第三方支付平台的进入策略与中国银联的反竞争行为

发布时间：2018-11-24 10:09

【摘要】：第三方支付技术与功能的不断创新使第三方支付在支付市场中的角色已经发生了改变,从最初的互联网信用中介平台及互联网资金独立清算平台的地位转变成为了在线下实体场景支付市场中的独立清算平台,其所引领的更方便快捷的新型支付方式已经使支付市场中线上支付与线下支付的界限越来越模糊,对传统的支付方式尤其是刷卡支付有着巨大的冲击。同时第三方支付的新型支付方式在实体场景支付市场中已经实现了收付款人之间的清算不通过中国银联清算网络的独立清算支付功能,可见已经进入支付市场的第三方支付平台严重威胁到了中国银联的利益与市场地位。本文选取第三方支付平台为研究对象,将第三方支付平台作为在支付市场中收款人和付款人这两边用户提供资金结算服务的平台厂商,第三方支付平台的两边用户为支付市场中的付款人和收款人即消费者和商户,在双边市场理论的基础之上来建立模型探讨平台厂商进入市场的进入策略,更进一步的对第三方支付平台进入支付市场的进入策略进行例证与分析,包括第三方支付平台进入POS收单支付市场的策略分析以及中国银联做出的反竞争行为之后第三方支付平台绕过银联清算网络进入实体场景无刷卡行为的独立清算支付市场的策略分析。通过模型我们得出,第三方支付平台在进入POS收单市场初期会利用在互联网支付市场中的利润作为在该市场的补贴来对商户采取收取低价费用的策略来获得用户数量基础。在银联对第三方支付平台设置强大的行政壁垒之后,第三方支付平台在进入实体场景无刷卡行为的独立清算支付市场中充分应用了提高创新支付技术对消费者实行低价、免费或补贴政策来培养用户支付习惯进而扩大用户数量的策略,该策略能够使平台厂商大量迅速的吸引交叉网络外部性较大的一边用户的数量,进而获取更多用户数量和市场地位。网络基础设施的构建与创新技术的提高和补贴消费者培养其支付习惯进而获得大量用户基础是使第三方支付绕过进入壁垒成功进入到实体场景的独立清算支付市场中关键策略。中国银联作为我国支付市场中唯一的清算组织,自成立以来就在支付市场占据着无可替代的重要市场地位。但是从最初不包括银联商务的第三方支付进入收单市场时与银联旗下的银联商务进行收单环节的竞争,到近年来第三方支付平台进入到买卖交易是基于实体场景无刷卡行为的新型独立清算的支付市场,第三方支付已经实现不通过银联清算网络的独立清算支付功能,试图架空与取代中国银联。中国银联为了保证自身利益不受损失,针对第三方支付的进入采取了一些反竞争行为,包括限制竞争的排他行为以及利用滥用市场支配地位等不当的反竞争行为,对我国支付市场有着不良的影响。本文对中国银联针对第三方支付的具体反竞争行为进行了分析,并得出银联的反竞争行为力度及垄断程度在长期和短期中都对收单市场费率产生正向影响。在文章的最后提出了对中国银联的规制建议以及对我国支付市场和第三方支付平台良好发展的政策建议。
[Abstract]:The continuous innovation of the third-party payment technology and function has changed the role of the third party in the payment market, the status transition from the original internet credit intermediary platform and the internet capital independent clearing platform has become an independent clearing platform in the online entity scene payment market, The more convenient and convenient new payment method led by the payment method has made the limit of the payment and the offline payment on the middle line of the payment market to be more and more blurred, and has a great impact on the traditional payment method, in particular the card-swiping payment. meanwhile, the new payment method of the third-party payment has realized that the settlement between the drawee and the payer is not through the independent clearing and payment function of the China UnionPay clearing network in the real-scene payment market, It can be seen that the third-party payment platform that has entered the payment market seriously threatens the interests and market position of China UnionPay. the third-party payment platform is selected as the research object, and the third-party payment platform is used as a platform manufacturer for providing fund settlement services to the users on both sides of the payee and the payer in the payment market, the users of both sides of the third-party payment platform are the payers and the payees in the payment market, namely, the consumers and the merchants, and on the basis of the theory of the bilateral market, a model is established to explore the entry strategy of the platform manufacturers to enter the market, and further example and analysis of the entry strategy of the third-party payment platform into the payment market, comprises the strategy analysis of the third-party payment platform to enter the POS receiving and receiving payment market and the strategy analysis of the independent clearing and payment market after the third-party payment platform bypasses the UnionPay clearing network and enters the entity scene without the card swiping behavior after the anti-competitive behavior of the China UnionPay. Through the model we can conclude that the third-party payment platform will use the profit in the Internet payment market as a subsidy in the Internet to obtain the base of the number of users on the basis of the policy of charging low-price charge to the merchant in the initial period of entering the POS receiving order market. after the UnionPay has strong administrative barriers to the third-party payment platform, the third-party payment platform fully applies the innovative payment technology to the consumer to implement the low-price, The strategy of free or subsidized policy to cultivate the user's payment habit and further expand the number of users, which can make the platform manufacturers attract the large number of users with large externalities of the cross network, and then obtain more users and market position. The construction of the network infrastructure and the improvement of the innovation technology and the subsidy of the consumer to train their payment habits and then obtain a large number of user bases are the key strategies in the independent liquidation payment market that the third party pays to bypass the entry barrier to successfully enter the entity scene. China UnionPay is the only clearing organization in China's payment market. Since its establishment, China UnionPay has the irreplaceable important market position in the payment market. but the third-party payment platform originally does not include the UnionPay business and the UnionPay business of the UnionPay business are used for the competition of the single link, and in recent years, the third-party payment platform enters into the trading transaction to be a new independent clearing payment market based on the non-card-swiping behavior of the entity scene, The third party payment has realized the independent clearing and payment function not through the UnionPay clearing network, and tries to overhead and replace the China UnionPay. In order to ensure that its own interests are not lost, China UnionPay has taken some anti-competitive actions against third-party payment, including limiting the exclusive behavior of competition and using improper anti-competitive behavior such as the abuse of dominant position of the market, and has a bad influence on the payment market in China. This paper analyzes the specific anti-competitive behavior of China UnionPay for third-party payment, and draws a conclusion that the anti-competitive behavior of UnionPay and the degree of monopoly have a positive effect on the market rate of the single market in both the long-term and the short-term. At the end of the article, the regulation suggestions for China UnionPay and the policy suggestions for the good development of the payment market and the third-party payment platform in China are put forward.
【学位授予单位】：山东大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2016
【分类号】：F832.2;F724.6

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