管理层权力、机会主义动机与股权激励计划设计

发布时间：2018-12-09 13:03

【摘要】：以2005-2011年期间公告或实施股权激励计划的上市公司为样本,利用股权激励预案公告日前一天公司股价与前一个月公司平均股价的较高者减去股权激励预案中设定的初始行权价格以后的差额数据,本文对管理层权力与股权激励计划制定中的管理层机会主义行为之间的关系进行了实证研究。发现,管理层权力越大,股权激励计划中所设定的初始行权价格就相对越低,即,在当前公司内部治理机制弱化的背景下,管理层可能会利用其对公司的控制权影响股权激励方案的制定,使其与己有利。还发现,相对于非国资控股公司,国资控股公司推出的股权激励计划所设定的行权价格更低。这表明,要想使得股权激励真正成为解决代理问题的有效手段,必须重视其设计有效性。
[Abstract]:A sample of listed companies that announced or implemented equity incentive plans during the period 2005-2011, The difference between the share price of the company on the day before the announcement of the stock incentive plan and the average share price of the company in the preceding month less the initial exercise price set in the stock incentive plan, This paper makes an empirical study on the relationship between management power and management opportunistic behavior in the formulation of equity incentive plan. It is found that the greater the power of the management, the lower the initial exercise price set in the equity incentive plan, that is, under the background of the weakening of the internal governance mechanism of the company, Management may use their control of the company to influence the formulation of equity incentives to their advantage. It also found that equity incentive schemes offered by state-owned holding companies set lower exercise prices than non-state holding companies. This indicates that in order to make equity incentive become an effective means to solve agency problem, we must attach importance to its design effectiveness.
【作者单位】：安徽财经大学会计学院;南京大学会计系;
【基金】：教育部人文社科研究规划基金项目“国资控股公司股权激励计划选择中在职消费替代效应及其影响因素研究(11YJA790155)” 安徽高校省级人文社科研究重点项目“国资控股与股权激励有效性——基于我国上市公司的实证研究(2010sk207zd)”的阶段性成果
【分类号】：F832.51;F272.92;F224

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