我国小微企业联保贷款还款激励机制研究
发布时间：2018-10-18 19:55
【摘要】：近年来，小微企业在我国所占有的经济地位越来越重要，但是小微企业融资难却一直是制约企业发展的瓶颈，我国各级政府、金融机构、学术界对破解小微企业融资困难的问题做了诸多的努力，虽然小有成效但是与数量众多的小微企业的巨额融资缺口相比却显得微不足道。自从1976年孟加拉国提出联保贷款模式以来，这种模式在世界范围内得到了广泛的推广，许多国家还将这种联保模式运用到了解决中小企业融资问题上。1999年联保贷款模式开始进入我国并迅速发展，从2011年“小微企业”这个概念被提出以后，许多银行还针对性地提出了“小微企业联保贷款”，，总的来说联保贷款模式对我国小微企业融资问题的解决起到了促进作用，但是进入2013年以后，联保贷款却成了不良贷款的重灾区，联保贷款违约问题引发了广泛的关注。如何提高联保贷款的还款率便成了当前开展小微企业联保贷款业务中一个亟待解决的问题。 正是基于这样一种思考，本文对我国小微企业联保贷款还款激励机制的有效性进行了研究。现有的研究通常是通过某个地区具体的案例或者使用博弈论分析法研究还款激励的因素或机制。本文将这两种研究方法结合在一起，首先进行博弈论分析，通过比较提出由“连带责任”、“社会惩罚”、“动态激励”三者构成的还款激励机制是最有效的。再根据对广州地区470家小微企业的问卷调查结果对构成还款激励机制的因素进行实证检验并验证了还款激励机制的有效性。最后根据本文的研究结论对银行、小微企业、提出了几点切实可行的建议，旨在促进小微企业联保贷款在我国的健康发展。
[Abstract]:In recent years, the economic status of small and micro enterprises in our country has become more and more important, but the financing difficulties of small and micro enterprises have been the bottleneck restricting the development of enterprises. Academic circles have made a lot of efforts to solve the problem of financing difficulties of small and micro enterprises. Although small and effective, compared with a large number of small and micro enterprises, the huge financing gap is insignificant. Since Bangladesh introduced the UNPROFOR loan model in 1976, it has been widely promoted worldwide. Many countries have also applied this model to solve the problem of financing SMEs. In 1999, the UNPROFOR loan model began to enter China and developed rapidly, since the concept of "small and micro enterprises" was put forward in 2011, Many banks have also put forward "small and microenterprise UNPROFOR loans". In general, the UNPROFOR loan model has contributed to the solution of the financing problem of small and micro enterprises in China, but after 2013, But the UNPROFOR loan has become the disaster area of the bad loan, the problem of the default of the UNPROFOR loan has aroused widespread concern. How to improve the repayment rate of UNPROFOR loan has become an urgent problem to be solved in the development of small and micro enterprise UNPROFOR loan business. Based on this thinking, this paper studies the effectiveness of the incentive mechanism for small and micro enterprises to repay UNPROFOR loans. Current studies are usually based on specific case studies or game theory analysis to study the factors or mechanisms of repayment incentives. In this paper, the two research methods are combined. First, the game theory analysis is carried out, and the repayment incentive mechanism composed of "joint and several liability", "social punishment" and "dynamic incentive" is put forward by comparison. Based on the questionnaire survey of 470 small and micro enterprises in Guangzhou, this paper makes an empirical test on the factors that constitute the repayment incentive mechanism and verifies the effectiveness of the repayment incentive mechanism. Finally, according to the conclusion of this paper, some practical suggestions are put forward for the banks and small and micro enterprises, in order to promote the healthy development of the small and micro enterprises' UNPROFOR loan in our country.
【学位授予单位】：广东财经大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：F276.3;F832.4
[Abstract]:In recent years, the economic status of small and micro enterprises in our country has become more and more important, but the financing difficulties of small and micro enterprises have been the bottleneck restricting the development of enterprises. Academic circles have made a lot of efforts to solve the problem of financing difficulties of small and micro enterprises. Although small and effective, compared with a large number of small and micro enterprises, the huge financing gap is insignificant. Since Bangladesh introduced the UNPROFOR loan model in 1976, it has been widely promoted worldwide. Many countries have also applied this model to solve the problem of financing SMEs. In 1999, the UNPROFOR loan model began to enter China and developed rapidly, since the concept of "small and micro enterprises" was put forward in 2011, Many banks have also put forward "small and microenterprise UNPROFOR loans". In general, the UNPROFOR loan model has contributed to the solution of the financing problem of small and micro enterprises in China, but after 2013, But the UNPROFOR loan has become the disaster area of the bad loan, the problem of the default of the UNPROFOR loan has aroused widespread concern. How to improve the repayment rate of UNPROFOR loan has become an urgent problem to be solved in the development of small and micro enterprise UNPROFOR loan business. Based on this thinking, this paper studies the effectiveness of the incentive mechanism for small and micro enterprises to repay UNPROFOR loans. Current studies are usually based on specific case studies or game theory analysis to study the factors or mechanisms of repayment incentives. In this paper, the two research methods are combined. First, the game theory analysis is carried out, and the repayment incentive mechanism composed of "joint and several liability", "social punishment" and "dynamic incentive" is put forward by comparison. Based on the questionnaire survey of 470 small and micro enterprises in Guangzhou, this paper makes an empirical test on the factors that constitute the repayment incentive mechanism and verifies the effectiveness of the repayment incentive mechanism. Finally, according to the conclusion of this paper, some practical suggestions are put forward for the banks and small and micro enterprises, in order to promote the healthy development of the small and micro enterprises' UNPROFOR loan in our country.
【学位授予单位】：广东财经大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：F276.3;F832.4
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2 王静;徐逞
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