上市公司信息披露、投资者信息识别与博弈均衡

发布时间：2018-05-23 06:35

本文选题：信息披露 + 信息识别　；参考：《中央财经大学学报》2012年02期

【摘要】：上市公司信息披露与投资者信息识别,是上市公司与投资者间的隐性合约行为。信息披露与识别博弈均衡取决于上市公司信息披露类型组合与投资者信息识别模式、信息披露与识别波动性、相关性、投资者风险偏好、投资者信息识别成本等因素。决定因素不对称影响上市公司信息披露与投资者信息识别均衡,产生信息披露与信息识别模式间比较收益。上市公司选择性信息披露与投资者信息选择性识别,获取合约剩余收入分配,可能激励上市公司信息披露与投资者信息识别过度或不足。信息披露与识别实际上是市场交易行动和利益分配的实现机制、分配机制与联系机制,优化上市公司信息披露与投资信息识别,就是优化市场利益分配。
[Abstract]:Information disclosure and investor information identification of listed companies are hidden contract behaviors between listed companies and investors. The equilibrium of information disclosure and recognition game depends on the combination of information disclosure types of listed companies and investor information identification mode, information disclosure and identification volatility, correlation, investor risk preference, investor information identification cost and so on. The asymmetry of determinants affects the equilibrium of information disclosure and investor information identification of listed companies, resulting in a comparative return between information disclosure and information recognition patterns. Selective information disclosure of listed companies and selective identification of investors' information may encourage excessive or insufficient information disclosure and investor information identification of listed companies to obtain the distribution of residual income of contracts. Information disclosure and identification is actually the realization mechanism of market transaction action and benefit distribution, the distribution mechanism and contact mechanism, and the optimization of information disclosure and investment information identification of listed companies, which is to optimize the distribution of market benefits.
【作者单位】：中南大学商学院;株洲南车时代电气股份有限公司;
【基金】：教育部新世纪优秀人才项目(NCET-10-0830)的资助
【分类号】：F233;F832.51;F224

【参考文献】