我国商业银行公司治理对风险承担行为的影响研究
发布时间：2018-09-12 17:01
【摘要】：商业银行以货币为产品高杠杆经营,其存在和发展必须以承担风险为前提。08年爆发的金融危机,由于影响的广泛性、严重性和持久性,使人们逐步意识到仅依靠政府监管约束银行的风险行为不太现实,必须重视公司治理对控制银行风险行为的重要作用。因此,本文试图探讨商业银行公司治理对风险承担行为有何影响以及如何影响,其中本文研究的商业银行公司治理属于广义范畴,包括内部治理机制和外部治理机制。首先,以现有的理论为基础,理论分析商业银行内、外部治理机制对其风险承担行为的影响,内部治理机制主要考虑股权结构、组织制衡机制(包括董事会规模、独立董事占比、监事会规模)和激励约束机制(包括管理层报酬和持股),外部治理机制主要考虑政府监管(包括资本充足率监管、存款保险制度和特许权价值)和市场约束。其次,在Jeitschko和Jeung理论模型的基础上,加入政府监管、市场约束变量,建立一个考虑商业银行内、外部治理机制的一般性理论分析框架,探讨公司内、外部治理因素如何影响商业银行的风险承担行为。再次,以除光大、农行外14家上市商业银行从2007下半年-2012年年底的相关半年度数据作为研究样本,实证研究我国商业银行公司治理对其风险承担行为的影响。实证结果表明：1.股权集中度与银行风险水平呈U型关系,第一大股东具有国有性质会降低银行风险水平；2.董事会、监事会规模对银行风险水平的影响系数虽然很小,但与后者显著负相关,独立董事占比与银行风险水平正相关；3.管理层薪酬水平与银行风险水平负相关,管理层持股与银行风险水平正相关；4.资本监管与银行风险行为显著负相关,存款人的市场约束与银行风险行为负相关；5.资产规模、资本杠杆与银行风险水平显著正相关。最后,依据我国商业银行公司内、外部治理对风险承担行为的影响效果,提出相关政策建议。
[Abstract]:The existence and development of commercial banks with high leverage of money as products must be based on the assumption of risk. The financial crisis broke out in 2008, due to the universality, severity and durability of the impact, It makes people realize that it is not realistic to rely on government supervision to restrain banks' risk behavior, so we must pay attention to the important role of corporate governance in controlling banks' risk behavior. Therefore, this paper attempts to explore the impact of corporate governance on risk-bearing behavior of commercial banks and how to influence it. The corporate governance of commercial banks studied in this paper belongs to a broad category, including internal governance mechanism and external governance mechanism. First of all, based on the existing theories, this paper theoretically analyzes the influence of internal and external governance mechanisms on the risk-bearing behavior of commercial banks. The internal governance mechanism mainly considers the ownership structure, the organization and checks and balances mechanism (including the size of the board of directors). The proportion of independent directors, the size of board of supervisors, incentive and restraint mechanism (including management compensation and stock holding), external governance mechanism mainly consider government supervision (including capital adequacy regulation, deposit insurance system and franchise value) and market constraints. Secondly, based on the theoretical model of Jeitschko and Jeung, we add the variables of government supervision and market constraint, and establish a general theoretical analysis framework to consider the internal and external governance mechanism of commercial banks. How external governance factors affect the risk-bearing behavior of commercial banks. Thirdly, taking the relevant semi-annual data of 14 listed commercial banks from the second half of 2007 to the end of 2012 as the research sample, this paper empirically studies the impact of corporate governance on the risk-bearing behavior of commercial banks in China. The empirical results show that 1: 1. There is a U-shaped relationship between equity concentration and bank risk level, and the state-owned nature of the largest shareholder will reduce the bank risk level by 2. 5%. Although the influence coefficient of board size on bank risk level is very small, it is negatively correlated with the latter, and the proportion of independent director is positively related to bank risk level. The compensation level of management is negatively correlated with the level of bank risk, and the level of bank risk is positively correlated with managerial shareholding. There is a significant negative correlation between capital supervision and bank risk behavior, and a negative correlation between depositors' market constraint and bank risk behavior. Asset size, capital leverage and bank risk levels are significantly positively correlated. Finally, according to the effect of external governance on risk-bearing behavior in Chinese commercial banks, relevant policy recommendations are put forward.
【学位授予单位】：南京财经大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：F832.33
[Abstract]:The existence and development of commercial banks with high leverage of money as products must be based on the assumption of risk. The financial crisis broke out in 2008, due to the universality, severity and durability of the impact, It makes people realize that it is not realistic to rely on government supervision to restrain banks' risk behavior, so we must pay attention to the important role of corporate governance in controlling banks' risk behavior. Therefore, this paper attempts to explore the impact of corporate governance on risk-bearing behavior of commercial banks and how to influence it. The corporate governance of commercial banks studied in this paper belongs to a broad category, including internal governance mechanism and external governance mechanism. First of all, based on the existing theories, this paper theoretically analyzes the influence of internal and external governance mechanisms on the risk-bearing behavior of commercial banks. The internal governance mechanism mainly considers the ownership structure, the organization and checks and balances mechanism (including the size of the board of directors). The proportion of independent directors, the size of board of supervisors, incentive and restraint mechanism (including management compensation and stock holding), external governance mechanism mainly consider government supervision (including capital adequacy regulation, deposit insurance system and franchise value) and market constraints. Secondly, based on the theoretical model of Jeitschko and Jeung, we add the variables of government supervision and market constraint, and establish a general theoretical analysis framework to consider the internal and external governance mechanism of commercial banks. How external governance factors affect the risk-bearing behavior of commercial banks. Thirdly, taking the relevant semi-annual data of 14 listed commercial banks from the second half of 2007 to the end of 2012 as the research sample, this paper empirically studies the impact of corporate governance on the risk-bearing behavior of commercial banks in China. The empirical results show that 1: 1. There is a U-shaped relationship between equity concentration and bank risk level, and the state-owned nature of the largest shareholder will reduce the bank risk level by 2. 5%. Although the influence coefficient of board size on bank risk level is very small, it is negatively correlated with the latter, and the proportion of independent director is positively related to bank risk level. The compensation level of management is negatively correlated with the level of bank risk, and the level of bank risk is positively correlated with managerial shareholding. There is a significant negative correlation between capital supervision and bank risk behavior, and a negative correlation between depositors' market constraint and bank risk behavior. Asset size, capital leverage and bank risk levels are significantly positively correlated. Finally, according to the effect of external governance on risk-bearing behavior in Chinese commercial banks, relevant policy recommendations are put forward.
【学位授予单位】：南京财经大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：F832.33
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