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博弈论视角下我国价格听证利益相关者研究

发布时间:2018-10-18 17:21
【摘要】:随着市场经济的发展,社会民主化进程不断加深,这对政府部门制定公共事业价格的形式提出了新的要求。为了顺应这种变化,上世纪90年代末,我国在政府价格决策方面出台了价格听证制度,吸收价格听证会上相关利益方的意见。价格听证会逐步成为公共部门价格决策的重要环节,这在一定程度上提高了公共产品和公共服务价格制定的公开性和透明性。但我国的价格听证实践仍然存在着各种弊端,遭到社会各界的质疑。一方面,相关法律对于价格听证的规定比较概括,使得其中各利益相关者的权利义务得不到实施,致使政府、经营者、消费者三大利益主体结构中消费者处于弱势地位。另一方面,听证会中消费者的弱势地位导致听证会“逢听必涨”、“听证专业户”、“信息不对等”等乱象丛生,严重削弱了公共价格制定的群众基础和公信力。因此,进一步优化价格听证制度,完善价格听证程序,对推动我国价格决策科学化具有重要意义。 文章在借鉴国内外有关价格听证研究的基础上,从博弈论的视角,深入剖析我国价格听证制度中的政府部门、经营者和消费者这三大主要利益相关者结构,构建博弈模型。同时结合北京市公共交通价格调整听证案例,揭示我国现实价格听证中三大主要利益相关群体之间博弈力量不均衡现象,并分析造成这种困境的原因。最后,以平衡博弈三方力量为准则,从改善政府管理角度,分别提出完善制度规范、保证信息安全和建立群众基础等建议,以期完善我国价格听证制度,加快公民参与社会管理的步伐。主要研究成果包括:(1)总结出目前我国价格听证制度所存在的具体问题。在各利益者地位设置上存在天然失衡现象,法律中价格听证参与人的界定和产生方式缺失明确规定,价格听证参与人的进入权掌握在政府部门手中;(2)运用博弈论的方法,构建了政府部门、经营者和消费者两两博弈关系,据此来了解价格听证过程中主要局中人是如何进行博弈,并影响价格听证结果的;(3)指出价格听证主要利益相关者之间博弈存在着局中人地位不平等、力量不均衡、效力不一致等困境,并认为法律制度缺失、民主意识淡薄、政企关系不清以及主体经济人的特性等都是导致这一困境出现的原因,从而提出对应的解决途径。
[Abstract]:With the development of market economy, the process of social democratization is deepening. In order to adapt to this kind of change, in the late 1990s, our country introduced the price hearing system in the government price decision, absorbing the views of the relevant stakeholders in the price hearing. Price hearings gradually become an important part of public sector price decision-making, which to some extent improves the openness and transparency of public goods and public service pricing. However, the practice of price hearing in our country still has a variety of drawbacks, which has been questioned by all walks of life. On the one hand, the provisions of the relevant laws on price hearing are more general, which makes the rights and obligations of the stakeholders can not be implemented, resulting in the government, operators, consumers in the three main interests of the consumer in a weak position. On the other hand, the weak position of consumers in the hearings leads to the chaos of hearing "every hearing," hearing professional households "," unequal information ", and so on, which seriously weakens the public basis and credibility of public price formulation. Therefore, it is of great significance to further optimize the price hearing system and perfect the price hearing procedure to promote the scientific price decision in our country. Based on the research of price hearing at home and abroad and from the perspective of game theory, this paper deeply analyzes the structure of the three main stakeholders in the price hearing system of our country, namely the government department, the operator and the consumer, and constructs the game model. At the same time, combining with the case of public transport price adjustment hearing in Beijing, this paper reveals the imbalance of game power among the three major interest groups in the real price hearing in China, and analyzes the reasons for this dilemma. Finally, in order to perfect the price hearing system of our country, we take the balanced game as the criterion, from the angle of improving the government management, put forward the suggestion of perfecting the system norm, guaranteeing the information security and establishing the mass base, etc., in order to perfect the price hearing system of our country. Speed up the pace of citizen participation in social management. The main research results are as follows: (1) the concrete problems existing in the price hearing system in China are summarized. There is a natural imbalance in the establishment of the status of the stakeholders. It is clearly stipulated in the law that the definition and the mode of production of the participants in the price hearing are in the hands of the government; (2) the method of game theory is used. The game relationship among government departments, operators and consumers is constructed to understand how the main players in the price hearing process play games and affect the results of the price hearings. (3) pointing out that the main stakeholders of price hearing have the dilemma of unequal status, unbalanced power, inconsistent effectiveness and so on, and holding that the legal system is lacking and the democratic consciousness is weak. The unclear relationship between the government and the enterprise and the characteristics of the principal economic man are the causes of this dilemma, and the corresponding solutions are put forward.
【学位授予单位】:中国科学技术大学
【学位级别】:硕士
【学位授予年份】:2015
【分类号】:F726

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