控制权激励双重性与技术创新动态能力——基于高科技上市公司面板数据的实证分析

发布时间：2018-08-08 12:47

【摘要】：高管激励契约对技术创新的显著影响受到理论界与实践界的普遍关注,但以往研究多以显性激励为主。控制权激励作为一种重要的高管隐性激励契约,在本质上具有双重性,应从非线性视角出发对其与技术创新的关联性进行重新审视。本文基于创新经济学相关理论,运用中国高科技上市公司2007—2010年的平衡面板数据,对高管控制权激励与技术创新动态能力的关联性进行实证检验,结果表明:技术创新动态能力由技术创新投入能力、技术创新产出能力、技术创新转化能力三个维度构成;控制权激励与技术创新动态能力之间存在显著的倒U型关系,即当达到极值之前,控制权激励以积极性为主导从而对技术创新动态能力具有促进效应,但超过此极值,控制权激励的消极性逐渐凸显,转而对技术创新动态能力产生明显的抑制效应。因此,保持适度的控制权激励力度、并对显性激励与隐性激励进行合理配置是提升上市公司技术创新动态能力的理性选择。
[Abstract]:The significant influence of executive incentive contract on technological innovation is generally concerned by the theoretical and practical circles, but the previous studies are mostly focused on explicit incentive. As an important implicit incentive contract, the incentive of control right has dual nature in essence, so the relationship between control incentive and technological innovation should be re-examined from the nonlinear perspective. Based on the theory of innovation economics and the balance panel data of Chinese high-tech listed companies from 2007 to 2010, this paper empirically tests the relationship between the incentive of executive control and the dynamic ability of technological innovation. The results show that the dynamic capability of technological innovation consists of three dimensions: the ability of technological innovation input, the ability of technological innovation output and the ability of technological innovation transformation, and the relationship between the incentive of control right and the dynamic ability of technological innovation is obviously inverted U-shaped. That is to say, before reaching the extreme value, the incentive of control power is driven by enthusiasm and thus has a promoting effect on the dynamic ability of technological innovation, but beyond this extreme value, the negativity of the incentive of control power becomes more and more prominent. In turn, the dynamic ability of technological innovation has an obvious inhibitory effect. Therefore, it is a rational choice to improve the dynamic ability of technological innovation of listed companies to maintain the appropriate incentive of control power, and to allocate the explicit incentive and implicit incentive reasonably.
【作者单位】：山东大学管理学院;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金项目“上市公司高管激励契约配置与协同——基于多层次情境因素的研究”(批准号71272120) 山东省自然科学基金项目“山东省上市公司治理对技术创新的促进效应研究”(批准号ZR2012GM004) 山东省博士后创新基金“管理层激励与山东上市公司治理效率优化(批准号201103065)
【分类号】：F276.44;F832.51;F224

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