究结论以及相对应的政策建议部分。在该部分根据文章的理论分析以及实证研究结果概括出相关的研究结论并提出了相应的政策建议,同时总结了文章的不足之处,并对未来在该方面可进行的研究方向进行了说明。本文研究后发现： (1)机构投资者的持股比例越高,上市公司的高管因业绩原因而发生非常规变更的概率就更大。说明机构投资者在替换业绩不佳的高管时发挥了积极的治理作用。 (2)与压力敏感型机构投资者相比,压力抵制型机构投资者相对能够提高上市公司高管因业绩原因而发生非常规更换的概率。 (3)与市场化进程相对较慢的地区相比,市场化进程相对快的地区能够促进压力抵制型机构投资者参与公司治理,提高上市公司高管因业绩原因而发生非常规更换的概率。在该论文的写作过程中,通过笔者对文献的阅读以及对框架的构思,主要做出了以下贡献： (1)拓宽了机构投资者作用于我国上市公司治理的相关研究领域。从文献综述中可以看出,当前国内学者对于机构投资者参与到我国上市公司治理所产生的影响研究主要集中在高管薪酬、盈余管理、股利政策等领域,而很少有学者从高管变更的视角来探讨机构投资者对上市公司治理的影响力。而本文试图从高管变更的视角来探讨机构投资者对我国公司治理所产生的影响,以此来拓宽机构投资者作用于公司治理的研究领域。 (2)通过对机构投资者的类型进行划分,探讨了不同类型的机构投资者在参与上市公司高管变更的决策过程中所发挥的作用力。 (3)研究了市场化进程的快慢对机构投资者参与上市公司的高管变更决策产生的影响。之前有一些文献研究了市场化进程对高管的薪酬机制可能产生的影响,但是对高管变更决策产生的影响还没有学者研究过。作者试图将市场化进程的快慢作为机构投资者参与高管变更决策的重要影响因素进行研究。本文存在的不足之处： (1)限于现有数据库中总经理变更数据缺失较多,本文仅仅是对董事长的非常规变更进行了研究,而并没有对总经理的非常规变更进行研究。难以将两个职位的变更进行对比研究,这是本文的一个缺憾。 (2)机构投资者的持股普遍存在内生性问题,本文通过采用滞后一期的业绩变量来减弱相关的内生性问题所产生的影响,但是这并不能完全消除这种内生性所产生的影响。如何更好的控制研究中存在的内生性问题,是未来研究中还需要改进的地方。
[Abstract]:In recent years, the team of institutional investors has developed rapidly in China, and has gradually become a key force in the capital market in the first half of.2000. The Chinese Securities Regulatory Commission has put forward the slogan of "supernormal, creative and developing institutional investors". Although some negative events have been broke out in the year, the supervision and Management Committee of the China Securities Regulatory Commission The determination of the ultra normal development of institutional investors has not changed the beginning of.2004. The State Council issued a number of suggestions on promoting the reform and opening up of the capital market and the steady development of the capital market. It also points out that a number of institutional investors with good faith, law-abiding and professional are needed to make investment based on fund management companies and insurance companies. In recent years, the SFC has developed and developed the institutional investors as an important policy means to promote the development of China's securities market. The implementation of the QFII system, insurance and the entry of the social security fund have made institutional investors increasing.
In the process of the continuous development of institutional investors in China, more and more scholars have begun to study the situation of institutional investors participating in corporate governance. Most of the first studies are the introduction and study of foreign theories and practices. Now there have been more in-depth theoretical analysis and empirical research, which also shows that China is a national study. This kind of research has become more mature.
In many theoretical circles, there is a dispute about the influence of institutional investors participating in the governance of Listed Companies in China: does our institutional investor really participate in the corporate governance of the listed companies? If they are involved in the corporate governance, there is a positive effect or a negative effect on the corporate governance. What is the difference between different types of institutional investors when they play its role? It is based on the controversy over the above problem that the author thinks it is necessary to further explore the influence of institutional investors in corporate governance and to study from the perspective of high management change. The speed of regional economic development is different, and the process of marketization is different. Then whether the different market process will affect the effect of corporate governance of institutional investors? These are all problems that are worth discussing in this paper.
For the reasons above, this paper intends to carry out theoretical analysis and empirical test on the following questions: (1) what role does institutional investors play in the process of replacing poor performance executives, "effective supervisors", "bystander" or "collusion"? (2) different institutional investors change their executives. Is there any difference in influence? (3) does the marketization process have different effects on institutional investors' participation in top management turnover?
