论人民币汇率安排是否构成WTO框架下专项性补贴

发布时间：2018-05-30 09:19

本文选题：SCM协定 + 汇率低估　；参考：《上海金融》2012年08期

【摘要】：人民币汇率问题是一个值得关注的热点问题,相关研究结论莫衷一是。本文从WTO协定入手,首先指出,WTO在汇率争端问题上将向IMF寻求技术支持,IMF内部的"汇率问题顾问组(CGER)"将发挥至关重要的作用。而事实上,CGER对人民币汇率的认定是实质性低估。随后,通过对WTO历往判例的考察,笔者认为在汇率低估的状态下,中国的外汇指定银行很有可能被认定为公共机构,通过结售汇服务向出口企业提供了财政资助,并且授予了一项利益,因此构成了WTO补贴与反补贴措施协定(SCM协定)第1.1条a项第1款所列举的情形(i)所指代的补贴。而在其专项性审查中,这种补贴以出口实绩为授予的条件之一,可能构成了SCM协定第3.1条a项所界定的禁止性补贴。而且,GATT第15条第9款中的"外汇限制"、"外汇管制"范围比较窄,无法适用于汇率争端,更无法被援引为SCM义务的例外。
[Abstract]:The issue of RMB exchange rate is a hot issue worthy of attention. Starting with the WTO agreement, this paper first points out that WTO will seek technical support from the IMF on the issue of exchange rate disputes and that the "Exchange rate Advisory Group" within the IMF will play a vital role. In fact, CGER's recognition of the RMB exchange rate is substantially undervalued. Then, through the investigation of the WTO history cases, the author thinks that under the condition of undervalued exchange rate, China's designated foreign exchange banks are likely to be recognized as public institutions, providing financial support to export enterprises through the settlement and sale of foreign exchange services. And a benefit is granted, thus constituting the subsidy referred to in Article 1.1 (a) (1) of the WTO Agreement on subsidies and countervailing measures. In its special examination, such subsidies, which are subject to export performance, may constitute prohibited subsidies as defined in Article 3.1 a of the SCM Agreement. Moreover, the "foreign exchange restriction" in Article 15 (9) of GATT is narrower and can not be applied to the exchange rate dispute, nor can it be invoked as an exception to the SCM obligation.
【作者单位】：武汉大学WTO学院;
【基金】：教育部人文社会科学基金项目“跨国并购中的技术溢出、风险防范与我国的经济安全”(11YJC790216) 国家社科基金项目“我国对美国高技术产品出口竞争力评价及影响因素研究”(12CGJ030) 武汉市社科基金项目“基于循环经济的武汉市产业集群发展模式研究”(11014) 武汉大学“70后”计划项目(09ZZKY056)
【分类号】：F832.6

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