基于多属性逆向拍卖参与者合作策略研究

发布时间：2017-12-31 06:15

本文关键词：基于多属性逆向拍卖参与者合作策略研究　出处：《北京邮电大学》2015年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：网络拍卖,是在传统拍卖的基础上产生、发展起来的。网络拍卖可分为C2C、B2B与B2C三种,其中最为流行、应用最广的是C2C与B2C。然而,B2B的潜在交易量远大于C2C模式。B2B模式的采购拍卖,又称网络逆向拍卖,是政府或企业利用现代信息技术系统和网络,通过数据电文形式实现无纸化招投标。网络采购拍卖能极大地提高招投标效率、降低招投标成本和预防腐败。然而,我国目前的网络逆向拍卖对采购商品或服务标准化程度要求较高,这限制了它在电子采购中的应用范围。因此迫切需要研究新型的、能满足企业更为复杂的采购需求的拍卖机制。多属性逆向拍卖的出现,为满足企业更为复杂的采购需求提供了可能。本文的主要研究内容具体如下：首先,改进了现有的多属性逆向拍卖模型。改进的多属性逆向拍卖模型更加符合现实,更具备一般性。其次,基于改进的多属性逆向拍卖模型,从投标方的角度出发,分析和证明了投标方分别在三种拍卖机制下的最优投标策略并模拟投标过程,证明文章中结论的正确性。接下来,本文从采购方的角度出发,研究多属性逆向拍卖的最优机制设计问题。分析和证明了采购方在两种机制下的最优评分函数,并分析在不同机制下,成本参数、投标方数量及边际成本的经济意义。基于前四章,采购方已可以选择出最优投标方,但是只有依据科学的投标方质量管理,才能确保后续采购产品的质量,并与投标方建立紧密合作关系,共同改进质量。因此,本文还从不同角度研究投标方质量管理。本文系统研究了多属性逆向拍卖理论,弥补和完善了现有的多属性逆向拍卖理论。
[Abstract]:Network auction is based on the traditional auction, developed. Network auction can be divided into C2CU B2B and B2C, the most popular, the most widely used C2C and B2C. however. The potential transaction volume of B2B is much larger than the purchase auction of C2C mode. B2B model, also called network reverse auction, is a government or enterprise using modern information technology systems and networks. Through the form of data message to achieve paperless bidding. Online procurement auction can greatly improve the efficiency of bidding, reduce the cost of bidding and prevent corruption. The current network reverse auction in China requires a high degree of standardization of procurement goods or services, which limits the scope of its application in electronic procurement. Therefore, there is an urgent need to study new types of auction. The emergence of multi-attribute reverse auction makes it possible to meet the more complex procurement needs of enterprises. The main contents of this paper are as follows: Firstly, the existing multi-attribute reverse auction model is improved, and the improved multi-attribute reverse auction model is more realistic and more general. Secondly, based on the improved multi-attribute reverse auction model, from the point of view of the bidders, this paper analyzes and proves the optimal bidding strategies of the bidders under the three auction mechanisms and simulates the bidding process. To prove the correctness of the conclusion in the article. Then, this paper studies the optimal mechanism design of multi-attribute reverse auction from the point of view of the buyer, analyzes and proves the optimal scoring function of the buyer under the two mechanisms, and analyzes the different mechanisms. Cost parameters, number of bidders and economic significance of marginal cost. Based on the first four chapters, the purchaser has been able to choose the best bidder, but only according to the scientific quality management of the tenderer, can the quality of the subsequent procurement products be ensured, and close cooperation relationship can be established with the bidder. Therefore, this paper also studies the quality management of bidders from different angles. In this paper, the theory of multi-attribute reverse auction is systematically studied to make up for and improve the existing multi-attribute reverse auction theory.
【学位授予单位】：北京邮电大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2015
【分类号】：F724.6;F724.59

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