利益集团对日本TPP政策的影响分析
本文选题:日本利益集团 + TPP ; 参考:《山东财经大学》2015年硕士论文
【摘要】:TPP(Trans Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership)全称跨太平洋战略经济伙伴协议,2008年,美国为了实现“重返亚太”的战略目标,宣布加入TPP谈判。美国一直鼓动日本加入,而日本政府也希望通过加入TPP改善国内经济萎靡的现状。然而,2010年菅直人表达了希望加入TPP战略的想法时,在日本国内引起了一片哗然,反对的声音此起彼伏,使得政府的TPP政策迟迟无法推进。利益集团是日本政治生活中不可或缺的组成部分,在政治活动中占据着举足轻重的地位,政府贸易政策的制定和实施在很大程度上要受到国内利益集团的影响。通过观察发现,日本TPP政策进展缓慢的原因主要是利益集团对TPP政策的不同偏好导致的,工商业利益集团希望推进TPP政策,而农业利益集团持坚决的反对态度。本文在梳理和总结影响日本贸易政策的利益集团的种类、作用、影响渠道的前提下,以Grossman和Helpman的“保护待售”模型为理论基础,对利益集团影响TPP政策的行为机制进行了详细分析,最后,在加入TPP的条件上,运用博弈矩阵探讨了利益集团的政策选择。以经团联和农协为利益集团的代表,通过行为机制分析发现,在院外游说行为上,经团联和农协基本上能实现博弈均衡,所以还需要在组织宣传和结盟能力上进一步探讨。组织宣传行为方面,农协在利用媒体工具和国民互动的能力上更胜一筹,经团联虽然也通过舆论宣传影响TPP政策,但忽略了与国民的沟通。集团结盟能力方面,农协由于强大的凝聚力,产生的分歧较小,更容易在TPP政策上达成统一意见。由于TPP还会触及到除农业以外的其他利益集团的利益,所以,在外部竞争上,与经团联相比,农协更容易与其他利益集团形成同盟,共同抵制TPP政策。而在政策选择方面,政府的TPP政策也会向农业的利益倾斜,主要表现在对外争取农产品的例外保护,对内增加对农业的补贴。日本利益集团对TPP政策的影响为中国未来的TPP之路提供了一个很好的借鉴。国内的利益集团在影响贸易政策实施的过程中应加强理论研究,多关注其他利益集团的政策动向,同时要加强利益集团间的沟通交流。最后,与议会、行政机构和普通民众保持良好的关系,争取在竞争中取胜。
[Abstract]:The TPP(Trans Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership) is fully known as the Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership Agreement. In 2008, the United States announced its accession to the TPP negotiations in order to achieve its strategic goal of "returning to the Asia-Pacific region." The United States has been urging Japan to join, and the Japanese government wants to improve the country's flagging economy by joining the TPP. However, when Naoto Kan expressed his wish to join the TPP strategy in 2010, it caused an uproar and opposition in Japan, making the government's TPP policy slow to move forward. Interest group is an indispensable part of Japanese political life and plays an important role in political activities. To a great extent, the formulation and implementation of government trade policy will be influenced by domestic interest groups. It is found that the slow progress of TPP policy in Japan is mainly due to the different preferences of interest groups on TPP policy. Industrial and commercial interest groups want to promote the TPP policy, while agricultural interest groups hold firm opposition. On the premise of combing and summing up the types, functions and influence channels of interest groups that influence Japan's trade policy, this paper takes the "protect for sale" model of Grossman and Helpman as the theoretical basis. The behavior mechanism of interest group influencing TPP policy is analyzed in detail. Finally, on the condition of joining TPP, the policy choice of interest group is discussed by using game matrix. Through the analysis of the behavior mechanism, it is found that in the lobbying behavior outside the hospital, the league federation and the peasant association can basically realize the game equilibrium, so it is necessary to further discuss the ability of organizing propaganda and alliance. In the aspect of organizing propaganda behavior, the Association of Agriculture is superior in the ability of using media tools and national interaction. Although the League also influences the TPP policy through public opinion, it neglects the communication with the people. In terms of alliance ability, the farmers' association is less divided because of its strong cohesion, making it easier to agree on TPP policy. Since the TPP also touches the interests of other interest groups other than agriculture, it is easier for them to form alliances with other interest groups and resist the TPP policy in external competition. In terms of policy choice, the government's TPP policy will also be inclined to the interests of agriculture, mainly in foreign countries to fight for the exception of agricultural protection, to increase domestic subsidies to agriculture. The influence of Japanese interest groups on TPP policy provides a good reference for China's future TPP. In the process of affecting the implementation of trade policies, domestic interest groups should strengthen theoretical research, pay more attention to the policy trends of other interest groups, and strengthen communication and exchange among interest groups. Finally, maintain good relations with Parliament, the executive and the general public in order to win the competition.
【学位授予单位】:山东财经大学
【学位级别】:硕士
【学位授予年份】:2015
【分类号】:F753.13
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