中小投资者法律保护与股权集中度：替代抑或结果

发布时间：2018-06-21 23:03

本文选题：中小投资者法律保护 + 股权集中度　；参考：《西南财经大学》2014年硕士论文

【摘要】：资本市场的发展与国家对投资者利益保护程度息息相关。随着国家对投资者利益保护水平的提高,推动着资本市场朝着健康的方向发展。纵观欧美成熟证券市场的发展历程,在股权全部流通的情况下,法律制度已然成为保护投资者的有力手段。虽然我国的股权分置改革基本实现,但上市公司的控股股东、高级管理人员、机构投资者等仍然拥有十分明显的股权优势、资金优势、专业技术优势和信息优势,这加深了资本市场信息不对称的矛盾。而中小投资者由于其持股份额较小且较为分散,很难参与公司的内部治理。当上市公司大股东所掌握的控制权超过现金流权时,其选择有损于中小投资者利益行为的可能性很大,进而会侵害中小投资者利益(Franks,1997)。这种侵害将会使公司的运营效率降低且会抑制潜在投资者的进入,最终会严重影响资本市场的可持续发展。因此,在我国资本市场的相关制度不健全的背景下,完善投资者法律保护,既可稳固我国资本市场的基础,又能保证上市公司顺利进行股权融资。股权结构是有效安排公司剩余控制权和剩余索取权的重要基础,并且也是公司治理的基础。股东所持有股份的大小在一定程度上影响了公司治理的水平。在公司股权比较分散的情况下,有关公司治理的矛盾主要体现在管理层与股东之间。大股东持股比例不断增加,其对公司的控制权也逐渐加强,导致控股股东与中小投资者之间也产生矛盾。由于中小投资者持股比例低且较为分散,基于成本收益原则,其没有动力和能力维护自身利益。然而,根据国外资本市场的发展和相关学者的研究,国家对中小投资者保护的相关法律的完善程度,直接影响了中小投资者的利益,法律越是完善,对中小投资者的保护力度越大(LLSV,1998)。可见,法律在保护中小投资者利益中扮演了重要的角色。在我国,对中小投资者利益保护的相关法律出台较晚,1994年实施的《公司法》针对中小投资者保护,制定了具体的规定(如中小股东表决权等)。截止到2010年1月,我国已经出台了九十四部涉及中小投资者利益保护方面的法律法规,累计一百八十三条。由此可见,在立法方面,我国对中小投资者的保护在不断加强。有关投资者法律保护与股权集中度之间关系的研究,主要存在两种观点。一种是以LLSV (1999)为代表提出的“替代假说”观点。“替代假说”主要关注公司管理层同股东间的利益制衡,而忽视了大部分国家的上市公司因控股股东和中小股东间的利益摩擦而引起的代理问题。另一种是“结果模型”Bebchuk (1999),持这一观点的学者认为公司内部人士能获得多少控制权私人收益取决于投资者法律保护状况的好坏,从而有关投资者保护的法律间接影响了公司的股权结构。在实证研究方面,现有文献通过证明法律制度立法变量与投资者股权集中程度负相关,说明了股权集中度替代作用的存在性。而“结果模型”则多是通过描述性统计和建立理论模型来进行证明,尚未提供足够多的经验证据。本文将从替代和结果两个角度比较全面地实证分析股权集中度与法律保护之间的关系。本文主要采用了理论分析与实证分析相结合的方法来进行研究。借鉴法与金融、所有权结构与公司治理等一系列研究成果(LLSV,1997,1998,1999,2000),并基于双重代理理论,将股权集中度、中小投资者法律保护与控制权私人收益置于一个研究框架中进行分析。本文共分为五个部分,通过理论和实证研究分析股权结构、中小投资者法律保护与控制权私人收益三者之间的关系。具体内容如下：第一章,绪论。介绍本文的选题背景和研究意义,依据研究思路组织逻辑框架,明确研究方法,并阐述研究的贡献及存在的不足。第二章,文献综述。本章分三节梳理国内外有关股权集中度与投资者法律保护关系的文献。第一节梳理了有关股权集中度与投资者法律保护的负相关关系文献,在本节又分别从替代关系角度和结果关系角度对文献进行分类整理；第二节涵盖了除负相关关系外其他相关关系的文献；第三节介绍二者间无相关关系的文献。最后对三方面文献进行归纳和总结。第三章,制度背景、理论基础与假设建立。首先对我国中小投资者法律保护制度背景进行了详细的阐述。然后分别从股东同管理层之间的代理问题和大股东同中小股东之间的代理问题进行论述,这种双重代理问题为本文的撰写提供理论支撑。最后根据理论基础提出相关研究假设。第四章,股权集中度与中小投资者法律保护的实证分析。介绍实证研究所需样本来源,解释变量的定义,并且对回归模型进行构建。将两职合一与管理层占董事会规模变量作为判断公司第一种代理问题严重的特征；将两权分离度与控制层级作为判断公司第二种代理问题严重的特征。分别从两种代理问题角度探究：公司股权结构与中小投资者法律保护立法变量的替代关系；控制权私人收益对于股权集中度的影响。第五章,研究结论及建议。根据假设及实证结果,得出本文的研究结论,分别从加强立法进程、提高执法效果和完善股权结构三方面提出政策建议,并为未来的研究指明方向。本文主要的研究结论： (1)在第一类代理问题严重的情况下,股权集中度对于缓解投资者法律保护立法不足的问题发挥了积极作用。在宏观立法层面,股权集中度与投资者法律保护立法变量负相关,投资者立法保护的提高会降低公司的股权集中程度。 (2)在第二类代理问题严重的情况下,股权集中度不仅作为投资者保护立法不完善的替代变量,而且在微观层面上是公司执法不利的一种结果。基于国内外的研究现状和本文的研究结果,本文的主要创新点表现如下： (1)本文在中小投资者法律保护分值体系的基础上,针对“其它制度与政策”这一大类,补充了两项与投资者法律保护相关的条款——“收购行为管理”与“会员自律”。这两部法规与中小投资者权益保护紧密相关,完善了我国中小投资者法律保护体系。并系统地梳理了2003年至2010年我国有关中小投资者法律保护的法律法规,在46部相关法律法规中,共有91条法律条款新增加到法律分值表中。将中小投资者法律保护分值期限延长至2010年1月,扩展了法律分值的数据,这对于研究中小投资者法律保护具有重要的借鉴意义。 (2)从宏观立法角度,证明股权集中度是否能够替代中小投资者法律保护,主要取决于大股东对经理层的监督水平是否完善。比较全面地研究了股权集中度和投资者法律保护与公司治理的关系。公司存在严重的第一类代理问题时,如果中小投资者的立法保护较差,则得出集中的公司股权结构能够替代较弱的投资者法律保护的结论。 (3)从微观执法角度,证实了股权集中度的产生是由于公司执法不利。股权的集中是投资者法律保护程度不高的情况下控股股东追求自身利益的结果。特别是在两权分离度高或控制层级较多的公司当中,上市公司的治理多体现为第二类代理问题。本文以现金股利分配率作为衡量公司投资者法律保护执行程度高低的变量。通过实证研究得出,投资者保护程度越低(公司执法水平越低),股权会变得越发集中。因个人能力与客观条件的限制,本文的研究也存在如下的不足： (1)结果模型中样本缺失较严重。针对替代模型,筛选出7146个样本,在该样本量的基础上对结果模型进行研究,并相应地引入了Sep变量、Number变量和R变量,而这三个变量数据的缺失比较严重,导致结果模型仅筛选出2950个样本,这样对于结果模型所形成的结论可能会产生一定的影响。 (2)手工收集的法律保护指数存在主观性。中小投资者法律保护指数是建立在沈艺峰(2004)法律保护指数基础上,对年限做了进一步的扩展,并另外加入了“收购行为管理”和“会员自律”这两个法律法规因素,本文对于中小投资者法律法规的认定具有主观性,存在某些认识层面的偏差,可能有未被考虑到的法律法规条款。 (3)研究样本考虑不全面。本文虽然对国有上市公司和非国有上市公司有所考虑,但并未对它们再做进一步的细分,对于研究结果可能会产生一些偏差。例如,完成上市的公司后期也许会被其他公司当做壳资源进行兼并收购,这些上市公司的内部代理问题也许会与其他上市公司的有所不同,本文并未进一步考虑这种情况。对于上市后业绩状况不佳的公司,是否又被其他公司当作壳资源进行并购重组,未来可以在这方面做进一步的研究。
[Abstract]:The development of the capital market is closely related to the degree of the protection of the interests of the investors. With the improvement of the level of the protection of the interests of investors, the capital market is promoting the development of the capital market in a healthy direction. The legal system has become the protection of the investors in the full circulation of the stock rights and the development of the mature securities market in Europe and America. Although the share disposition reform is basically realized in our country, the controlling shareholders, senior managers and institutional investors of listed companies still have very obvious ownership advantage, capital advantage, professional technical advantage and information advantage, which deepens the contradiction of information asymmetry in the capital market. Smaller and more dispersed, it is difficult to participate in the internal governance of the company. When the control rights of the large shareholders of the listed company exceed the cash flow power, their choice is very likely to damage the interests of small and medium investors, and then it will infringe the interests of small and medium investors (Franks, 1997). This kind of infringement will reduce the operating efficiency of the company and will inhibit the company. The entry of potential investors will seriously affect the sustainable development of the capital market. Therefore, in the background of the imperfect related system of China's capital market, improving the legal protection of investors can not only stabilize the capital market of our country, but also guarantee the listed companies to enter the equity financing smoothly.
