京东双重股权结构的经验及对我国国企混改的启示

发布时间：2018-01-08 20:39

本文关键词：京东双重股权结构的经验及对我国国企混改的启示　出处：《浙江工商大学》2017年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：在互联网科技公司高速发展的今天,企业发展必不可少的资金需求使得股权融资与保持控制权之间似乎有一种难以解决的矛盾,特别是近年来企业融资带来股权稀释从而导致企业控制权争夺的案例时有发生,在这种背景下,双重股权结构得到越来越多人的认可,被认为是企业股权融资的同时,保证控制权普遍有效的一种方式。近年来我国越来越多的科技公司选择海外上市,其中大部分都采用了双重股权结构这一制度设计。2013年阿里巴巴因其提出的合伙人制度不能在香港实现进而赴美上市,阿里特有的合伙人制度本质上也是双重股权结构的一种。这也引起了国内外的关注,让人们重新审视这一特殊的股权结构,目前我国内地和香港暂时都不允许采用这种股权结构。本文在这种背景下,选取中国第一家成功赴美上市的电商平台—京东为例,通过其双重股权结构案例的分析,我们发现:(1)几轮融资过后,创始人刘强东在第一大股东控制地位受到威胁的情况下,通过A型股与B型股的设计,以近20%的股权获得了83.7%的投票权,从而牢牢掌握着对公司的控制。通过其上市前业务领域和融资情况的分析得出京东实施双重股权结构势在必行。(2)从财务数据上体现出的业绩超预期、多品类布局见效、运营能力出色的正面效应,得出双重股权结构在保证企业控制权的同时,也有利于公司经营战略的贯彻与执行的结论。(3)分析京东价格战的理念带来了高投入高成本的负面效应,得出享有超级表决权的创始人在保有企业绝对控制的同时,也承担了超出其收益权的经营和财务风险,使企业存在不能持续健康发展的风险。同时从保护知情权原则、限制权利原则、事后矫正原则三个方面阐述双重股权结构可能带来风险的应对措施。(4)通过其带来的正面及负面效应的解读,为我国企业是否选择双重股权结构在海外上市做出参考。回归到我国国情,在国企混改中,尤其是涉及到国家安全、社会民生等关键领域的企业,针对国有资本逐步减持的同时如何保有必要的控制力来实现政策性目标的问题,从双重股权结构的设计中转换思路,赋予国有资本在股东大会上类似双重股权结构的超级表决权,使国有资本在减少的同时仍能在发展方向、政策目标等方面保有对企业的控制力,确保国企政策性目标的实现;在董事会层面上让民营资本和管理层更多地参与进来,控制企业的日常经营管理,为企业注入新鲜的活力,改善企业效益,进而实现共赢。从设计理念、法律制度、公司治理、适用范围四个方面审慎地分析双重股权结构在国企混改中的可行性,虽然双重股权结构思路理念的大方向是可行的,但在目前中国法律制度和资本结构的大环境下,引入双重股权结构还应以更加谨慎的态度对待。
[Abstract]:With the rapid development of Internet technology companies, there seems to be a difficult contradiction between equity financing and control rights. Especially in recent years, enterprise financing has brought about stock dilution, which leads to the enterprise control rights competition cases have occurred from time to time. Under this background, the dual ownership structure has been recognized by more and more people. In recent years, more and more science and technology companies in our country choose overseas listing. In 2013 Alibaba listed in the United States because his partnership system could not be realized in Hong Kong. Ali's unique partnership system is also a kind of dual ownership structure in essence, which has also aroused the attention of domestic and foreign people, let people re-examine this special equity structure. At present, China's mainland and Hong Kong are not allowed to adopt this kind of ownership structure for the time being. Under this background, this paper selects JingDong, China's first successful ecommerce platform to list in the United States, as an example. Through the analysis of its dual equity structure case, we find that after several rounds of financing, founder Liu Qiangdong, under the condition that the controlling position of the first largest shareholder is threatened, adopts the design of A-shares and B-shares. With nearly 20% shares, he gained 83.7% voting rights. Through the analysis of its pre-listing business field and financing situation, it is imperative for JingDong to implement dual equity structure. The positive effect of multi-category layout and excellent operation ability leads to the conclusion that the dual ownership structure ensures the control of the enterprise at the same time. Also conducive to the implementation of the company's business strategy and implementation of the conclusion. 3) the analysis of JingDong's concept of price war has brought high investment and high cost of negative effects. It is concluded that the founder who enjoys super voting rights, while retaining absolute control of the enterprise, also bears the operating and financial risks beyond his right to profit. At the same time, we should protect the principle of right to know and limit the principle of right to know. After the correction principle of the three aspects of dual equity structure may bring risk countermeasures. 4) through its positive and negative effects of interpretation. For our enterprises whether to choose dual ownership structure listed overseas to make reference. Return to the national conditions, in the mixed reform of state-owned enterprises, especially related to national security, social and livelihood of the key areas of enterprises. In view of the problem of how to maintain the necessary control to achieve the policy goal while the state-owned capital is gradually reducing, the thinking is changed from the design of dual ownership structure. Giving the state-owned capital the super voting rights similar to the dual ownership structure in the shareholders' general meeting, so that the state-owned capital can still retain control over the enterprises in the direction of development, policy objectives and so on. To ensure the realization of the policy goals of state-owned enterprises; At the level of board of directors, let private capital and management participate more, control the daily operation and management of enterprises, inject fresh vitality for enterprises, improve the efficiency of enterprises, and then achieve win-win. Four aspects of legal system, corporate governance and scope of application carefully analyze the feasibility of dual ownership structure in the mixed reform of state-owned enterprises, although the general direction of the idea of dual ownership structure is feasible. However, under the circumstances of China's current legal system and capital structure, the introduction of dual equity structure should be treated with more caution.
【学位授予单位】：浙江工商大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：F724.6;F832.51;F276.1;F271

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