基于中国上市公司股权融资的会计寻租研究

发布时间：2018-05-18 05:06

本文选题：证券市场 + 上市公司　；参考：《南京理工大学》2014年博士论文

【摘要】：我国上市公司一方面热衷于股权融资却不知给投资者回报；另一方面会计信息严重失真。这一千夫所指的现象与会计寻租紧密相关。本文系统地研究了我国上市公司在股权融资过程中的会计寻租行为,期望能为我国股票发行制度改革与会计制度创新,以及会计寻租理论体系的建立提供有价值的研究成果。论文运用寻租理论和证券市场股权融资与会计的关系理论,并采用规范研究和实证研究相结合的方法展开研究。首先,基于现有会计寻租理论很不成熟的现实,按照寻租理论的核心思想,结合会计实务特点,清晰地界定了会计寻租的内涵及研究范畴,提出了会计寻租理论体系的基本结构和会计寻租研究四要素,构建了会计寻租的分析框架。其次,探讨了股权融资会计寻租的性质。主要包括二个方面：一是构建了股权融资会计寻租租金的计量模型；二是构建相关计量模型,分析了股权融资会计寻租的社会成本构成和福利效应。认为政府退出股权融资环节,股权融资市场化,是我国证券市场改革的必然趋势。第三,分析了股权融资会计寻租的主体及其协同效应。股权融资会计寻租的主体由控股股东、公司高管、相关中介机构和政府有关部门组成。上市公司的控制权是股权融资寻租主体协同寻租的基础。如果是在制度范围内寻租,由于不至于遭到刑事处罚,寻租主体很容易协同；如果要进行违规性寻租,寻租主体是否协同则取决于处罚制度的严厉程度。完善上市公司和中介机构的内部控制是遏制协同寻租的关键。第四,分析了会计寻租的制度机制。从我国股权融资有关的会计制度产生、发展的历史过程来看,政府整体上表现出“从有意创租到无意创租”的规律。在会计制度制定民主化、会计信息使用市场化、司法救济等方面还要深化改革。第五,研究了股权融资会计寻租方法及其基本特征。在股权分置改革以前,上市公司存在一条“大股东向上市公司进行利益输送——上市公司股权融资——上市公司向大股东进行利益输送”的可以重复寻租的无法律风险通道。在股权分置改革时,案例分析显示,从最终租金获取程度来看,拥有信息优势的非流通股股东是最大的赢家,禁售股解禁会导致非流通股股东延伸会计寻租。股权分置改革后,上市公司的股权整体上处于全流通状态,实证研究表明：尽管股权融资制度环境有了质的变化,但股权融资会计寻租仍在进行,操纵往来账是主要手段(虽然不是唯一手段),且更加隐蔽；全流通时代机构投资者有与大股东一同寻租的动力；配股有消退的迹象；独立董事对于抑制寻租作用不大。因此完善关联交易制度,揭露关联交易非关联化,提高独立董事比例,实行优先股制度等措施有利于抑制上市公司会计寻租。根据会计的基本原理,基于对会计实务的研究,从净利润、净资产、净现金流和会计信息披露四个方面总结了股权融资违规性会计寻租的一般规律和15种比较隐秘的违规性寻租手段。具体的案例分析表明,违规性寻租上市采取的手段符合上述规律,且其社会成本巨大。因此,实行舞弊导向审计(或鉴证)模式,并加大上市公司高管和中介责任,完善退市制度,实行严刑峻法,才可有效遏制这种恶意寻租行为。
[Abstract]:China ' s listed companies are keen on equity financing but do not know the return of investors ;
On the other hand , accounting information is seriously distorted . This phenomenon is closely related to accounting rent - seeking . This paper systematically studies the accounting rent - seeking behavior of listed companies in the course of equity financing , and expects to provide valuable research results for China ' s stock issuance system reform and accounting system innovation , as well as the establishment of accounting rent seeking theory system .

The paper uses the theory of rent - seeking theory and the relation theory of equity financing and accounting in stock market , and adopts the method of normative research and empirical research to carry out the research .

First , based on the reality that the existing accounting rent seeking theory is very immature , according to the core idea of the rent seeking theory and the characteristics of the accounting practice , the connotation and the research scope of the accounting rent seeking are clearly defined , the basic structure of the accounting rent seeking theory system and the four elements of the accounting rent seeking research are put forward , and the analysis framework of the accounting rent seeking is constructed .

Secondly , the nature of the rent - seeking of equity financing is discussed , which mainly includes two aspects : one is the model of the rent - seeking rent of equity financing ;
The second is to build the relevant measurement model , and analyze the social cost composition and welfare effect of the equity financing accounting rent seeking . It is considered that the government exits the equity financing link , and the equity financing is the inevitable trend of the reform of the securities market in China .

Thirdly , the main body of the equity financing accounting rent - seeking is analyzed . The main body of the equity financing accounting rent - seeking is composed of the controlling shareholder , the executive branch of the company , the relevant intermediary and the relevant government departments . The control right of the listed company is the basis of the cooperative rent - seeking of the equity financing rent - seeking main body .
If the rent - seeking is to be carried out , whether the rent - seeking main body is in coordination depends on the severity of the penalty system , and the internal control of the listed company and the intermediary institution is the key to curb the cooperative rent - seeking .

Fourth , the system mechanism of accounting rent seeking is analyzed . From the historical process of the development of accounting system related to equity financing in our country , the government has shown the law of " deliberately creating the rent from intention to create the rent " . In the accounting system , democratization , the use of accounting information and the judicial relief should be further reformed .

Fifth , the method and basic characteristics of equity financing accounting rent - seeking are studied . Before the reform of stock rights , the listed company has a non - legal risk channel which can repeat the rent - seeking for the interest delivery of listed companies to listed companies . In the case analysis , the stock rights of listed companies are the biggest winners . After the reform of stock rights , the stock rights of listed companies are in the whole circulation state .
The institutional investors in the all - circulation era have the power to rent the rent with the big shareholders ;
There are signs of regression of the shares ;
According to the basic principle of accounting , this paper sums up the general rule of accounting rent - seeking and 15 kinds of illegal rent - seeking methods . According to the basic principle of accounting , this paper sums up the general rule of the non - compliance accounting rent - seeking and the 15 kinds of comparative hidden rent - seeking methods .
【学位授予单位】：南京理工大学
【学位级别】：博士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：F275;F832.51

【参考文献】