众筹平台定价策略研究

发布时间：2018-01-07 04:02

本文关键词：众筹平台定价策略研究　出处：《浙江财经大学》2017年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：“大众创业、万众创新”的号召使得群众的创业热情高涨,作为互联网金融的三种主要表现形式之一,众筹平台的兴起为解决创业企业融资问题提供了新的渠道。我国第一家众筹平台点名时间于2011年正式上线运营,此后,由于市场的需求以及政府的支持等原因,国内众筹平台的数量得到了迅速增长。在众筹行业双边参与者数量和实际筹资规模都得到了快速发展的同时,每年也有不少平台停止运营或面临倒闭。这不可避免的涉及到众筹平台的盈利问题,当前众筹平台企业的收入主要来源于对筹资成功的项目发起者收取所筹资金一定比例佣金。这一现象引起了我们的思考:(1)众筹平台为促成筹资者、投资者之间成功交易提供服务,为什么普遍只采取对成功项目的筹资者收费?(2)在众筹平台盈利存在困难导致平台经营难以为继的情况下,为什么平台仍然将交易佣金比率维持在极低的水平?(3)这样的收费特点能否实现众筹平台企业的利润最大化?如果不能,众筹平台采取这种定价方式的目的又是什么?目前对于众筹行业的研究主要集中在项目发起人视角的项目成功率影响因素方面,现有的文献尚未对众筹行业中普遍存在的定价行为给出很好的理论解释。本文试图运用双边市场定价理论构建数理模型对上述问题进行深入研究,以探究众筹平台企业对双边用户的定价机理,寻找适合众筹平台持续发展的定价模式。本文的主要内容有三方面:第一,对众筹平台类型进行划分,在此基础上对众筹行业相关市场进行界定,对各细分市场的市场结构做出判断;探究众筹产业链上各参与主体之间的利益关系,明确众筹平台企业的成本收入构成;发掘众筹行业的双边市场特征,并挖掘众筹行业具有较高转移成本、平台不能完全匹配用户成功交易的特殊属性。这一系列的研究为构建符合众筹行业经济特征的定价模型奠定了基础。第二,在对众筹行业进行一些列合理简化的基础上,构建平台收取交易佣金方式下,含有交叉网络外部性参数、用户转移成本、平台服务差异化程度在内的双寡头众筹平台定价模型,揭示竞争状态下众筹平台企业的定价机理。接着构建两阶段定价模型,论证了用户存在较大转移成本情况下,众筹平台当期采取亏损经营能够积累用户,从而提高平台后期定价,实现两期利润的最大化。第三,以行业中两家筹资规模相近的独立性众筹平台——点名时间和追梦网为例分析定价策略,发现平台在竞争过程中同时采取倾斜式定价、亏损经营、差异化竞争行为,与理论分析相符。研究表明:(1)众筹行业各细分市场具有显著的寡占型市场结构特征,其中回报式众筹细分市场寡占程度强于股权式众筹细分市场。(2)网络外部性的提高会降低平台的利润,但能提高社会福利;采取差异化经营策略有利于提升平台利润水平,但是降低了社会福利;(3)平台倾向于对总网络外部性强度高的投资者采取价格补贴行为,而对总网络外部性强度低的筹资者收费以实现平台收入的最大化。(4)存在转移成本的两阶段竞争中,本平台对于用户的转移成本越大,对手平台对于用户的转移成本越小,则越有利于此平台维持用户规模,获取更大利润;(5)平台后一期的利润水平受前一期用户规模的影响;(6)平台追求两期利润最大化时的最优定价,可能导致平台前期利润为负,即平台前期可能选择亏损经营。
[Abstract]:"Public entrepreneurship, innovation" the call makes masses of entrepreneurial enthusiasm, as one of the three main forms of Internet banking, the rise of the public to raise the platform to provide a new channel to solve the problem of financing of entrepreneurial enterprises. China's first public raised platform upon time on 2011 officially launched operations, since then, due to the market needs the support of the government and other reasons, the domestic public to raise the number of platforms has been growing rapidly. All got rapid development at the same time in the public sector to raise the number of participants and the actual bilateral financing scale, every year there are many platforms to stop operations or face closure. The profit problem inevitably involves the current public platform to raise the public. The main source of income of the enterprise to raise the platform for financing the success of the project sponsors collect funds raised by a certain percentage of commission. This phenomenon has aroused our thinking: (1) the congregation raised platform In order to raise funds, investors between successful trading services, generally only take on why successful project financing charges? (2) in the raised platform profit difficult circumstances leading to the platform difficult to continue operating platform, why will still maintain the transaction commission rate at a very low level? (3) characteristics of such charges can achieve the maximum crowdfunding platform of enterprise profit? If not, what is the public to raise the platform to take this pricing goal? The present study for the public to raise the industry focused project sponsors perspective in the success rate of the project impact factors, explain the existing literature has not been very good for all the chips are generally pricing behavior there are industry in theory. This paper tries to construct mathematical model of two-sided market pricing theory to conduct in-depth research on the above problems, to explore the platform to raise public enterprises on bilateral user set The price mechanism for the sustainable development of the public to raise the platform pricing model. The main contents of this paper has three aspects: first, to divide the public to raise the platform type, on the basis of the public sector to raise the relevant market definition, market structure of the various segments of the judge; explore the crowdfunding industry chain participants the relationship between the interests of, clear platform to raise public enterprise cost income; two-sided market characteristics to explore the industry to raise the public, and the mining industry to raise the public has a high transfer cost, special attributes platform can not fully match the user trading success. This series of studies to construct the pricing model of the public sector to raise the economic characteristics laid the foundation second, some reasonable simplification based on the industry to raise the public, build a platform for trading commissions charged under way, with cross network externality parameter, the user transfer cost, service platform Is the difference in the degree of duopoly, raised platform pricing model, reveal the competitive state of the congregation raised platform of enterprise pricing mechanism. Then construct two stage pricing model, demonstrates the users there is a big transfer cost situation, take the current platform to raise public business losses can accumulate users, so as to improve the platform to maximize the two late pricing. Profit. Third, with the industry in two independent of the scale of financing platform to raise similar - named time and dream analysis network pricing strategy as an example, discovery platform in the process of competition and adopt inclined pricing, loss of business, competitive behavior, consistent with the theoretical analysis. The research shows that: (1) to raise public industry segments of the market has obvious characteristics of market oligopoly structure, which in return to raise the degree of oligopoly market segments to raise public equity market segment. (2) the network externality will improve Reduce the profit platform, but can improve social welfare; take the business strategy of differentiation is conducive to enhancing the level of platform profit, but reduces social welfare; (3) the platform tends to total network externality is high investors take the price subsidies, and financing of the low strength of the total network charges to achieve to maximize platform revenue. (4) there are two stages of competition in the transfer cost, the greater the platform for the transfer cost of the user, the smaller rival platform to transfer the cost of the user, the more conducive to the platform to maintain the size of the user, to obtain greater profits; (5) affected by a user scale a profit level of the platform; (6) the optimal pricing platform in pursuit of the maximum profit of the two, may cause the platform pre profit is negative, the platform early may choose to loss of business.

【学位授予单位】：浙江财经大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：F724.6;F832

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