This article is divided into six chapters, and the contents are as follows:
The first chapter is an introduction, which briefly introduces the purpose and significance of the study, contents and methods, and the main contributions of this paper.
In the second chapter, the definition of related concepts and the literature review of relevant research at home and abroad is reviewed. The definition of institutional investors, heterogeneous institutional investors, corporate governance and executive change is expounded. The basic theories involved in this paper are briefly analyzed, such as principal-agent theory and equity structure theory, and at the same time at home and abroad. The related literature has been combed in the following aspects: (1) the willingness of institutional investors to participate in corporate governance and supervision efficiency; (2) the main areas of institutional investors' participation in corporate governance; (3) the influencing factors of executive change.
The third chapter is the analysis of the theory of institutional investors in the process of corporate executive change and the corresponding assumptions. The theoretical analysis mainly includes the following aspects: the analysis of the motivation of institutional investors affecting the change of senior executives, the analysis of the ways that institutional investors affect the change of executives, and the high influence of institutional investors. The theoretical analysis of management change, the effect analysis of hetero institutional investors affecting the change of senior executives, and the theoretical analysis of the mechanism investors' participation in the decision making of the company executives' change in the market process. Then, according to the following questions, the corresponding assumptions are put forward: (1) the institutional investors are in the process of replacing the top executives of the listed companies with poor performance. Play a role. (2) whether different types of institutional investors play a different role. (3) whether the speed of the market process of the location of the listed company will affect the institutional investors' participation in the change of executives.
The fourth chapter is for research and design, mainly introducing the method of sample selection and data sources, explaining the reasons for the selection of variables, explaining the construction of the model and defining the variables used.
The fifth chapter is the empirical test and the result analysis. First, it carries on the descriptive statistical analysis to the basic data used in this paper, and carries out the correlation test between the variables. Then the model is tested with Stata software, and the results are explained after the test results are obtained.
The sixth chapter is the relevant research conclusions and the corresponding policy recommendations. In this part, the relevant research conclusions are summarized and the corresponding policy suggestions are summarized according to the theoretical analysis and the results of the empirical study. At the same time, the shortcomings of the article are summarized, and the research direction that can be carried out in this area is also carried out. Explain.
After the study, we found that:
(1) the higher the shareholding ratio of institutional investors, the probability of unconventional changes for the executives of listed companies is greater. It shows that institutional investors have played a positive role in replacing executives with poor performance.
(2) compared with the pressure sensitive institutional investors, the pressure boycott institutional investors can increase the probability of unconventional replacement of the listed company executives because of their performance reasons.
(3) compared with the relatively slow market process, the regions with relatively fast marketization can promote the pressure boycott institutional investors to participate in corporate governance and improve the probability of unconventional replacement of the listed company executives because of their performance reasons.
In the process of writing this article, I have made the following contributions through the author's reading of the literature and the conception of the framework.
(1) it has widened the related research fields of institutional investors' effect on the governance of Listed Companies in China. From the literature review, it can be seen that the research on the impact of institutional investors on corporate governance in China is mainly focused on executive compensation, earnings management, dividend policy and so on, while few scholars have from senior executives. This paper tries to explore the influence of institutional investors on corporate governance in China from the perspective of executive change, so as to broaden the research field of institutional investors' role in corporate governance.
(2) by dividing the types of institutional investors, this paper discusses the exertion of different types of institutional investors in the decision-making process of participating in the change of listed company executives.
(3) the influence of the speed of the marketization process on the decision making by the institutional investors participating in the executive change of the listed company is studied. Some previous literatures have studied the possible influence of the marketization process on the executive compensation mechanism, but the influence on the executive change decision has not been studied by scholars. As an important factor affecting institutional investors' participation in top management turnover decisions, speed and speed are studied.
The shortcomings of this article are as follows:
(1) limited to the general manager's change of data in the existing database, this paper only studies the unconventional changes of the chairman, and does not study the unconventional changes of the general manager. It is difficult to compare the changes of the two positions. This is a shortcoming of this article.
(2) there is a general problem of endogenous ownership in institutional investors. In this paper, the impact of the related endogenous problems is weakened by using the performance variables of the lag phase, but this does not completely eliminate the impact of the endogenous nature. How to better control the endogenous problems in the study is also needed in the future research. A place to improve.

【学位授予单位】：西南财经大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：F272.91;F832.51;F271;F275

【参考文献】