上市公司高管薪酬强制性披露研究
发布时间：2018-08-18 19:59
【摘要】：上市公司信息的"强制性披露"与"自愿性披露"之争由来已久。我国上市公司高管薪酬的信息披露的现实状况是强制性披露制度不健全,自愿性信息披露不足,无法满足投资者的信息需求。"市场失灵"和"委托代理"等强制性信息披露的经济学理论基础表明,高管薪酬信息应该坚持以强制性披露为主的原则。美国高管薪酬强制性披露制度的变迁,可以说是一部"监管"与"反监管"的历史。近年来,美国证券交易委员会在高管薪酬披露的建设上取得重要进展。借鉴美国成功的经验,立足于我国当前的制度背景,我国可从几个方面完善我国上市公司薪酬强制披露制度:一是充分、完整地披露高管薪酬具体构成项目;二是要求披露薪酬讨论与分析报告,并以图表形式说明高管薪酬与企业业绩之间的关系;三是积极稳妥地推进薪酬与公司风险披露制度的建设。
[Abstract]:The dispute between mandatory disclosure and voluntary disclosure of listed company information has a long history. The reality of information disclosure of executive compensation of listed companies in China is that the mandatory disclosure system is not perfect and the voluntary information disclosure is insufficient to meet the information needs of investors. " The economic theoretical basis of mandatory information disclosure, such as market failure "and" principal-agent ", shows that executive compensation information should adhere to the principle of mandatory disclosure. The change of mandatory disclosure system of executive compensation in the United States can be said to be a history of "supervision" and "anti-regulation". In recent years, the Securities and Exchange Commission has made important progress in the construction of executive compensation disclosure. Drawing on the successful experience of the United States and based on the current system background of our country, we can perfect the compulsory disclosure system of compensation of listed companies in China from several aspects: first, fully and completely disclose the specific components of executive compensation; The second is to require disclosure of salary discussion and analysis report, and to illustrate the relationship between executive compensation and corporate performance in the form of charts; third, to actively and steadily promote the construction of compensation and corporate risk disclosure system.
【作者单位】： 厦门大学会计系;
【分类号】：F272.92;F832.51
[Abstract]:The dispute between mandatory disclosure and voluntary disclosure of listed company information has a long history. The reality of information disclosure of executive compensation of listed companies in China is that the mandatory disclosure system is not perfect and the voluntary information disclosure is insufficient to meet the information needs of investors. " The economic theoretical basis of mandatory information disclosure, such as market failure "and" principal-agent ", shows that executive compensation information should adhere to the principle of mandatory disclosure. The change of mandatory disclosure system of executive compensation in the United States can be said to be a history of "supervision" and "anti-regulation". In recent years, the Securities and Exchange Commission has made important progress in the construction of executive compensation disclosure. Drawing on the successful experience of the United States and based on the current system background of our country, we can perfect the compulsory disclosure system of compensation of listed companies in China from several aspects: first, fully and completely disclose the specific components of executive compensation; The second is to require disclosure of salary discussion and analysis report, and to illustrate the relationship between executive compensation and corporate performance in the form of charts; third, to actively and steadily promote the construction of compensation and corporate risk disclosure system.
【作者单位】： 厦门大学会计系;
【分类号】：F272.92;F832.51
【参考文献】
相关期刊论文 前1条
1 吕长江;赵宇恒;;国有企业管理者激励效应研究——基于管理者权力的解释[J];管理世界;2008年11期
相关重要报纸文章 前1条
1 本报记者 林U啞∮谄，
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