媒体报道的公司治理作用——双重代理成本视角

发布时间：2018-06-24 17:16

本文选题：媒体报道 + 公司治理　；参考：《金融研究》2012年10期

【摘要】：本文从双重代理成本视角实证检验媒体作为一种外部监督机制能否帮助上市公司缓解代理问题。考虑到媒体报道与公司代理问题之间的相互影响,本文采用联立方程模型对内生性问题进行控制。本文基于中国A股上市公司2006～2009年数据的实证分析结果表明,上市公司的双重代理成本——股东与管理者间的第一类代理成本和大股东与中小股东间的第二类代理成本越高,受到的媒体关注和报道就越多,而高水平的媒体报道能够有效降低公司的双重代理成本,且媒体报道的上述治理作用在第一类代理问题中表现得更强。进一步,本文还分析了媒体与市场化环境两种目前学术界最为关注的外部监督机制间的交互影响,发现这两种机制的治理作用存在显著的替代效应。
[Abstract]:This paper empirically tests whether the media, as an external supervision mechanism, can help the listed companies to alleviate the agency problem from the perspective of double agency cost. Considering the interaction between media reports and agency problems, the simultaneous equation model is used to control the endogenetic problems. Based on the data of A share listed companies in China from 2006 to 2009, the results show that the double agency cost of listed companies-the first type of agency cost between shareholders and managers and the second type of agency cost between large shareholders and medium and small shareholders are higher. The more media attention and reports, and the higher the level of media reports can effectively reduce the company's double agency costs, and the above governance role of media reports is stronger in the first kind of agency problems. Furthermore, this paper also analyzes the interaction between the media and the market-oriented environment, and finds that there is a significant substitution effect between the two mechanisms.
【作者单位】：厦门大学管理学院;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金青年项目(71202061和71202062) 福建省社科规划青年项目(2012C027)的资助
【分类号】：F276.6;F832.51;G212;F224

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