产品信息不对称下的B2C平台经营模式及激励机制研究

发布时间：2018-04-17 14:11

本文选题：信息不对称 + 平台运营　；参考：《武汉大学》2017年硕士论文

【摘要】：随着互联网时代的开始,越来越多的交易活动发生在线上,为交易提供便利的互联网平台成为了交易各方进行线上交易的载体。对比过往,在互联网尚未如此普及之前,日常购物、生活缴费等活动以线下面对面交易为主,但是随着时代的带来的转变,很多传统的线下支付活动逐渐转到线上交易。类似于天猫、京东等B2C模式(商家对个人)平台渐渐地成为了商家与用户交易的重要方式。伴随着线上交易的规模越来越大,B2C模式的比例逐步扩大,网购也从早期的单一价格优势逐渐转变为价格与品质并重。随着消费者购买力的提升,对于产品质量的关注也较之以前有了明显的增加。一方面,平台提供的外部性使得参与其中的用户受到其他用户规模的影响,另一方面,规模的扩大化也加剧了可能出现的信息不对称问题。文章主要想研究网络环境下的平台运营商,面对存在产品信息不对称情况下的经营模式选择以及针对不同的经营模式所采取的激励措施。因为产品质量信息不对称问题的存在,平台运营商在实际的经营中会面临着中面临着经营模式选择。同时,在平台运营商选择不同模式时,针对其决策主体以及决策的变量有所不同,需要针对性的对不同情况下的卖家(同时也是产品供应商)进行激励。本文主要相通过考虑平台中进行销售的产品存在质量信息不对称问题,来分析平台运营商选择不同经营模式时的激励策略。希望通过对比平台运营商选择不同经营模式的差异与联系,分析出当平台运营商选择平台型经营模式时,产品供应商拥有产品质量信息同时对其营销努力程度无法进行监督的前提下,平台运营商所需要进行的激励策略选择。同时,分析出当平台运营商选择自营型经营模式时,面对产品供应商掌握完全的质量信息时,需要对其供应不同质量水平的产品进行一定的激励措施,从而使得其告知自己关于产品的真实信息,从而达到平台利润最大化的目的。本文从这一逻辑出发,文章主要得出平台运营商需要面临信息不对称条件下的经营模式选择,在产品质量信息、规模系数、定价等信息已知的条件下,高质量产品所占比例及平台监督成本不同对于平台运营商的模式选择存在影响,同时也会影响其相应的最优激励策略选择。主要结论如下:(1)在平台型运营模式的最优契约下,不同质量水平的供应商会根据自身产品质量选择对应的契约,并根据产品质量展开合理的营销活动,同时平台运营商也可以达到其利润最大化。对不同类的产品质量水平分析,可以得出对于高质量产品的卖家而言,低质量产品的质量对于平台运营商与其制定的最优契约没有关联,对于其分配系数没有任何影响。(2)在自营型运营模式的最优契约下,不同质量水平的供应商会根据自身产品质量告知平台运营商自身信息,平台运营商然后根据其汇报的产品质量展开营销活动,最终达到利润最大化的目的。对于高质量产品供应商而言,自身质量水平越高则收益会随之增加,同时低质量产品的水平增加,会使得高质量供应商的收益受损。(3)当平台运营商面临两种经营模式选择时,通过数值模拟分析出当平台监督成本系数一定的前提下,随着市场中高质量产品的比例增加,平台运营商选择自营模式下的收益会逐渐增加。当市场中高质量产品的比例超过一定值时,平台运营商会转向选择自营性经营模式,并且会随着高质量产品占比升高而收益之差进一步拉大。
[Abstract]:With the coming of Internet era, more and more transactions occur online, provide convenient Internet platform become the carrier of the parties for online transactions for transactions. Compared to the past, before the Internet, has not been so popular in daily shopping, payment and other life activities in line face transactions, but with the changes brought about and many of the traditional offline payment activities gradually go to the online transaction. Similar to Tmall, the Jingdong B2C (business to individual) platform gradually become an important way for businesses and users with online trading transactions. With the increasing scale, the proportion of B2C mode is gradually expanding, online shopping also from the early single price advantage gradually into both the price and quality. With the enhancement of consumer purchasing power, the product quality is concerned than before there is an obvious increase. On the one hand, the platform The externality provides the participating users affected by other users, on the other hand, the scale of expansion also exacerbated the problem of asymmetric information may appear. This paper want to study under the environment of network platform operators, faced with the choice of operation pattern of products under the condition of asymmetric information and to take different management model of incentive measures. Because of the information asymmetry problem of product quality, platform operators will face facing the choice of operation mode in the actual operation. At the same time, the platform operators choose different mode, the main decision-making and decision variables are different, need to be targeted to different situations the seller (and suppliers) incentives. This paper is considering to sell the product quality problems of asymmetric information platform, to The choice of operation mode of incentive strategy of different platform operators. Hope to choose the difference and contact of different operating modes by comparing the platform operators, analysis of the platform operators choose the platform business model, product suppliers have the premise of product quality information and the marketing effort to supervision under the platform operators the need to choose the incentive strategy. At the same time, analysis of the platform operators choose self management model, product suppliers face master quality of complete information, the need for the supply of different quality level of products for certain incentives, which makes the real information to inform themselves about the product, so as to achieve the maximum profit of the platform the purpose of this paper. From this logic, this article draws the platform operators need to face under the condition of asymmetric information management mode In the choice of product quality information, scale coefficient, pricing information is known under the condition of high quality products and the proportion of the cost of supervision platform for different platform operator mode selection effect will also affect the choice of their corresponding optimal incentive strategies. The following conclusions: (1) in the optimal contract type platform the operation mode under different quality level of suppliers according to its product quality is selected according to the contract, and the reasonable marketing activities according to the quality of the products, and platform operators can achieve the maximum profit. The analysis of product quality level of different types, can obtain high-quality products for the sellers, the quality of low quality the product is not associated to the optimal contract platform operators and develop, for without any influence. The distribution coefficient (2) in the optimal contract of self operation mode under different The quality level of the supplier will inform the operator's own information platform according to their product quality, platform operators and then according to the report of product quality marketing activities, and ultimately achieve the purpose of maximizing profits. For high quality product suppliers, the quality level of their higher income will increase, while the low quality level of the products increased the high quality supplier income damaged. (3) when facing platform operators two management mode selection, through numerical simulation and analysis of the premise of supervision platform cost coefficient is certain, with the high quality products in the market increased, platform operators choose self mode when the income will gradually increase. High quality products in the market more than a certain value, the platform operators to choose self management mode, and with high quality products accounted for increased income The difference between the benefit and the benefit is further enlarged.

【学位授予单位】：武汉大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：F724.6;F274

【参考文献】