小微企业与互助担保组织的动态博弈研究

发布时间：2018-05-25 16:08

本文选题：动态博弈 + 小微企业　；参考：《财经问题研究》2012年12期

【摘要】：直接融资渠道的不畅,导致小微企业只能通过互助担保展开自救。但在我国,互助担保融资模式发展缓慢,本文在梳理国内外针对互助担保的研究和对现实考量的基础上,构建了小微企业与互助担保组织的动态博弈模型,对小微企业和互助担保组织的信贷决策过程及其影响因素展开分析。研究结果表明:小微企业互助担保贷款模式具备一定的可操作性,成员企业的非货币收益、企业面临的社会惩罚和贷款规模是贷款企业选择是否履约的关键所在。
[Abstract]:Direct financing channels are not smooth, leading to small and micro-enterprises can only through mutual support to carry out self-help. However, in China, mutual guarantee financing mode is slow to develop. On the basis of combing the domestic and foreign research on mutual aid guarantee and considering the reality, this paper constructs a dynamic game model between small and micro enterprises and mutual guarantee organizations. This paper analyzes the credit decision-making process and its influencing factors of small and micro enterprises and mutual guarantee organizations. The results show that the mutual guarantee loan model of small and micro enterprises has certain maneuverability, the non-monetary income of member enterprises, the social punishment faced by the enterprises and the loan scale are the key factors for the loan enterprises to choose whether to fulfill the contract or not.
【作者单位】：东北大学工商管理学院;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金面上项目“基于产品市场竞争的创业企业融资结构决策研究”(71150002) 教育部博士学科点专项科研基金“中小企业融资契约选择与金融服务机制创新研究”(G20090042110033) 中央高校基本科研业务专项资金“基于企业社会资本视角的小企业互助担保发展模式与机制创新研究”(N110606003) 辽宁省科技计划项目“辽宁省微小企业互助担保融资发展模式与机制创新研究”(2011401027)
【分类号】：F276.3;F832.39;F224.32

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