管理层业绩预告违规与分析师监管

发布时间：2018-05-09 03:14

本文选题：业绩预告 + 强制预告　；参考：《会计研究》2015年03期

【摘要】：本文从外部治理的角度考察了分析师对业绩预告违规的影响及其对监管制度的替代作用。研究结果表明,分析师跟踪可以显著降低上市公司业绩预告违规的概率;进一步控制分析师跟踪规模后发现,有明星分析师跟踪以及来自高声誉券商的分析师数量越多、分析师预测分歧度越低,预测越准确,这种治理作用越显著。但是分析师的监管作用仅在上市公司受监管较弱时有效,对受监管力度较强上市公司的业绩预告违规行为则没有显著影响,表明分析师对业绩预告的治理效应仅在监管力度较弱时发挥作用,成为监管制度的有效替代。本文拓展了我国分析师研究的领域与视角,并为监管部门信息披露制度的制定与执行提供了新的经验证据。
[Abstract]:From the perspective of external governance, this paper examines the influence of analysts on the performance forecast violation and its substitution for the regulatory system. The results of the study show that analyst tracking can significantly reduce the probability of earnings forecast violations of listed companies; after further controlling the scale of analyst tracking, it is found that the more analysts who have star analysts tracking and those from reputable brokerages, Analysts predict that the lower the divergence, the more accurate the forecast, and the more significant this governance is. However, the regulatory role of analysts is only effective when the listed companies are subject to weaker supervision, and it has no significant impact on the performance forecast violations of the listed companies with stronger supervision. It shows that the governance effect of analysts' earnings forecast only plays a role in the weak supervision and becomes an effective substitute for the regulatory system. This paper expands the field and perspective of analyst research in China, and provides new empirical evidence for the establishment and implementation of regulatory information disclosure system.
【作者单位】：对外经济贸易大学国际商学院/国际财务与会计研究中心;
【基金】：教育部新世纪优秀人才支持计划(NCET-11-0623) 财政部“全国会计领军人才(学术类)培养项目”的资助
【分类号】：F832.51;F275

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