The ownership structure is an important basis for the effective arrangement of the residual control and residual claim of the company, and it is also the basis of corporate governance. The size of the shares held by the shareholders affects the level of corporate governance to a certain extent. In the case of the decentralized ownership of the company's shares, the contradiction between the management and the shareholders is mainly reflected in the management and the shareholders. Between the controlling shareholders and the small and medium investors, the shareholding ratio of the large shareholders is increasing, which leads to the contradiction between the controlling shareholders and the small and medium investors. The study of relevant scholars, the state of the law on the protection of small and medium investors has a direct impact on the interests of small and medium investors. The more perfect the law is, the greater the protection of small and medium investors (LLSV, 1998). It is visible that the law plays an important role in protecting the interests of small and medium investors. In China, the interests of small and medium investors are in China. The relevant laws of protection are late, and the "company law" implemented in 1994 has formulated specific regulations (such as the right to vote for small and medium shareholders). By January 2010, ninety-four laws and regulations concerning the protection of the interests of small and medium investors have been issued in China, and one hundred and eighty-three. China's protection of small and medium investors is constantly strengthening.
There are two main points of view on the relationship between investor legal protection and ownership concentration. One is the "substitution hypothesis", which is represented by LLSV (1999). "Substitution hypothesis" mainly pays attention to the balance of interests between the company management and the shareholders, but neglects the listed companies in large parts of the country because of the controlling shareholders and the small and medium size. The other is the agency problem caused by the friction between shareholders. The other is the "result model" Bebchuk (1999). The scholars holding this view believe that the private income of the insider is determined by the condition of the investor's legal protection, and the investor protection law indirectly affects the company's ownership structure. In the empirical study, the existing literature shows the negative correlation between the legislative variables of the legal system and the degree of investor ownership concentration, which illustrates the existence of the substitution effect of equity concentration. The result model is mostly proved by descriptive statistics and the establishment of theoretical models, and has not provided enough empirical evidence. The relationship between ownership concentration and legal protection is comprehensively analyzed from two angles.
This paper mainly uses a combination of theoretical analysis and empirical analysis to study. A series of research results (LLSV, 1997199819992000) are used for reference to law and finance, ownership structure and corporate governance. Based on the dual agent theory, the concentration of equity, the legal protection of small and medium investors and the private benefits of control are put into a study. The analysis is carried out in the framework.
This article is divided into five parts. Through theoretical and empirical research, the paper analyzes the relationship between the ownership structure, the legal protection of small and medium investors and the three private income of the control right.
The first chapter, introduction, introduces the background and significance of the topic, organizes the logical framework according to the research ideas, clear the research methods, and expounds the contribution and the deficiency of the research.
The second chapter, literature review. This chapter is divided into three sections to sort out the literature about the relationship between ownership concentration and the legal protection of investors at home and abroad. The first section combs the literature on the negative correlation between ownership concentration and the legal protection of investors. In this section, the literature is classified from the angle of substitution relationship and the relationship between results; second The section covers the literature of other related relationships except the negative correlation; the third section introduces the literature between the two. Finally, the literature of the three aspects is summarized and summarized.
The third chapter, the institutional background, the theoretical basis and the hypothesis. Firstly, the background of the legal protection system of small and medium investors in China is expounded in detail. Then, the agency problem between the shareholders and the management level and the agency problem between the large shareholders and the small and medium shareholders are discussed respectively. This double agency problem provides the theory for the writing of this article. Finally, based on the theoretical basis, we put forward relevant research hypotheses.
