风险投资对创业板IPO公司盈余管理的影响研究

发布时间：2019-05-16 20:38

【摘要】：IPO盈余管理一直以来都是重要的研究课题,投资者会因被粉饰的财务报告而做出错误的股票估价和买卖决定。由于风险投资不仅为被投资公司注入资金,同时还会提供一系列的增值服务、对企业进行治理,即风险投资具有理论上的监督作用。本文通过实证研究,考察了风险投资是否具有财务报告监督作用,即风险投资是否能够抑制被投资公司的IPO盈余管理。本文研究了IPO附近的三个时期：IPO前一年、IPO当年、IPO后一年。本文的研究对象为创业板市场,考虑到金融危机这一特殊宏观时期的干扰,剔除了2009年上市的公司,最终选取了2010-2012年上市的319家公司为研究样本。本文首先运用截面修正琼斯模型分年度回归计算得出了样本公司的操控性应计利润,以此作为盈余管理程度的衡量指标。接着,本文考虑了可能影响盈余管理程度的公司规模、财务杠杆、成长性、现金流充裕情况等因素,同时将有无风险投资背景作为虚拟变量,建立了多元回归模型,验证有风险投资背景的公司与无风险投资背景的公司相比,是否有更低的盈余管理程度。研究发现：成功IPO对我国风险投资机构有很大的利益诱惑,在IPO前风险投资表现出了道德风险,风险投资不能抑制盈余管理,甚至有轻微助长盈余管理的嫌疑；而鉴于风险投资机构在前期进行了谨慎、详细的项目评估,风险投资机构在IPO成功后完全可以预期公司上市后的良好的市场表现,此时道德风险动机小,而能支持监督假说,风险投资开始发挥对盈余管理的抑制作用。但这种监督和抑制作用亦有其时限性,在IPO后一年,由于部分风险投资机构即将退出,因此其监督积极性不高,表现为监督作用不显著。上述发现表明,风险投资机构一定程度上看重诚实的高质量的财务报告,本身有意识影响财务报告的质量,但风险投资对财务报告进行监督的意愿和积极性并不强,在与短期利益发生冲突时,风险投资不能显著抑制盈余管理,甚至有可能助长盈余管理行为。因此,目前需要监管层理顺体制机制,从制度上激发风险投资机构提供增值服务的积极性,并通过奖惩机制给予风险投资机构正确的引导。从而使风险投资机构更好地发挥其作为专业投资机构的职业能力,促进我国资本市场的健康发展。本文研究风险投资与IPO盈余管理的关系,拓展研究了盈余管理的抑制问题；并验证了风险投资的财务报告监督作用,为风险投资的研究提供了“财务报告监督”这样一个有益的视角；同时也对促进我国资本市场和风险投资的健康发展有重要意义。
[Abstract]:IPO earnings management has always been an important research topic, investors will make wrong stock valuation and trading decisions because of whitewashed financial reports. Because venture capital not only injects funds into the invested company, but also provides a series of value-added services to govern the enterprise, that is, venture capital has a theoretical supervision role. Through empirical research, this paper examines whether venture capital has the role of financial reporting supervision, that is, whether venture capital can inhibit the IPO earnings management of invested companies. This paper studies three periods near IPO: the year before IPO, the year after IPO, and the year after IPO. The research object of this paper is gem. Considering the interference of the financial crisis in this special macro period, the listed companies in 2009 are eliminated, and 319 listed companies from 2010 to 2012 are selected as the research samples. In this paper, the operational accrual profit of the sample company is calculated by using the cross section modified Jones model by annual regression, which is used as the index to measure the degree of earnings management. Then, this paper takes into account the factors that may affect the degree of earnings management, such as the size of the company, financial leverage, growth, cash flow adequacy and so on. At the same time, taking the background of venture capital as a virtual variable, a multiple regression model is established. Verify that companies with venture capital background have lower level of earnings management than those without venture capital background. It is found that successful IPO has great interest temptation to venture capital institutions in our country, and venture capital shows moral hazard before IPO. Venture capital can not restrain earnings management, and even slightly contribute to earnings management. In view of the cautious and detailed project evaluation of venture capital institutions in the early stage, venture capital institutions can fully expect the good market performance of the company after the IPO is successful, at this time, the motivation of moral hazard is small, and it can support the supervision hypothesis. Venture capital began to play a role in curbing earnings management. However, this kind of supervision and inhibition also has its time limit. One year after IPO, because some venture capital institutions are about to withdraw, their supervision enthusiasm is not high, which shows that the supervision role is not significant. The above findings show that venture capital institutions value honest and high quality financial reports to a certain extent and consciously affect the quality of financial reports, but the willingness and enthusiasm of venture capital to supervise financial reports is not strong. In the case of conflict with short-term interests, venture capital can not significantly inhibit earnings management, and may even contribute to earnings management behavior. Therefore, at present, it is necessary for the regulatory level to straighten out the institutional mechanism, stimulate the enthusiasm of venture capital institutions to provide value-added services from the system, and give the venture capital institutions the correct guidance through the reward and punishment mechanism. So that venture capital institutions can give full play to their professional ability as professional investment institutions and promote the healthy development of China's capital market. This paper studies the relationship between venture capital and IPO earnings management, and expands and studies the suppression of earnings management. It also verifies the role of financial reporting supervision of venture capital, which provides a useful perspective for the study of venture capital, and is also of great significance to promote the healthy development of capital market and venture capital in China.
【学位授予单位】：财政部财政科学研究所
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：F275;F832.51;F276.6

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