互联网金融个人信用信息共享机制研究

发布时间：2018-07-09 22:43

本文选题：个人征信 + 互联网金融　；参考：《北方工业大学》2017年硕士论文

【摘要】：近年来,互联网金融蓬勃发展,一方面填补了我国线下传统金融的短板,推动了小微金融的发展,但另一方面其产生的诸多信用风险问题不容忽视。建立完善的个人征信体系已成为互联网金融可持续发展的迫切要求。本文首先分析了中国互联网金融个人信用体系的发展情况,通过分析发现,我国个人征信存在信用评价有效性低、合作面窄、风控成本高、多平台重复借款等问题。据此提出了"信用信息共享是构建我国互联网个人征信体系的关键"的观点。其次,本文分析了国外成熟的个人信用信息共享机制。主要包括以美国为代表的私营模式下的信用信息共享机制、以欧洲为代表的公共模式下的信用信息共享机制以及以日本为代表的会员制模式下的信息共享机制,为我国的个人信用信息共享机制的建设提供参考经验。再次,本文以动态演化博弈理论为基础,对企业间个人信用信息共享实现条件进行了分析:一是从动态演化博弈理论出发阐述了选择此理论的合理性和可行性;二是对模型进行了基本假设,选择影响信用信息共享结果的相关因素,并作为模型变量;三是建立了同质征信企业之间博弈与异质征信企业之间博弈两种情况下的动态演化博弈模型,通过求解参与博弈企业的复制动态方程来分析不同情况下企业的稳定均衡策略。最后,本文根据结论中的限制条件对选定的参数进行赋值,并且设定强势企业与弱势企业选择共享策略的初始比例,采用数值模拟的方法对理论结论进行了仿真,结果趋势图表明理论结果成立。本文研究表明,个人征信企业是否选择共享策略与企业信息共享的成本、信息转化为收益的能力、因共享而造成的竞争力损失、双方均共享所获收益与只有一方共享信息时所获收益的差额有关。基于此,本文提出了构建互联网金融个人信用信息共享机制的相关政策建议。
[Abstract]:In recent years, Internet finance has developed rapidly. On the one hand, it has filled the short board of traditional finance under the line of our country, promoted the development of micro-finance, but on the other hand, many credit risk problems can not be ignored. The establishment of a sound personal credit system has become an urgent requirement for the sustainable development of Internet finance. This paper first analyzes the development of personal credit system of Internet finance in China, and finds that there are some problems such as low validity of credit evaluation, narrow scope of cooperation, high cost of wind control and repeated borrowing on multiple platforms in China. Based on this, this paper puts forward the view that the sharing of credit information is the key to the construction of personal credit system of Internet in China. Secondly, this paper analyzes the mature personal credit information sharing mechanism abroad. It mainly includes the credit information sharing mechanism under the private mode represented by the United States, the credit information sharing mechanism under the public mode represented by Europe, and the information sharing mechanism under the membership model represented by Japan. It provides reference experience for the construction of personal credit information sharing mechanism in China. Thirdly, based on the dynamic evolution game theory, this paper analyzes the realization conditions of personal credit information sharing among enterprises: firstly, the rationality and feasibility of choosing this theory are expounded from the dynamic evolution game theory; Secondly, the basic assumptions of the model are made, and the relevant factors that affect the results of credit information sharing are selected as the model variables. Thirdly, the dynamic evolution game model between homogeneous credit enterprises and heterogeneous credit enterprises is established, and the stable equilibrium strategy of enterprises under different conditions is analyzed by solving the replicating dynamic equations of participating enterprises. Finally, according to the limitation conditions in the conclusion, this paper assigns the selected parameters, and sets the initial proportion of the choice of the sharing strategy between the strong and the weak enterprises, and simulates the theoretical conclusions by numerical simulation method. The results show that the theoretical results are valid. The research shows that whether the individual credit investigation enterprise chooses the cost of sharing strategy and enterprise information sharing, the ability of transforming information into revenue, and the loss of competitiveness caused by sharing. Both parties share the proceeds in relation to the difference between the gains obtained when only one party shares the information. Based on this, this paper puts forward the relevant policy recommendations on the construction of Internet financial personal credit information sharing mechanism.
【学位授予单位】：北方工业大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：F832.4;F724.6

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