机构投资者参与公司治理的传导途径研究

发布时间：2018-07-26 13:46

【摘要】：机构投资者制度是英美等发达国家重要的公司治理机制之一,机构投资者积极主动地监督公司经营管理缓解了公司治理中的代理问题。在本世纪初,中国证监会也提出了大力发展机构投资者的思路。然而,已有制度引进的经验教训表明,中国上市公司的治理问题与西方发达国家是不同的,有两个重要问题必须予以回答:在西方发达国家制度背景下建立起来的机构投资者制度,在中国是否能有效发挥作用?基于中国的特殊制度背景,机构投资者制度成功的条件和机制是什么?利用中国上市公司数据,采用结构方程模型对机构投资者参与公司治理的传导途径进行的实证分析表明,中国的机构投资者参与公司治理不能直接促进公司业绩,而是通过抑制上市公司的控股股东掏空行为,间接地提升公司业绩。上市公司投资者保护执行行为在此发挥了中介作用,有效地约束了上市公司控股股东的掏空行为。但是,机构投资者对高管层过度的在职消费和薪酬操纵等代理行为不能发挥治理作用。其政策含义是,加强投资者保护执行力度以及完善机构投资者本身的治理机制,有利于上市公司治理的改善。
[Abstract]:Institutional investor system is one of the important corporate governance mechanisms in developed countries such as the United States and the United States. Institutional investors actively supervise the management of companies to alleviate the agency problems in corporate governance. At the beginning of this century, China Securities Regulatory Commission also put forward the idea of vigorously developing institutional investors. However, the experience and lessons from the introduction of the existing system show that the governance problems of listed companies in China are different from those in western developed countries. There are two important questions to be answered: can the institutional investor system established under the background of western developed countries play an effective role in China? Based on China's special institutional background, what are the conditions and mechanisms for institutional investors' institutional success? Based on the data of listed companies in China and the structural equation model, the empirical analysis of institutional investors' participation in corporate governance shows that the participation of institutional investors in corporate governance can not directly promote corporate performance. Instead, it can indirectly improve the company's performance by suppressing the hollowing behavior of the controlling shareholders of the listed company. The behavior of investor protection and execution plays an intermediary role and effectively restrains the tunneling behavior of the controlling shareholders of listed companies. However, agency behavior such as excessive on-the-job consumption and salary manipulation by institutional investors cannot play a governance role. The policy implication is that strengthening the enforcement of investor protection and perfecting the governance mechanism of institutional investors is beneficial to the improvement of corporate governance.
【作者单位】：东北财经大学经济学院;新疆维吾尔自治区中医医院;新疆财经大学会计学院;
【分类号】：F276.6;F224;F832.51

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