电子废弃物回收商经营策略的演化博弈研究

发布时间：2018-05-20 15:19

本文选题：电子废弃物 + 技术创新　；参考：《杭州电子科技大学》2015年硕士论文

【摘要】：随着电子产品普及率的提升，电子废弃物数量也不断增长。然而，我国尚未形成有一套完善有效的电子废弃物回收利用系统，正规回收处理渠道在回收价格、处理成本及政策持续性等方面缺乏优势，大部分电子废物流入非正规回收处理渠道。本文针对正规渠道回收量不足的现状，对正规回收渠道的激励及非正规回收渠道的约束机制展开研究。首先，构建了政府和非正规回收商策略的演化博弈模型，对于非正规回收商而言，有“转型”和“不转型”两种策略，对于政府而言，有“管制”和“不管制”两种策略。通过对博弈的演化稳定性分析得知：在市场机制下，追求短期利润最大化的非正规回收商会采取“不转型”的策略。在政府管制下，政府和回收商采取混合策略的演化呈现周期性特征，且回收商策略的选择取决于政府采取“管制”策略概率的大小。其次，为了探索回收商竞争优势的获取途径，本文构建了两回收商群体之间的演化博弈模型。分析回收商群体采取不同经营模式下的演化稳定趋势，结果表明：从竞争博弈角度而言，回收商采取引进技术创新的经营模式有利于提高所有回收商群体的回收价、回收量和回收利润，而技术创新领导者竞争优势的获取取决于创新溢出率的大小。从演化博弈角度而言，当创新溢出率较小时，市场上的有限理性的回收商群体都会选择技术创新的企业经营模型。当技术创新溢出率较大时，回收商群体经营模式的选择取决于政府补贴力度的大小。在此基础上，本文采用数值仿真的方法，，进一步探索了技术创新效率、创新溢出率、回收竞争系数、政府补贴力度等参数对群体演化结果的影响。仿真结果表明：减少创新溢出率、增加政府补贴力度及保持适当的回收竞争都有利于提高演化稳定状态下采取技术创新经营模式的回收商群体比例。最后，为了促进回收商往规模化方向发展，采用三阶段博弈的方法，建立了政府和不同规模回收商的博弈模型，用逆向归纳法求出三阶段博弈的均衡结果，确定了政府的最优补贴率。研究表明，在回收商扩大规模过程中政府补贴有效降低了行业门槛，激发了回收商的积极性，促使更多的小型回收企业转变为无害化处理的大型规模企业，进而有效的减少了电子废弃物处理过程中的环境污染问题。
[Abstract]:With the popularization of electronic products, the number of electronic wastes is also increasing. However, China has not yet formed a set of perfect and effective electronic waste recycling system, and the formal recycling channels lack advantages in the aspects of recovery price, treatment cost and policy sustainability, etc. Most e-waste flows into informal recycling channels. In this paper, the incentive mechanism of the formal recovery channel and the restraint mechanism of the informal recovery channel are studied according to the current situation of the lack of recovery in the formal channel. Firstly, the evolutionary game model of government and informal recycler strategy is constructed. For informal recycler, there are two strategies: "transformation" and "no transformation", and for government, there are two strategies: "control" and "no regulation". Through the analysis of the evolutionary stability of the game, it is concluded that under the market mechanism, the informal recyclers pursuing the maximization of short-term profits adopt the strategy of "no transformation". Under government control, the evolution of mixed strategy between government and recycler is cyclical, and the choice of recycler strategy depends on the probability of government adopting "control" strategy. Secondly, in order to explore the way to obtain the competitive advantage of the recyclers, this paper constructs an evolutionary game model between the two groups of recyclers. This paper analyzes the evolution and stability of the recycler group under different business models. The results show that from the point of view of competitive game, the recycler adopts the business model of introducing technology innovation to increase the recovery price of all the recyclers. Payback and profit recovery, and technological innovation leader's competitive advantage depends on innovation spillover rate. From the point of view of evolutionary game, when the innovation spillover rate is small, the limited rational recycler group in the market will choose the enterprise management model of technological innovation. When the spillover rate of technological innovation is large, the choice of business model of recycler group depends on the degree of government subsidy. On this basis, the paper further explores the effects of technological innovation efficiency, innovation spillover rate, recovery competition coefficient, government subsidy and other parameters on the results of population evolution by using the method of numerical simulation. The simulation results show that reducing innovation spillover rate, increasing government subsidies and maintaining appropriate recycling competition are all beneficial to the proportion of recyclers adopting technological innovation business model in evolutionary and stable state. Finally, in order to promote the scale development of the recycler, the game model of the government and the recycler of different scale is established by using the three-stage game method, and the equilibrium result of the three-stage game is obtained by the reverse induction method. The government's optimal subsidy rate is determined. The research shows that government subsidies effectively lower the industry threshold, stimulate the enthusiasm of recyclers, and promote more small recycling enterprises to transform into large scale enterprises with harmless treatment in the process of expanding the scale of recyclers. And then effectively reduce the problem of environmental pollution in the process of electronic waste disposal.
【学位授予单位】：杭州电子科技大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2015
【分类号】：F713.2;F224.32

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