交易成本、法律传统与金融制度边界的决定

发布时间：2019-04-17 05:29

【摘要】：金融制度边界(或者结构)的决定是制度金融理论的一个核心问题,可是,不少文献对此问题的讨论从一开始就转向对不同金融体系结构以及绩效的简单刻画与比较。特别是,一度备受追捧的法金融学理论也深陷金融制度孰优孰劣判断的"陷阱"而难以自拔。因此,正确的理论选择就是重返制度边界决定的交易成本传统。本文的讨论发现,各国之所以拥有不同的金融制度边界,基本原因是其在利用金融市场和金融企业制度方面的"比较优势"存在差异;法律传统不可能抛开市场交易方式以及交易效率而直接决定金融制度边界。相比之下,文化渊源的重要性则体现在,它决定着交易成本的初始结构,并由此影响人们对交易方式或者交易制度的选择。
[Abstract]:The decision of financial institutional boundary (or structure) is one of the core issues in institutional finance theory. However, the discussion of this issue in many literatures has shifted from the beginning to the simple description and comparison of different financial systems and performance. Especially, the once-popular legal finance theory is deeply trapped in the "trap" of judging which financial system is superior or inferior, and it is difficult to extricate itself from it. Therefore, the correct theoretical choice is to return to the institutional boundary to determine the transaction cost tradition. The discussion in this paper finds that the basic reason why countries have different boundaries of financial system is that they have different "comparative advantages" in making use of financial market and financial enterprise system. Legal tradition can not directly determine the boundary of financial system without market transaction mode and transaction efficiency. In contrast, the importance of cultural origin is that it determines the initial structure of transaction costs, and thus affects the choice of trading methods or systems.
【作者单位】：中国人民大学中国财政金融政策研究中心;
【基金】：中国人民大学科学研究基金(中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金资助)重大基础研究计划项目“金融分析的制度范式与制度金融学”(10XNL008)的支持
【分类号】：D922.28;F832.1

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