IMF的金融危机治理行为研究——基于经济学视角

发布时间：2018-06-27 11:58

本文选题：IMF(国际货币基金组织) + 金融危机治理　；参考：《国际论坛》2012年03期

【摘要】：借助于经济学分析框架,本文探究了金融危机国际治理首要主体——国际货币基金组织(IMF)分别作为自利行为者、有限理性行为者、受制度缺陷约束的行为者和资源有限的行为者的特性和危机治理行为。本文还进一步分析了IMF与其他的金融危机治理主体之间的关系:其与美国的关系是相互的代理人关系和仆人-主人关系;其与危机发生国家或地区的关系是治理资源与治理行动的不对等供求关系;其与区域性治理主体之间存在着互补和竞争的双重关系。以上关系也从不同侧面对IMF的危机治理行为有着重大影响。本文认为,改革IMF必须着眼于其本身特性与其内外部约束条件。
[Abstract]:With the help of the framework of economic analysis, this paper explores that the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the main body of international governance of financial crisis, is a self-interested actor and a limited rational actor, respectively. The characteristics and crisis management behavior of the actors constrained by institutional defects and those with limited resources. This paper also analyzes the relationship between IMF and other financial crisis management subjects: the relationship between IMF and the United States is a mutual agent relationship and a servant-master relationship; The relationship between it and the country or region in which the crisis occurs is the unequal supply and demand relationship between governance resources and governance action, and there is a complementary and competitive relationship between it and the regional governance subject. The above relation also has the significant influence on the IMF crisis management behavior from different aspects. This paper argues that the reform of the IMF must focus on its own characteristics and its internal and external constraints.
【作者单位】：上海外国语大学国际金融贸易学院;同济大学经济与管理学院经济与金融系;
【基金】：上海外国语大学校级重大科研项目(KX161022);上海外国语大学校级一般科研项目(KX171247) 国家留学基金全额资助项目(留金出〔2007〕3035号)
【分类号】：F831.59

【参考文献】