The fourth chapter, the empirical analysis of the ownership concentration and the legal protection of the small and medium investors, introduces the sample source of the empirical research, explains the definition of the variables, and constructs the regression model. It takes the two and the management to judge the serious characteristics of the first agency problem of the company, and the separation and control of the two rights. The hierarchy is a serious feature to judge the second kinds of agency problems of the company. From the angle of two kinds of agency problems, we explore the substitution relationship between the ownership structure of the company and the legislative variables of the small and medium investors' legal protection; the influence of the private income of control right on the ownership concentration.
The fifth chapter, research conclusions and suggestions. According to the hypothesis and the empirical results, we draw the conclusions of this paper, and put forward the policy suggestions from three aspects: strengthening the legislative process, improving the effect of law enforcement and improving the ownership structure, and point out the direction for future research.
The main conclusions of this paper are as follows:
(1) in the case of the serious problem of the first kind of agency problem, the ownership concentration has played an active role in alleviating the shortage of the legal protection legislation of the investor. In the macro legislative level, the ownership concentration is negatively related to the legislative variables of the investor's legal protection, and the improvement of the investor's legislative protection will reduce the concentration degree of the company's equity.
(2) in the case of the second kind of agency problem, the ownership concentration is not only an alternative variable for the imperfect investor protection legislation, but also a result of the disadvantage of the company's law enforcement at the micro level.
Based on the research status at home and abroad and the research results in this paper, the main innovations of this paper are as follows:
(1) on the basis of the distribution system of the legal protection of small and medium investors, this article has supplemented two items related to the legal protection of investors, "management of purchase behavior" and "self-discipline", which are related to the legal protection of investors. These two regulations are closely related to the protection of small and medium investors' rights and interests, and the small and medium investment in China has been perfected. The legal protection system of the investors has been systematically combed and the laws and regulations concerning the legal protection of small and medium investors from 2003 to 2010 are systematically combed. In the 46 relevant laws and regulations, there are 91 legal provisions which have been newly added to the legal score table. The time limit of the legal protection of small and medium investors is extended to January 2010, which extends the data of the value of the law, It has important reference significance for studying the legal protection of small and medium investors.
(2) from the macro legislative point of view, it is proved that whether the ownership concentration can replace the legal protection of the small and medium investors depends mainly on the improvement of the supervision level of the large shareholders to the manager level. The relationship between the ownership concentration and the legal protection of the investors and the corporate governance is more comprehensive. Small investors' legislative protection is poor, and the conclusion is that centralized corporate ownership structure can replace the conclusion of weaker investors' legal protection.
(3) from the micro law enforcement point of view, it is confirmed that the ownership concentration is due to the disadvantage of the company's law enforcement. The concentration of the stock is the result of the controlling shareholders pursuing their own interests under the condition that the investor's legal protection is not high. Especially in the companies with high separation of two rights or more control levels, the governance of the listed companies is embodied in second categories. In this paper, the rate of cash dividend distribution is used as a variable to measure the level of the legal protection of corporate investors. Through empirical study, the lower the degree of investor protection (the lower the level of the law enforcement of the company), the equity will become more concentrated.
Due to the limitations of personal ability and objective conditions, there are also deficiencies in this study.
(1) the loss of sample is serious in the result model. According to the replacement model, 7146 samples are selected and the result model is studied on the basis of the sample size. The Sep variable, Number variable and R variable are introduced accordingly, and the missing data of the three variables are more serious, resulting in the result model only screening out 2950 samples, so the result is the result. The conclusion of the model may have some influence.
(2) the legal protection index of manual collection is subjective. The legal protection index of small and medium investors is based on the Shen Yifeng (2004) legal protection index, and has further expanded the number of years, and also added the two legal and regulatory factors of "purchase behavior management" and "member self-discipline". This article is on the law of small and medium investors. The cognizance of laws and regulations is subjective, and there are some deviations at the level of cognition. There may be provisions of laws and regulations which have not been considered.
(3) the research sample is not fully considered. Although this paper has some consideration on the state-owned listed companies and non-state-owned listed companies, it does not further subdivide them and may produce some deviations for the results of the study. For example, the later stage of the listed company may be merged and acquired by other companies as shell resources. The internal agency problem of the company may be different from that of other listed companies. This article does not further consider this situation. Whether companies with poor performance after the market have been reorganized by other companies as shell resources, the future can be further studied in this respect.
【学位授予单位】：西南财经大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：D922.287;F832.51;F275

【参考文献】