协调博弈视角下的中日韩自贸区谈判问题研究

发布时间：2018-03-21 03:30

本文选题：中日韩自贸区谈判　切入点：协调博弈　出处：《吉林大学》2015年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：2012年11月20日，中日韩三国经贸部长于东亚领导人系列会议期间举行会晤，宣布正式启动三国自贸区谈判。在中日、韩日政治关系陷入僵局的背景下，三国自贸区谈判的正式启动具有重大战略意义，也令各界对谈判进程的推进十分期待。然而，进入到具体协议谈判阶段的中日韩自贸区建设并不顺利。长期以来，政治关系并不稳定的中日韩三国在彼此间合作问题上一直坚持“政经分离，以经促政”的外交逻辑，但这种具有惯性的合作逻辑在自贸区谈判进程始终难以推进的现实面前陷入了严重的解释困境。由此产生了关于中日韩自贸区谈判的两个相互联系的重要问题：第一，为什么中日韩自贸区谈判能够在严峻的政治环境下如期启动，但进入具体谈判阶段却难以取得实质性成果？第二，未来中日韩自贸区谈判的核心问题及谈判推进的可能路径分别是什么？从而，本文以协调博弈模型为分析框架，，结合国际关系中绝对获益和相对获益的理论，把握中日韩自贸区谈判的博弈逻辑，试图解释三国在自贸区谈判的两个不同阶段表现出不同态度、做出不同战略选择的原因，探讨推动三国自贸区谈判的可能路径。除绪论和结论外，正文共分为四个部分：第一部分，协调博弈模型特点与中日韩自贸区谈判的博弈逻辑。存在多个对于整体而言最优的纳什均衡结果，参与博弈的各行为主体对这些结果有不同的偏好，但合作的结果总要好于背叛，这是协调博弈的突出特点。由内生性动力和外部压力共同塑造的合作性预期和因产业结构差异造成的收益分配问题二者并存，构成中日韩自贸区谈判的协调博弈逻辑。基于此，中日韩自贸区谈判可以被高度抽象为一种协调博弈。第二部分，协调博弈中的绝对获益与相对获益问题。在协调博弈中，参与博弈的行为主体既面临绝对获益问题，也面临相对获益问题。对绝对获益的关注是合作出现的基础，对收益分配的关注程度则是合作能否实现的关键。参与博弈的行为主体对收益分配的关注程度并不是先验的，它受事务领域、行为体数量、国家间实力对比关系和国家间政治关系等因素的影响。第三部分，中日韩自贸区谈判的协调博弈分析。运用协调博弈模型分析，可以看到，在中日韩自贸区启动阶段，三国主要关注绝对获益的问题，因此，建立自贸区是三方共赢的最优战略。然而，进入到具体协议谈判阶段，三国对相对获益的关注成为重点，日本与中、韩两国政治关系的恶化加强了三国对相对获益的关注，使自贸区谈判难以推进。第四部分，推动中日韩自贸区谈判的可能路径。在理论上，计算合作性博弈均衡解，提供强制性领导或塑造非强制性领导力量都是解决协调博弈条件下收益分配问题的方案。但对中日韩自贸区谈判这一特定问题而言，非强制性的领导均衡是可能的路径。中日韩三国可以通过以非强制性领导力量拟定谈判议程、塑造共同利益认同的方式推动三国自贸区谈判进程。
[Abstract]:In November 20, 2012, Japan and South Korea economic and trade ministers meeting in East Asian leaders during the meeting, announced the official launch of the FTA negotiation. In Japan, South Korea and Japan political relations under the background, it is of great strategic significance to formally start the FTA negotiations, to promote the negotiation process from all walks of life to look forward to. However, to the construction of CJK FTA the specific stage of negotiations is not smooth. For a long time, the political relationship is not stable trilateral cooperation with each other on the issue has been adhering to the "political and economic separation, in order to promote governance through diplomatic logic", before the logic of cooperation with inertia but this has always been difficult to advance in the FTA negotiation process into reality to explain serious difficulties.
The resulting two interrelated negotiations on important issues: first, why Japan and South Korea FTA to Japan and South Korea FTA negotiations on schedule to start in the severe political environment, but in the specific stage of negotiations is difficult to achieve substantive results? Second, what is likely the future path of core issue in Japan and South Korea FTA negotiations and negotiations to promote respectively. Thus, the coordination? Game model as the analytical framework, combined with the absolute benefit in international relations and the relative benefit theory, game logic grasp of Japan and South Korea FTA negotiations, trying to explain the three in two different stages of the negotiations showed a different attitude, make strategic choice for different reasons, to explore the possible path to promote the FTA negotiation. In addition to the introduction and conclusion, the text is divided into four parts:
The first part of the game logic coordination game model and characteristics of Japan and South Korea FTA negotiations. There are many for the overall optimal Nash equilibrium, the subjects involved in the game have different preferences for these results, but the result of cooperation is better than total betrayal, this is a prominent feature of the game. Coordination molded by endogenous motivation and the external pressure of expectations and cooperation due to differences in industrial structure of the income distribution of the two co-exist, constitute the logic of coordination game to Japan and South Korea FTA negotiations. Based on this, Japan and South Korea FTA negotiations can be abstracted as a coordination game.
The second part, the coordination of absolute benefit and relative advantage in the game. In the coordination game, actors involved in the game are both absolute benefit, is also facing the problem of absolute benefit relative benefit. Attention is the basis for cooperation, the degree of concern on the distribution of income is the key to the realization of cooperation behavior participation. Game on the income distribution of the degree of concern is not a priori, it is affected by affairs, behavior body quantity, influence of national strength and national political relations and other factors.
The third part, coordination game analysis of Japan and South Korea FTA negotiations. By analysis, the coordination game model can be seen, launched in Japan and South Korea FTA, three main concern of absolute benefit, therefore, the establishment of a free trade area is the best strategy to win three. However, in the specific stage of the negotiation, the relative benefit has become the focus of attention and in Japan, South Korea, the deterioration of political relations between the two countries to strengthen the three on the relative benefit of attention, make the FTA negotiations difficult to advance.
The fourth part, may promote the path of Japan and South Korea FTA negotiations. In theory, calculation of cooperative game equilibrium solutions, provide mandatory leadership or leadership are shaping the non mandatory coordination game under the condition of income distribution problem. But the specific problem of Japan and South Korea FTA negotiations, leading the equilibrium non mandatory is possible path Japan and South Korea. By non mandatory leadership development agenda, shaping the common interests of the identity of the three countries to promote FTA negotiation process.

【学位授予单位】：吉林大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2015
【分类号】：F752.7

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